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Abstract 
This research has first established that it is based on multiple methodologies developed to 
tackle the areas of engineering cargo handling systems, both at port and on-board vessels, 
as well as in the area of organisational self-assessment. It continued in reviewing the 
current status and future aspects of marine safety assessment together with an 
examination of a few major accidents. The major problems identified in marine safety 
assessment in this research are associated with inappropriate treatment of uncertainty in 
data and human error issues during the risk modelling estimation process and the 
calculation of failure probabilities. Following the identification of the research needs, this 
thesis has developed several analytical models for the safety assessment of cargo 
handling systems and organisational assessment structure. Such models can be effectively 
integrated into a risk-based framework using the marine formal safety assessment, safety 
case concepts. 
Bayesian network (BN) and evidential reasoning (ER) approaches applicable to cargo 
handling engineering systems have been proposed for systematically and effectively 
addressing uncertainty due to randomness and vagueness in data respectively. ER test 
cases for both a vessel selection process and a comparison of the safety maturity of 
different organisations in terms of self-assessment have been produced within a domain 
in which main and sub criteria have been developed for assessment reasons along with 
the combination of the proposed model with existing organisational models. BN test case 
for a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) reliquefaction plant has been produced within a 
cause-effect domain in which Bayes' theorem is the focal mechanism of inference 
processing. A methodology aiming in finding the probability of failure when having 
variables ruled by uncertainty is established using certain variable transformation 
methods through the First and Second order reliability methodologies. Form/Sorm 
produces a most likely failure point, which is demonstrated through the application at a 
port cargo handling crane system. The outcomes have the potential to facilitate the 
decision-making process in a risk-based framework. Finally, the results of the research 
are summarised and areas where further research is required to improve the developed 
methodologies are outlined. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General overview 
The need for reliability in engineering systems became very apparent in the Second World 
War. Military equipment, in fields such as weapons, communications and transportation, 
experienced a rapid increase in complexity especially in terms of electronics and control 
systems. The Department of Defense (DOD) in USA realized that the complexity of the 
equipment would continue to increase dramatically. As a result they created the Advisory 
Group on the Reliability of Electronic Equipment (AGREE). A major part of the reliability 
theory development is based on the research made by the DOD [House of Lords, 1992], 
[Wang, 2000]. 
Along with the sectors of environmental and computer technology, safety, risk and reliability 
engineering have also met a significant percentage of development and expansion in the last 
forty years. In the early 1960s safety analyses were empirically based, the term risk analysis 
was totally unknown, and the word reliability was used only in isolated areas of the military 
and aerospace industry. The chemical industry, which was the world's largest industry at that 
time, first started to publish articles concerning reliability after 1966 [Barker & Campbell, 
2000], [Birolini, 1993]. The issues of hazard and risk analysis were brought up from the 
European Union after the occurrence of the Seveso accident in 1976, which prompted the 
adoption of legislation aimed at the prevention and control of such accidents [U. N 96/82/EC, 
1999]. Within the 1980s, offshore industry headed towards qualitative risk analysis in an 
attempt to break down the operational systems of offshore platforms to their respective 
components and conduct a preliminary hazard analysis trying to identify potential dangers. 
An industrial self regulative regime was operating in Norway and UK followed with a safety 
case regime. Risk analysis got towards the beginning of the 90s with the shipping industry 
entering a safety culture following a number of significant accidents which will be mentioned 
in this chapter but further explained in Chapter 2. Reaching the 216` century, risk assessment 
has been formalised and specific guidelines have been presented by International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). 
Quality and reliability of complex engineering systems demanded a number of specific 
activities, from the initial design stage of the project to the operation phase [Villemeur, 
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1992], [Barker, 1990]. This includes the definition of targets, planning and performing 
analysis, selecting the appropriate components and materials, configuration management, 
control of production procedures and processes, aiming in a continuous development of 
reliability and quality during the production process [Birolini, 1993]. All these activities 
should be taken into account and executed correctly from the project's engineers in order to 
achieve the best performance in terms of reliability and quality of the scheduled targets. 
Before the 1960s adequate level of quality was achieved when the item was tested at final 
inspection, and found to be free of defects and failures after it left the manufacturer. 
In the shipping industry the main concern of port designers, port-builders, port operators as 
well as vessel operators and vessel's personnel is the safety of the vessel and the safety of 
near-by installations or other vessels that may exist. A few serious accidents such as the 
sinking of Titanic, the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Exxon Valdez grounding 
and the Esthonia ferry tragedy attracted greater attention to ship safety. There are significant 
consequences when an accident happens, in terms of deaths and injuries, damage to the 
environment and destruction of property. Further studies have been carried out, in order to 
find ways to prevent such unacceptable incidents. This has been reflected in the attention 
given to both the design improvements and to the port's operations conducted by educated 
and trained operators to the highest of industry's standards. The use of formalized procedures 
to estimate risks and to make decisions based on risk estimation has been changing within the 
maritime industry [Wang, 2000]. The risk levels existing in the maritime transportation can 
be initially estimated based on accident statistics. These studies allow the identification of 
time evolution of the levels of safety in global activity, and differentiation of safety in the 
different types of ships as far as size and age are concerned. The adoption of the safety case 
approach in the UK offshore industry has also encouraged marine safety analysis to look at 
the possibility of using similar methods to the wider marine industry [Guedes & Teixeira, 
2001], [Wang, 2000]. 
The issue of a more scientific approach to the subject of ship safety was first highlighted by 
Lord Carver's report on the investigation of the capsize of Herald of Free Enterprise in 1992 
[House of Lords, 1992]. Lord Carver's report recommends that more emphasis should be 
given to the subject of ship safety by focusing on a performance based regulatory method. 
Significant improvements in maritime and specifically vessel's safety could be achieved 
using a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) approach with possible application to ship design 
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and the operation of new technology. After the publication of Lord Carver's report the UK 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) showed serious concerns over the improvement of 
ship safety and in 1993 proposed to the IMO that FSA method should be applied to ship 
design and operation in order to ensure safety and pollution prevention either in ports or in 
the open sea [MSA, 1993]. The IMO followed the MCA's proposal for FSA submission, and 
since then continuing efforts have been made to reach greater safety standards through 
specific methodologies. The FSA methodology adopted from IMO, progresses through the 
completion of five steps [MSA, 1996]. The five steps of FSA are: 
1. The identification of hazards related to a case examined (engineering system or 
operational process). 
2. The assessment of risk(s) associated with the identified hazards. 
3. The control measures that need to be applied so that the assessed risk(s) can be managed. 
4. The cost-benefit assessment of the proposed control measures. 
5. The decisions which eventually lead to the best combination of risk controls in terms of 
cost benefit assessment for reduction of the overall risk factor to an acceptable level. 
In general terms, within the last few years the application of FSA has been significantly 
progressed [Wang, 2002]. This is demonstrated by the successful case studies dealing with 
high speed crafts and bulk carriers, which were analysed and approved by the IMO, 
supporting a risk-based rule-making process [Wang, 2000]. Using FSA as a complete safety 
framework there are a number of advantages that come with it in terms of 
1. It creates a framework which is characterized by consistency and integration in all safety 
aspects examined. 
2. It tries to get the best possible cost saving solution, through careful cost benefit analysis, 
without omitting the essence for performing safety analysis. 
3. It changes the current status of approach from reactiveness to pro-activeness, thus 
enabling the easier identification of hazards that have not given rise to concerns yet. 
4. The confidence of applying the proper risk control measures is increased, therefore 
staying in line with all regulatory requirements. 
S. It gives the freedom to address and point out future developments in high risk areas that 
appear due to the ever-changing nature of marine industry. 
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The above mentioned five advantages, can be utilized in order for a shipping company to 
improve its performance by keeping risk levels as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 
[Wang, 2001]. It is worth mentioning that the only possible disadvantage of FSA is the fact 
that there are areas where methodologies need to be further developed in order to have 
accurate estimation results within an FSA framework 
Safety assessment in ship/port design and operation offers great advantages including: 
1. It ensures the quality and reliability of new vessels and installations like loading docks, 
loading arms and cranes. It measures the performance and the efficiency of operations, 
and based on the performance measurements, improves them. 
2. All experiences gained from field work and all the lessons learned from any incidents that 
have occurred can be incorporated in a safety framework applied to port and ship 
operation. 
3. It helps develop methodologies for estimation and control of possible scenarios that may 
result in undesirable incidents. 
Understandably, there has been some concern over the likely impact of risk-based rule 
making on behalf of ship owners and vessel operators (Wang, 1997]. A change in what is 
considered to be established patterns of operations is never to the liking of many, as it creates 
problems in terms of time management, resources, additional training and doubt if at the end, 
the newly proposed methodologies are going to work and offer advantages over the existing 
status. Risk analysis follows a progressive path. It existed as guidance at the beginning but 
gradually it evolved to become part of the management decision making process. Although 
scepticism governs the majority of marine companies, others have realized the potential for 
development and adopted the newly proposed methodology aiming at improving their overall 
performance through the described safety analysis framework. 
As marine industry is still an uncharted area relatively to shore industries in terms of safety 
assessment, methodologies and techniques need to be further developed to accommodate a 
number of questions raised. Generic FSA methodologies are able to facilitate safety at a 
reasonable accuracy degree in terms of results, leaving out details that cannot be 
accommodated within them. Vessels and ports are parted by a number of complex 
engineering and operational systems. There is lack of data and an uncertainty degree 
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involved when it comes to information concerning these systems separately, even more when 
trying to assess the reliability and safety of their individual components [Wang & Ruxton, 
1997]. To date, comparatively little use of safety and reliability assessment methods has been 
made in connection with merchant shipping. Lloyd's Register of Shipping has for a long 
period, collected information relating to failures and has carried out development work to 
investigate the application of such methods to the classification of ships. Apart from this, 
some consultancy work has also been carried out on behalf of ship owners. Engineering 
systems and operational processes require a number of specific methodologies, being able to 
facilitate performance measurements and reliability assessment during operation, as well as 
being able to locate and identify any further problematic areas that traditional methods 
cannot efficiently tackle. Cases of risk estimation and decision making governed by 
uncertainty or lack of data need to be examined [Wang et al., 1996]. Rule-based decision 
making is an area where further research and development is required in order to make 
rational decisions. This thesis seeks to explore these identified gaps and propose means, 
through the development of a number of methodologies, to accommodate uncertainty and 
decision making processes in the areas of engineering reliability safety and organisational 
safety. 
1.2 Aim and objectives of this thesis 
This thesis is called upon to develop a number of risk-based methodologies to assess the 
reliability and safety of marine engineering systems as well as establish a pattern for self- 
assessment at organizational level within the marine sector in cases where vagueness and 
uncertainty of data exist. This aim is achieved through the generation of various risk-based 
models, novel for the maritime industry. 
In order to achieve the main aim set, the following objectives have to be met throughout the 
course of the presented chapters: 
" To critically review the current status of safety in the marine and port industry. 
" To identify any key risk analysis techniques currently implemented in the sector. 
" To examine formal safety assessment and its implementation to vessels. 
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" To demonstrate that Bayesian networks can be a very powerful tool in the process of 
assessing the reliability of an engineering system. 
" To demonstrate that the combination of fuzzy logic with evidential reasoning can create a 
powerful tool in the decision making process for the maritime sector. 
9 To demonstrate the aid of evidential reasoning as a self-assessment tool when a company 
is trying to assess its own performance and benchmarked against others. 
9 To show through Form/Sorm method a better approximation of risk estimation. 
These goals are established analytically through the course of this thesis. 
1.3 Why various and not single methodology were adopted through the thesis 
This thesis incorporates multiple models, each one dealing with a different element. Each 
model is based on a custom proposed methodology, along with its respective test case. A 
brief outline of the generic structure for each of the following chapters includes: 
1. A brief literature review within the sector that the chapter is dealing with. Critical 
evaluation of other people's work and proposed models is made in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. The review within each chapter exists mainly to support the ideas of the author as 
far as information is concerned in the identification of existing gaps in the industry. 
2. Background information on the theory that each model is based upon. Key elements of 
the theory are to be identified and presented so as to explain the mechanism that each 
theory works on. After the presentation of the framework, all modifications and novelties 
are presented along with the proposed methodological steps. 
3. After proposing the methodology a test case is required to demonstrate its applicability. 
Test cases from within the marine industry are chosen so as to give a more advanced, 
though practical, when applicable, approach. Engineering systems from liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) vessels and container cranes are some of the cases that the proposed 
methodologies are applied to. It is the author's intention to demonstrate that theory and 
applicability within the marine industry are not so far apart. 
4. All chapters end with a discussion of the key points raised throughout the chapter 
examined. The findings are assessed and a conclusion is drawn. 
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It is the combination of the methodologies developed within this thesis that when applied 
together can derive rational results when examining the engineering reliability or risk factors 
imposed to large engineering systems such as complete vessels or full dock 
loading/unloading facilities. The proposed methodologies when applied by experts can 
formulate, according to the case examined, a platform which can facilitate risk modeling and 
decision making when data is governed by vagueness or fuzziness or incompleteness. 
As it can be seen from the aim and objectives of this thesis, there is the need to cover several 
aspects within the marine industry using the application of formal safety assessment that 
forces the implementation of a different methodology in each particular case. A unified 
methodology would not be applicable in all cases and it was not the intention to provide a 
single path, but multiple solutions to the number of different cases examined. 
1.4 Scope of work 
The safety analysis and decision support methodologies developed and described within this 
thesis have been applied to specific test cases. Their nature though, is such that they are 
applicable to a great variety of cases either in the operational or the design fields. They can 
also be utilized by other disciplines of engineering in cases where safety related data is 
lacking or vague. All these methodologies can be used in conjunction with the traditional 
methods in safety assessment for engineering products. 
The paragraphs presented next, give the reader a "road map" of the content of each individual 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 outlines the generic development of formal safety assessment within the marine 
industry and its current status. It shows the progress from a reactive approach usually used 
after a major accident towards a pro-active approach trying to minimize the overall risk 
factor existing in a system or a task. The adoption of FSA from the UK MCA as a means to 
improve safety is also included. A number of key lessons raised from accidents are outlined 
and briefly discussed. A critical overview of several models developed is made and gaps that 
have been omitted are identified so as to show the applicability of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 presents the fundamental risk assessment methods used within the risk analysis 
framework, explaining their key points in such a way that they can be utilized along with the 
proposed methodologies in the chapters further up the thesis. This chapter does not intend to 
be a textbook chapter, but merely to show the interconnection of basic methodologies and the 
way they can be linked with more advanced risk estimation models. Methods like fault tree, 
event tree, risk matrix modeling and others are explained in this section of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 shows that when dealing with multiple attribute decision analysis, the decision 
maker is often required to process simultaneous data containing both qualitative and 
quantitative values. The main aim of the decision-making process is to be able to derive 
rational decisions from uncertain or incomplete data contained in the total package of 
information. In this chapter a multilevel decision-making technique is developed based on 
the Dempster-Shafer theory, and is used in different areas of engineering, safety, 
management and design selection. The basic functions of evidential reasoning are also 
analysed and further developed in order to improve the process of dealing with attributes 
containing uncertainty or attributes with lack of information. A numerical example of a 
vessel selection process is examined using a proposed form of evidential reasoning approach. 
The sequence of the numerical steps followed to assess vessels is indicated so as to 
demonstrate the implementation of the procedure. 
Chapter 5 indicates that along with the economic growth within the marine industry the need 
for sufficient safety levels has been increased throughout the past years, in view of 
optimising them for the years to come. Decisions made must ensure that adequate safety 
levels are achieved. What is more, to ensure that decisions are taken on a rational basis, a 
number of uncertainties need to be taken into consideration before any results are produced. 
Bayesian networks and influence diagrams provide the means of analysis in such a case. The 
intention of this chapter is to demonstrate their potential as a modelling technique, which can 
provide features not always available through conventional methods. The literature review 
and the background theory of Bayesian networks are analysed along with a proposed 
methodology and a test case to prove the value of the method. 
Chapter 6 presents the Form/Sorm method, also known as most-likely failure point (MLFP), 
It is a method for estimating the probability Pf that a value of a calculated quantity would 
exceed (or, alternatively, be less than) a certain limit, given that a number of the input data 
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values, on which the calculation is based, is uncertain. This chapter contains a brief 
introduction to the background of the method, an explanation of its use and a proposed 
change in the way that variables are handled. Finally, a test case is presented to demonstrate 
the usage of the modified Form/Sorm method. 
Chapter 7 shows that human and organisational performances are the main factors within a 
management framework used to either self-assess the progress of a company or compare it 
with other companies operating in the same field. Organisations that are safety oriented are 
often required to produce a self-assessment regime under which performance and safety 
analysis are divided into a number of main criteria. Some of these assessment criteria contain 
sub-criteria. This chapter presents a method incorporating the evidential reasoning algorithm, 
which can be equally used for self-assessment as well as for comparing two or more 
companies by an independent assessment source. The criteria used are presented, analysed 
and brought into a common utility plane so that comparisons can be carried out. All linguistic 
variables used as assessment grades, are the result of consultation with experts such as 
academics and engineers. A test case of assessment between four companies is also presented 
to demonstrate the applicability of the method within the marine industry. 
Chapter 8 gives an overview of the thesis presented. A discussion is presented following the 
key points raised through the thesis. The safety analysis methodologies in the form presented 
in this thesis are capable of dealing with a number of questions and problems concerning 
engineering systems along with any topics raised within a safety assessment organizational 
framework. Suggestions for future work are made. A number of publications arising from 
this thesis can be found in journals and conferences as well as being referenced in this thesis. 
Figure 1.1 shows a graphical representation of the structure of this thesis. 
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10 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
In the maritime industry, over the recent years, quite a few serious accidents including 
the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise and the Exxon Valdez tragedy have 
shocked the public and attracted great attention to safety. The studies on how similar 
accidents may be prevented have been actively carried out at both the national and 
international levels. After Lord Carver's report on the investigation of the capsize of 
the Herald of Free Enterprise was published in 1992, the UK Maritime & Coastguard 
Agency (MCA) quickly responded and in 1993 proposed to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) that formal safety assessment (FSA) should be applied 
to ships to ensure a strategic control of safety and pollution prevention [MSA, 1993], 
[MSA, 1996]. The guidelines for the application of formal safety assessment have 
been recently approved for rule/regulation making purposes by the IMO. At the 
moment, one of the major concerns on the practical application of formal ship safety 
assessment is associated with the simplification of the approach and the study of trial 
test cases for producing more detailed guidelines to facilitate its application while 
human and organizational elements that significantly influence quality, safety, etc., 
also need to be addressed in detail accordingly. In the UK offshore industry, a safety 
case approach was introduced in 1993 following the public inquiry into the Piper 
Alpha accident of July 6,1988. The safety case regulations were amended in 1996 to 
include verification of safety-critical elements. The offshore installations and wells 
(Design and Construction, etc. ) regulations 1996 (DCR'96) were introduced to deal 
with various stages of the life cycle of the installation [HSE, 1998]. The main feature 
of the new offshore safety regulations in the UK is the absence of a prescriptive 
framework; defining specific duties of the operator as regard to what are adequate 
means. The regulations set higher safety standards while leaving the selection of 
particular arrangements to deal with hazards in the hands of the operator. This is in 
recognition of the fact that hazards related to a complex engineering system such as a 
vessel or an installation are specific to its function and site conditions. 
Recently, the industrial guidelines on a framework for risk related decision support 
have been produced by the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) [UKOOA, 
2002]. In general, the framework could be usefully applied to a wide range of 
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situations. In particular, it provides a sound basis for evaluating the various options 
that need to be considered at the feasibility and concept selection stages of a project. It 
can also be combined with other formal decision making aids such as Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
As far as port safety is concerned, the guidelines indicating a general framework on 
port safety in the UK came from "Safety in Docks - Port regulations and guidance" 
[Health & Safety Commission, 1988]. The current status of port safety shows that 
there is a close relation between the MCA and the port authorities in order to ensure 
adequate levels of safety and pollution prevention in UK ports. It is again a case of 
leaving the operators to decide on the ways to deal with possible hazards instead of 
setting the path that they should follow in each case. What is needed is an application 
of formal safety assessment methods for handling situations arising in any kind of 
terminal with just minor modifications in the factors influencing them. This means 
that the methods applied in a chemical refinery dock when the vessel is undertaking 
loading or unloading of cargo, can be equally applied, with the domain knowledge, to 
a container or a Ro/Ro terminal. The "Port Marine Safety Code" recently produced by 
the DETR (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, UK) 
introduces a national standard for every aspect of port marine safety in the UK 
[DETR, 2000]. Using it as a basis, further development and research can be targeted 
to engineering systems related to loading/unloading of cargo (such as cargo cranes) as 
well as in the logistics and transportation of goods within the port premises. 
Many leading maritime organizations have started to move away from prescription, 
towards a risk based regime, to assist in maintaining capability throughout the life 
cycle of maritime products. Such a change will create new perspectives in risk 
modelling and safety based decision making. It is believed that a change from re- 
active to pro-active regime will gradually take place in the maritime industry [Sii & 
Wang, 2003]. This can certainly encourage safety engineers to develop and apply 
more flexible risk modelling and decision making approaches from the advances in 
general engineering and technology. Table 2.1 gives a brief overview of the current 
regulatory safety approach compared with the FSA proposed approach [Wang, 2002]. 
The differences are obvious as FSA focuses on pro-activeness whereas up until lately 
the lessons to be learned stood as the key players in the effort of improving marine 
safety. 
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Table 2.1 Difference between FSA and current regulatory safety approach 
Formal Safety Assessment Current Approach 
Step 1 What might go wrong? Hazard identification What did go wrong? 
Step 2 How often, how Risk analysis 
likely? Frequencies, probabilities 
How bad? Consequences 
Risk = probability x 
consequence 
Step 3 How can matters be Risk control options How can matters be 
improved? identification improved? 
Step 4 How much? Cost benefit evaluation 
How much better? 
Step 5 What actions are Recommendation What actions are 
worthwile to take? worthwhile to take? 
In the following paragraphs an overview of major marine accidents is given. Among 
others, these accidents triggered the need for a pro-active safety framework and hence 
helped in the proposal and implementation of FSA. Following the accidents' review, 
FSA's structure and methodology is described. 
2.2 Review of major marine and offshore accidents 
2.2.1 The Amoco Cadiz 
The Amoco Cadiz was a supertanker, owned by Amoco, that split in two after running 
aground on Portsall Rocks, three miles off the coast of Brittany, in March 16,1978, 
resulting in one of the largest oil spills in history [NOAA, 1978]. En route from the 
Persian Gulf to Le Havre, France, the ship encountered stormy weather with gale 
conditions and high seas. A seemingly minor failure in its steering gear started a slow 
drift to the French coastline. 
The entire cargo of 1,619,048 barrels spilled into the sea. A slick 18 miles wide and 
80 miles long covered about 200 miles (320 km) of Brittany coastline. Beaches of 76 
different Breton communities were oiled. The isolated location of the grounding and 
the rough seas at that time hampered clean-up efforts for two weeks after the incident 
occurred. Severe weather resulted in the complete breaking of the ship before any oil 
could be pumped out of the wreck. 
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As mandated in the "Polmar Plan", the French Navy was responsible for all offshore 
operations while the Civil Safety Service was responsible for shore clean-up 
activities. Although the total quantity of collected oil and water reached 100,000 tons, 
less than 20,000 tons of oil were recovered from this liquid after treatment in refining 
plants. After long negotiations on financial terms between the ship's captain and the 
master of a West German tugboat and two unsuccessful towing attempts, the towline 
finally broke during the argument and the ship drifted on the rocks [Conan, 
d'Ozouville & Marchand, 1978]. This accident was caused as seen mainly due to bad 
weather as well as due to multiple failures occurring in close time intervals. 
Following the Amoco Cadiz disaster, new requirements for tanker regulations were 
developed by IMO. The results of the inquiry into the Amoco Cadiz accident have 
contributed to the implementation of the 1978 Protocol (Tanker Safety and Pollution 
Prevention) to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
(SOLAS) [IMO, 2001]. All tankers of 10000grt and above shall have two remote 
steering gear control systems, each operable separately from the navigating bridge. 
The main steering gear of new tankers of 10000grt and above shall comprise two or 
more identical power units and shall be capable of operating the rudder with one or 
more power units. 
2.2.2 The Exxon Valdez 
On March 23,1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez departed from the Valdez oil 
terminal in Valdez, Alaska (on its 28th voyage), heading south through Prince 
William Sound, with a full load (52 million gallons) of oil. Captain Joseph 
Hazelwood radioed to the Coast Guard station that he would be changing course in 
order to avoid some growlers, small icebergs which had drifted into the sound from 
the Columbia Glacier (Galt, Lehr, & Payton, 1991). The captain received permission to 
move into the northbound lane. Before retiring to his cabin, Captain Hazelwood 
instructed his third mate Gregory Cousins to "start coming back into the lanes" once 
the ship was abeam Busby Island Light, some 2 minutes ahead. 
Although Cousins did give the instructions to the helmsman to steer the vessel to the 
right, the vessel was not turning sharply enough and at 12: 04 a. m. on March 24, the 
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vessel hit Bligh Reef. It is not known whether Cousins gave the orders too late or the 
helmsman did not follow instructions properly. 
The spilled oil affected 1,900 km of Alaskan coastline. Although Exxon's initial 
report of 10.8 million gallons (40,900 m3) of oil spilled has been widely accepted, 
other sources estimate the spill at 35 million gallons (110,000 m3) [Rice, Spies, Wolfe 
& Wright, 1996]. The Exxon Valdez supertanker was towed to San Diego, arriving on 
July 10 and repairs began in July 30,1989. Approximately 1,600 tons of steel were 
removed and replaced. This accident was a typical example of human error and 
negligence. 
2.2.3 The Piper Alpha 
On 6 July 1988 there was a massive leakage of gas condensate which was ignited 
causing an explosion which led to large oil fires. The heat ruptured the riser of a gas 
pipeline from another installation [UKOOA, 2005]. This produced a further massive 
explosion and fireball that engulfed Piper Alpha. All this took just 22 minutes. The 
scale of the disaster was enormous. 167 people died, 62 people survived. 
It is believed that the leak came from piping connected to a condensate pump. A 
safety valve had been removed from this piping for overhaul and maintenance. The 
pump itself was undergoing maintenance work. When the piping from which the 
safety valve had been removed was pressurised at start-up, it is believed the leak had 
occurred. 
Lord Cullen chaired the official Public Inquiry into the disaster in two parts led by the 
Department of Energy (DOE) [DOE, 1990]. The first was to establish the causes of 
the disaster. The second part made recommendations as to the future safety regime. 
By 1993 all had been acted upon and substantially implemented. It is believed that 
this accident was the result of combined procedural defects and human error 
At the same time the HSE developed and implemented Lord Cullen's key 
recommendation, the making of regulations to require that the Operator/Owner of 
every installation should be required to submit to HSE, for their acceptance, a Safety 
case which demonstrated that the Company had adequate safety management systems, 
is 
had identified risks and reduced them to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), 
had put management controls in place, had provided for temporary safe refuge to be 
available and had made provisions for safe evacuation and rescue [DOE, 1990]. The 
Temporary Refuge is designed to provide a period of protection, allowing personnel 
to muster in safety while an accident is being assessed, and a decision is taken on 
whether or not to abandon the installation. The Temporary Refuge is equipped, 
amongst other things, with command, communication, monitoring, mustering and 
medical facilities. By November 1993 a safety case for every installation had been 
submitted to the HSE and by November 1995 all had had their Safety case accepted 
by the HSE. 
The marine and offshore industry's accident frequency rates have improved 
significantly since 1988. There has been an overall reduction in accident frequency 
rates in the order of 50% [HSE, 2003]. Whilst the actual accident rates do not prove or 
disprove a safety regime or culture, they do provide a year on year or over a period of 
years, comparison to indicate an improving or worsening or level trend, provided that 
the statistics are compiled on the basis of a consistent methodology. 
The marine and offshore industry agreed in 1992 to report to HSE on a voluntary 
basis, all offshore releases of hydrocarbons. From 1992 to 1994/95 the number of 
reported releases rose to a peak of [HSE, 2001]: 
" 36 major releases. 
" 170 significant releases. 
" 11I minor releases. 
From 1994/95 to 1997/98 the number of releases have declined to: 
" 22 major releases (39% reduction). 
" 102 significant releases (43% reduction). 
" 50 minor releases (55% reduction). 
This reduction can be illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Reduction in the recorded release rates from 1992-1998 
Similarly Figure 2.2 illustrates the descending number of fatalities and serious injuries 
which show that the industry has started to follow the road towards a safety oriented 
regime [HSE, 2001]. 
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Figure 2.2 Reduction in fatalities and major accidents from 1988-1997 
It is clear that it would be possible to prevent marine accident by proper design, 
correct operational training and procedures as well as an appropriate management 
system that performs regular reviews on the safety standards functioning. As the 
public concern regarding maritime safety increases, a lot of attention has been drawn 
to formal safety assessment as regulatory tool. It is believed that the adoption of such 
a tool both in the design and operation stages will reduce maritime risks to the 
ALARP level. Above this particular level systems and processes continue to operate 
without safety issues raised. The following paragraphs give an insight on the 
mechanism of operation of formal safety assessment. 
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2.3 Formal safety assessment 
FSA is a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks relating to maritime 
safety and the protection of the marine environment and for evaluating the costs and 
benefits of the recommended risk control options for reducing these risks. The use of 
FSA is consistent with, and should provide support to, the IMO decision-making 
process. It provides a basis for making decisions in accordance with IMO resolutions 
A. 500(XII) "Objectives of the Organization in the 1980s", A. 777(18) "Work Methods 
and Organization of Work in Committees and their Subsidiary Bodies" and A. 900(21) 
"Objectives of the Organization in the 2000s" (MSA, 1993]. 
Application of FSA may be particularly relevant for proposals for regulatory 
measures which have far reaching implications in terms of costs to the maritime 
industry or the administrative or legislative burdens which may result in. This is 
achieved by providing a clear justification for proposed regulatory measures and 
allowing comparison of different options of such measures to be made [MSA, 1996]. 
This is in line with the basic philosophy of FSA in that it can be used as a tool to 
facilitate a transparent decision-making process. In addition, it provides a means of 
being proactive, enabling potential hazards to be considered before a serious accident 
occurs. The decision makers both at a regulatory level such as the IMO [IMO, 1996] 
or at a industrial and organizational level, through FSA, will be able to appreciate the 
effect of proposed regulatory changes in terms of benefits (e. g. expected reduction of 
lives lost or of pollution) and related costs incurred for the industry either as a whole 
or just for the particular case examined and affected by the decisions they need to 
take. 
2.3.1 FSA steps 
FSA should consist of the following steps [IMO, 1997a]: 
1. Identification of hazards. 
2. Risk analysis. 
3. Risk control options. 
4. Cost-benefit assessment. 
5. Recommendations for decision-making. 
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Figure 2.3 is a flow chart of the FSA methodology. The process begins with the 
decision makers defining the problem to be assessed along with any relevant 
boundary conditions or constraints. These are presented to the group who will carry 
out the FSA and provide results to the decision makers for use in their resolutions 
[IMO, 2002]. In cases where decision makers require additional work to be 
conducted, they would revise the problem statement or boundary conditions or 
constraints, and resubmit this to the group and repeat the process as necessary. Within 
the FSA methodology, step 5 interacts with each of the other steps in arriving at 
decision-making recommendations. 
Decision makers 
Criteria 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 5 
Hazard Risk Decision-making 
identification assessment recommendations 
T -I 
Step 3 
Risk control 
------------------ options 
Step 4 
Cost benefit 
assessment 
Review 
-------------------------------------------------------------' 
Figure 2.3 Flow chart of FSA methodology 
The group carrying out the FSA process should consist of qualified and experienced 
people to reflect the range of influences and the nature of the "event" being addressed. 
The depth or extent of application of the methodology should be in-line with the 
nature and significance of the problem [IMO, 2004]. However, before starting the 
detailed application, a coarse application is suggested for the relevant ship type or 
hazard category, in order to include all aspects of the problem under consideration. 
Whenever there are uncertainties, e. g. in respect of data or expert judgment, the 
significance of these uncertainties should be assessed. Characterization of hazards and 
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risks should be both qualitative and quantitative, and both descriptive and 
mathematical, consistent with the available data, and should be broad enough to 
include a comprehensive range of options to reduce risks. A hierarchical screening 
approach may be utilized. This would ensure that excessive analysis is not performed 
by utilising relatively simple tools to perform initial analyses, the results of which can 
be used to either support decision-making (if the degree of support is adequate) or to 
scope/frame more detailed analyses (if not). The initial analyses would therefore be 
primarily qualitative in nature, with a recognition that increasing degrees of detail and 
quantification will come in subsequent analyses as necessary. A review of historical 
data may also be useful as a preparation for a detailed study. 
The availability of suitable data necessary for each step of the FSA process is very 
important [Peachey, 1995]. When data is not available, expert judgment, physical 
models, simulations and analytical models may be used to achieve valuable results. 
Consideration should be given to those data which are already available (e. g. casualty 
and deficiency statistics) and to potential improvements in those data in anticipation 
of an FSA implementation (e. g. a better specification for recording relevant data 
including the primary causes, underlying factors and latent factors associated with a 
casualty). Data concerning incident reports, near misses and operational failures may 
be very important for the purpose of making more balanced, proactive and cost- 
effective legislation. A judgement on the value of data which can be collected should 
be carried out in order to identify uncertainties and limitations, and to assess the 
degree of reliance that should be placed on the available data. Figure 2.4 illustrates a 
more detailed diagram of how the five steps of FSA are connected to each other 
giving a better overview of the risk estimation step which in fact is the most important 
step within the FSA methodology [Peachey, 1995]. It is the step in which traditional 
and advanced risk estimation techniques are applied. What can be measured can be 
reduced. 
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Figure 2.4 Flow chart of FSA methodology concentrated on risk estimation 
The human element is one of the most important contributory aspects to the causation 
and avoidance of accidents. Human element issues throughout an integrated system 
should be systematically treated within the FSA framework, associating them directly 
with the occurrence of accidents, underlying causes or influences. Additionally, 
appropriate techniques for incorporating human factors, such as the TESEO technique 
should be used. This technique uses a marking system based on different human 
related criteria and produces the outcome in terms of multiplication of all the 
respective factors. Thus can produce quantitative results in a case where qualitative 
variables are used. 
2.3.1.1 FSA step 1- Identification of hazards 
The purpose of step I is to identify a list of hazards and associated scenarios 
prioritized by risk level specific to the problem under review. This purpose is 
achieved by the use of standard techniques to identify hazards which can contribute to 
accidents, and by screening these hazards using a combination of available data and 
judgement [Riding, 1997]. The hazard identification process should be undertaken in 
the context of the functions and systems generic to the ship type or problem being 
considered. 
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The approach used for hazard identification generally comprises a combination of 
both creative and analytical techniques, the aim being to identify all relevant hazards. 
The creative element is to ensure that the process is proactive and not confined only to 
hazards that have materialized in the past. It typically consists of structured group 
reviews aiming at identifying the causes and effects of accidents and relevant hazards 
[CCPS, 1992]. Consideration of functional failure may assist in this process. The 
group carrying out such structured reviews should include experts in the various 
appropriate aspects, such as ship design, operations and management and specialists 
to assist in the hazard identification process and incorporation of the human element. 
A structured group review session may last over a number of days. The analytical 
element ensures that previous experience is properly taken into account, and typically 
makes use of background information (for example applicable regulations and codes, 
available statistical data on accident categories and lists of hazards to personnel, 
hazardous substances, ignition sources, etc. ). Examples of hazards relevant to 
shipboard operations are shown at Appendix I. A complete analysis of possible causes 
and outcomes of each accident category should be carried out by using established 
techniques (typical techniques are reviewed in Chapter 3), to be chosen according to 
the problem in question. 
The identified hazards and their associated scenarios relevant to the problem under 
consideration should be ranked to prioritize them and to discard scenarios judged to 
be of minor significance. The frequency and consequence of the scenario outcome 
requires assessment. Ranking is undertaken using available data, supported by 
judgement, on the scenarios. The qualitative method named risk matrix is described in 
Chapter 3. The frequency and consequence categories used in the risk matrix have to 
be clearly defined. The product given by the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired 
event (frequency) and the severity of consequences imposed represents the derived 
risk level. 
Therefore the output from step 1 consists of: 
1. A list of hazards and their associated scenarios prioritized by risk level. 
2. A description of causes and effects. 
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2.3.1.2 FSA step 2- Risk analysis 
The purpose of the risk analysis in step 2 is a detailed investigation of the causes and 
consequences of the more important scenarios identified in step 1. This can be 
achieved by the use of suitable techniques that model the risk. This allows attention to 
be focused upon high risk areas and to identify and evaluate the factors which 
influence the level of risk. Different types of risk [Henley & Kumamoto, 1992] (i. e. 
risks to people, the environment [EPA, 1996] or property) should be addressed as 
appropriate to the problem under consideration. 
The construction and quantification of fault trees and event trees are standard risk 
assessment techniques that can be used to build a risk model (see Chapter 3). An 
example of a conceptual risk model is the Risk Contribution Tree (RCT) as shown in 
Figure 2.5 [IMO, 2002a]. Whilst the example makes use of fault and event tree 
techniques, other established methods could be used if appropriate. Quantification 
makes use of accident and failure data and other sources of information as appropriate 
to the level of analysis. Where data is unavailable, calculation, simulation or the use 
of recognized techniques for expert judgement may be used. 
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Figure 2.5 Example of a risk contribution tree 
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The output from step 2 consists of the identification of the high risk areas which need 
to be addressed. 
2.3.1.3 FSA step 3- Risk control options 
The purpose of step 3 is to propose effective and practical risk control options (RCOs) 
consisting of the following four principal stages [Brafelt. & Larsson 2000]: 
1. Focusing on risk areas needing control. 
2. Identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs). 
3. Evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating step 2. 
4. Grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options. 
Step 3 aims at creating risk control options that address both existing risks and risks 
introduced by new technology or new methods of operation and management. Both 
historical risks and newly estimated risks (from steps I and 2) should be considered, 
producing a wide range of risk control measures. Techniques designed to address both 
specific risks and underlying causes should be used. 
The purpose of focusing significant risks is to screen the output of step 2 so that the 
effort is focused on the areas most needing risk control. The main aspects to making 
this assessment are to review [Wang, Labrie & Ruxton, 1993]: 
1. Risk levels, by considering frequency of occurrence together with the severity of 
outcomes. Accidents with an unacceptable risk level become the primary focus. 
2. Probability, by identifying the risk areas that have the highest probability of 
occurrence. These should be addressed irrespective of the severity of the outcome. 
3. Severity, by identifying the risk areas that contribute to highest severity outcomes. 
These are be addressed irrespective of their probability. 
4. Confidence, by identifying areas where the risk model has considerable uncertainty 
either in risk, severity or probability. These uncertain areas should be addressed. 
Structured review techniques are typically used to identify new RCMs for risks that 
are not sufficiently controlled by existing measures. These techniques may encourage 
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the development of appropriate measures and include risk attributes and causal chains. 
Risk attributes relate to how a measure might control a risk, and how causal chains 
relate to where, in the "initiating event to fatality" sequence, risk control can be 
introduced. RCMs (and subsequently RCOs) have a range of attributes. The prime 
purpose of assigning attributes is to facilitate a structured thought process to 
understand how an RCM works, how it is applied and how it would operate. 
Attributes can also be considered to provide guidance on the different types of risk 
control that could be applied. Many risks will be the result of complex chains of 
events and a diversity of causes. For such risks the identification of RCMs can be 
assisted by developing causal chains which might be expressed as follows [IMO, 
2002]: 
causal factors -º failure -º circumstances -i accident -> consequences 
RCMs, in general be aimed at one or more of the following: 
1. Reducing the frequency of failures through better design, procedures, 
organizational policies, training, etc. 
2. Mitigating the effect of failures, in order to prevent accidents. 
3. Examine the circumstances in which failures may occur. 
4. Mitigating the consequences of accidents. 
RCMs are to be evaluated regarding their risk reduction effectiveness by using step 2 
including consideration of any potential side effects of the introduction of the RCM. 
The purpose of this stage is to group RCMs into a limited number of well thought out 
practical regulatory options. There is a range of possible approaches to grouping 
individual measures into options. The following two approaches, related to likelihood 
and escalation, can be considered: 
1. Generic approach which provides risk control by controlling the likelihood of 
initiation of accidents and may be effective in preventing several different accident 
sequences. 
2 Distributed approach which provides control of escalation of accidents, together 
with the possibility of influencing the later stages of escalation of other, perhaps 
unrelated, accidents. In generating the RCOs, the interested entities (also named as 
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stakeholders), which may be affected by the combinations of measures proposed, 
should be identified. 
The output from step 3 consists of 
1. A range of RCOs which are assessed for their effectiveness in reducing risk. 
2. A list of interested entities affected by the identified RCOs. 
2.3.1.4 FSA step 4- Cost benefit assessment 
The purpose of step 4 is to identify and compare benefits and costs associated with the 
implementation of each RCO identified and defined in step 3. A cost benefit 
assessment may consist of the following stages [Mathiesen, 1997]: 
1. Consider the risks assessed in step 2, in terms of both frequency and consequence, 
in order to define the base case in terms of risk levels of the situation under 
consideration. 
2. Arrange the RCOs, defined in step 3, in a way to facilitate understanding of the 
costs and benefits resulting from the adoption of an RCO. 
3. Estimate the pertinent costs and benefits for all RCOs. 
4. Estimate and compare the cost effectiveness of each option, in terms of the cost per 
unit risk reduction by dividing the net cost by the risk reduction achieved as a result of 
implementing the option. 
5. Rank the RCOs from a cost-benefit perspective in order to facilitate the decision- 
making recommendations in step 5 (e. g. to screen those which are not cost effective 
or impractical). 
Costs are be expressed in terms of life cycle costs and may include initial, operating, 
training, inspection, certification, decommission costs, etc. Benefits may include 
reductions in fatalities, injuries, casualties, environmental damage and clean-up, 
indemnity of third party liabilities, etc. and an increase in the average life of ships 
[Wang, Yang & Sen, 1995). The evaluation of the above costs and benefits can be 
carried out by using various methods and techniques. Such a process should be 
conducted for the overall situation and then for those interested entities which are 
most influenced by the problem in question. In general, an interested entity can be 
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defined as the person, organization, company, Coastal State, Flag State, etc. who are 
directly or indirectly affected by an accident or by the cost effectiveness of the newly 
proposed RCO. Different interested entities with similar interests can be grouped 
together for the purpose of applying the FSA methodology and identifying decision. 
making recommendations. 
The output from step 4 consists of. 
1. Costs and benefits for each RCO identified in step 3 from an overview perspective. 
2. Costs and benefits for those interested entities which are the most influenced by the 
problem in question. 
3. Cost effectiveness expressed in terms of suitable indices. 
2.3.1.5 FSA step 5- Recommendations for decision making 
The purpose of step 5 is to define recommendations which should be presented to the 
relevant decision makers in an auditable and traceable manner. The recommendations 
would be based upon the comparison and ranking of all hazards and their underlying 
causes; the comparison and ranking of risk control options as a function of associated 
costs and benefits [Yang & Singh, 1994] should follow the identification of those risk 
control options which maintain risk levels below the ALARP level. 
Recommendations are to be presented in a form that can be understood by all parties 
irrespective of their experience in the application of risk and cost benefit assessment 
and related techniques [Delgado, Herrera, & Martinez, 1998]. Those submitting the 
results of an FSA process must provide timely and open access to relevant supporting 
documents and a reasonable opportunity for, and a mechanism to, incorporate 
comments. 
The output from step 5 consists of 
1 An objective comparison of alternative options, based on the potential reduction of 
risks and cost effectiveness, in areas where legislation or rules should be reviewed or 
developed. 
2. Feedback information to review the results generated in the previous steps. 
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2.4 Current status of FSA 
The FSA methodology has been developed by a joint Working Group of the IMO's 
Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection Committees, based upon research 
undertaken in the UK [IMO, 1996], [IMO, 1997]. The two committees approved 
guidelines setting out the details of the method during 1997. Although many of the 
elements of the approach described above are well established in other contexts, their 
application to the shipping industry, and in an overview or generic way, is relatively 
new and unproven. Trial applications are presently being undertaken, with the 
intention of reporting the results and experience gained to the IMO [IMO, 1998]. 
Consideration is also being given, by a Correspondence Group of IMO members, to 
the development of suitable mechanisms and procedures by which the FSA process 
can be applied by the IMO committees in their future decision making. FSA is 
intended to be applied at an overview level (for example to all the hazards affecting a 
particular ship type), with a view to identifying and prioritising the principal risks and 
regulatory options. FSA results will part a summary of the key risks relevant to the 
scope of the study, and information regarding the relative costs and benefits of the 
regulatory options for addressing those risks. The conclusions of an FSA study should 
therefore facilitate a proactive approach by the IMO, by providing a justifiable basis 
for making decisions about the need for, and content of, maritime regulations [IMO, 
1997]. It is not however the purpose of FSA to take account of the details of specific 
ships, or their arrangements, operations, etc, nor is the process designed to address the 
risks facing a particular owner or ship. As with all risk assessments, the results 
obtained are dependent in part upon data (eg historical incident and accident 
information), and also upon judgement in interpreting that data and anticipating 
industry trends, the impact of changes in technology, the potential for future 
accidents, etc. The results of an FSA study are therefore dependent upon not only the 
availability of relevant data, but also suitably qualified and experienced people to 
undertake such judgements [IMO, 1999]. 
The safety case approach was introduced to the UK offshore industry by the UK 
Health & Safety Executive (HSE) [HSE, 1998]. For offshore activities a Safety case 
has to be produced for submission to the HSE. This safety case regime is primarily a 
UK offshore approach. 
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The primary objective of a safety case approach is to ensure an adequate level of 
safety for a particular ship, based upon the management and control of the risks 
associated with that ship [Stansfeld, 1994]. A central feature of a safety case is that 
the ship-owner takes responsibility for assessing the risks associated with his ship, 
and for documenting how his safety management system limits those risks to an 
acceptable level. The document containing details of the risk assessment and the 
safety management system is called a safety case. The safety case approach 
constitutes a demonstration, to the vessel's owner, and to his employees, customers 
and society at large, that risks arising from the operation of the ship are adequately 
understood and controlled. In some industries, for example the UK offshore oil & gas 
industry, the safety case regime is mandatory, i. e. operations cannot legally be 
commenced until a safety case approach has been compiled by the owner and 
submitted to the official regulator for scrutiny and approval [HSE, 2002]. However, it 
is beginning to be recognised by responsible owners in the shipping industry that a 
safety case approach can be adopted voluntarily. Thus, in addition to complying with 
existing prescriptive regulatory requirements, an owner may choose voluntarily to 
compile a safety case and introduce a safety management system, for example to 
protect his business interests or reputation, or where he wants to achieve a higher 
level of safety than is implied by the regulations. It should be noted that although 
described above in the context of a vessel's owner, a safety case approach can, where 
appropriate, be compiled and maintained by a vessel's operator [HSC, 2004]. 
A safety case approach will include a comprehensive description of the ship itself, and 
of its operation and the environment within which it operates. The risk assessment 
will be undertaken using a number of established techniques, such as FMEA [IMCA, 
2002] (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) and HAZOP [Kletz, 1974] (Hazard and 
Operability study) studies for hazard identification, and fault and event tree analyses 
[Villemeur, 1992] for the determination of risk. Risks will be quantified to the extent 
it is appropriate to do so. Risk criteria will be set, relevant to the vessel and its 
operational context, and usually in accordance with the ALARP principle 
[Kumamoto, & Henley, 1979]. Likewise, the safety management system will be 
developed from established good management principles, and will be an integral part 
of the company's overall management strategy. The safety management system will 
include elements firstly of setting policy, secondly of organising, planning and 
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implementing actions to fulfil that policy, and finally of monitoring review and 
feedback to assess performance against the policy [MOD, 1996]. Typically, for a 
complex engineering system, a design safety case approach would initially be 
compiled. This would subsequently be developed and expanded into an operational 
safety case as the vessel enters service. Thereafter, the safety case approach would 
normally be subject to regular review, with updating as necessary, to take account of 
changing conditions, ownership, activities, modifications, etc. A safety case approach 
will usually make reference to extensive back-up information recording details of the 
ship and its operation, the risk assessments, risk criteria, etc. It is essential that the 
safety case approach is developed with the involvement of staff who have close 
familiarity with the system, its operation, company practice, procedures, etc. This 
approach also ensures ownership of, and commitment to, the safety targets and 
philosophy contained within the safety case. However, in compiling a safety case, an 
owner will often need to seek specialist assistance, particularly in respect of the 
quantified assessment of risks. 
The effectiveness of the safety management system is usually monitored and verified 
by means of regular audits, and compliance with the requirements of the safety case 
checked by means of inspections. 
The safety case approach is well established in industries other than shipping, most 
notably in the offshore oil and gas sector. However, the approach can, in principle, be 
applied to ships, and in recent years there has been discussion of this possibility. 
There are at present no known requirements by maritime regulators to impose a safety 
case regime on ship owners. All known current examples of the application of the 
safety case approach for ships fall into the voluntary category, in that the 
organisations involved have decided to develop safety cases without being required to 
do so by any regulatory authority. Most notably, the UK Ministry of Defence 
introduced a safety case regime for each of its new ships with effect from 1996 [HSE, 
1998]. In the merchant shipping sector, a few companies are known to have adopted 
the safety case approach. One of them is BP Tankers which, has adopted the safety 
case in view of their newly-built crude oil tankers for the Alaskan oil trade [BP, 
2004]. 
The safety case approach is intended to be applied primarily to a large engineering 
system like a ship [Wang & Ruxton, 1998]. It provides a comprehensive and detailed 
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evaluation of all the risks to which that ship is exposed, together with an explicit 
statement of the safety management system that the owner has established for 
controlling and reducing those risks to an acceptable level. The safety case approach 
document therefore provides the reference source, not only for checking the 
completeness and validity of the owner's risk assessment, but also as the basis for 
auditing the owner's management system and operations, and for inspecting the 
vessel, with the object of verifying compliance with the provisions of the case. The 
principal limitation of a safety case regime is that it presumes a high degree of 
responsibility on the part of the vessel's owner to be accountable for the risks created 
by his vessel and its operation. Therefore, exclusive reliance upon a safety case 
regime as a mechanism for ship safety regulation would only be practical within a 
framework where the regulator has both the competence to assess the veracity of the 
safety case, and also the authority to exercise effective sanctions in the event of being 
dissatisfied with the case itself or the owner's compliance with its provisions. A 
further limitation on the widespread introduction of the safety case approach for 
shipping is the burden of work required to undertake the complex analyses and 
compile extensive documentation for each and every vessel. 
Public safety awareness and the related distribution of responsibilities to local 
authorities has increased the need for tools to evaluate the total safety in the port 
environment. The maritime (nautical) operations determine an essential part of this 
safety. Traditionally expert opinion more recently completed with simulation studies, 
or fast-time simulations, help to evaluate the different design or existing port lay-outs 
and operational measures within a given environment and a given traffic distribution. 
This is still a viable option for the basic assessment of the feasibility of a design on 
the operational level but fails to predict the total levels of risk and consequences of 
measures once the total traffic distribution needs to be evaluated [HSE, 1988]. Over 
the last two decades additional quantitative safety management assessment tools have 
been developed which take into account the total vessel traffic image and its related 
risks in the whole physical port environment and which are capable of evaluating the 
consequences of measures on a strategic level. More recent developments in the 
Netherlands and the UK (Port Marine Safety Code) [DETR, 2000] suggest the 
application of FSA to ports as a panacea to all strategic safety issues, a promise which 
eventually can come true if due consideration is given to the small details. Which type 
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of study will be performed depends on the main question that has to be answered. A 
rough subdivision of safety studies is presented in Table 2.2. 
Safety Studies 
Generic 
Vessel 
Daily 
operations 
Human 
failure 
Technical failure 
Study Port Traffic Lay-out 
Parameters Environment Wind Current Waves 
Organisation On shore On ship 
Policy level Classificatio n level 
Table 2.2 Application of FSA in various safety studies 
The application of FSA methodology in port safety assessment is increasing and 
appropriately recognised as a valuable tool to identify the risk determining factors and 
to put these factors within the right framework of the total port system. However, the 
quantification of the actual risk level and the consequences of measures still require 
considerable input from analysed accident databases and more detailed models. The 
usage of FSA will result in improved risk assessment models, based on more physical 
relationships in which the impact of regulatory aspects is modelled. Because the 
outcome of the risk assessment model is directly used in the decision process as to 
whether a RCO is effective or not, it is very important to improve this model where 
possible. 
The European Maritime Pilot's Association (EMPA) has suggested that operational 
procedures and working instructions should be entirely based on and be in line with 
FSA [EMPA, 2006]. The management of the Pilot Organisations should benefit from 
a better understanding of the technical risks being taken by the Pilot Organisation by 
using the Formal Risk and Formal Safety Assessment methodology. The FSA 
methodology will define a logical and systematically structured approach, for 
decision-making based on qualitative and quantitative Risk and Safety Assessment. 
Using the FSA methodology should enable the Pilot organisation to define in advance 
the problems needing to be addressed, together with any relevant deadline condition 
or constrains. For the trial ports (Rotterdam, River Elbe and Antwerp) EMPA 
submitted a detailed trial application to demonstrate the practicability and usefulness 
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of FSA for operational pilotage. FSA is based on reliable incidents containing 
hazardous and damage occurrence data. 
The trial application methodology covered [EMPA, 2006]: 
" Prioritising areas and/or parts of harbours and fairways. 
" Classifying ship and cargo types. 
" Identifying hazards by defining failure modes e. g. grounding, drifting, fire, 
explosions. 
" Defining the causes of failures e. g. engine failure, steering failure, on-board 
navigational equipment failure, human failure. 
" Geographic area or region including meteorological, hydrological and 
hydrographic data. 
" Assessing risks, including the frequency of occurrence (likelihood) and the 
consequence or impact. 
" Defining risk control options. 
" Cost/Benefit Assessment (CBA) or alternative risk management options to reduce 
likelihood and impact. 
Another case that FSA is being utilised is through a project developed by Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV). One of the work packages is aimed at developing risk or probabilistic 
models of particular relevance to ship design. The subprojects relate to fast and 
accurate flooding prediction in case of damage, probabilistic assessment of structural 
strength (Structural Reliability Analysis models), probabilistic intact stability, 
prediction of collision and grounding, and fire and explosion. This work links to and 
extends ongoing trends in design and regulatory development. For example, DNV has 
recently completed the HARDER project, which provided the basis for the new 
Probabilistic Damage Stability Regulations at IMO; the next step is to include the 
time aspect (flooding prediction), and intact stability [DNV, 2006]. Gradually, tools 
will be introduced that can be used directly in design and explicitly minimise risks. 
This work package will address regulatory aspects, involving such issues as risk 
evaluation criteria, approval process of risk-based designs, requirements on 
documentation and qualification of personnel when it comes to assessing the 
reliability of engineering systems. As a basis for the risk aspects, FSA studies are 
being carried out for cruise vessels, LPG carriers and container ships. 
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Looking back a few years in 2001, International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) submitted a proposal to the Maritime Safety Committee (MCA) 
concerning the fore-end watertight integrity of bulk-carriers [IMO, 2001 a]. The whole 
study was supported by minor statistical data which gave analysts problems in terms 
of decision making recommendations as far as the integrity of the vessels' structure is 
concerned. Low percentage of data existed specially in terms of double skinned bulk- 
carriers. Even though the different bulk-carrier sizes were separated in different 
categories there was lack of data for the smaller handy-size carriers and even less as 
far as the newest larger vessels were concerned. Even though the study produced 
certain recommendations as far as the strengthening of forward structure is concerned, 
it lacked the interdependence analysis between the different sizes of vessels, so that it 
could be able to recommend a common utility plane of solutions. 
The above studies were developed at the fundamental levels of risk assessment. There 
is much concern though as it can be clearly seen, in terms of handling data being 
vague or uncertain. Interdependence of components is another issue which traditional 
techniques cannot handle efficiently in order to produce rational results and 
recommendations. The methods chosen to conduct risk estimation have gaps that 
require advanced models producing rational solutions in terms of engineering 
reliability and safety. 
2.5 Statistical data treatment 
Every risk or uncertainty modelling has to be supplied with reliable failure and repair 
data input, which will enable the quantification process to be achieved. A vast amount 
of reliable maritime database is available to serve this purpose. When no data for a 
component failure mode can be obtained, it may be possible to express the failure in 
terms of fundamental and quantifiable parameters and to analyse it using limit state 
reliability analysis, although there is uncertainty about the relevant distributions [Sii 
& Wang, 2003]. 
Casualty includes any accidental grounding, or any occurrence involving a vessel 
which results in damage related to the vessel, its apparel, gear, cargo, or injury or loss 
of life of any person; and includes among other things, collisions, strandings, 
groundings, founderings, heavy weather damage, fires, explosions, failure of gear and 
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equipment and any other damage which might affect or impair the seaworthiness of 
the vessel [IMO, 2002]. The obtained data is usually treated from its raw form 
depending on its intended use within the analysis structure. In some cases, such as 
with accident or initiating events, available data may be need to be treated and 
supplied in terms of frequency per ship/installation operating year. The best way to 
assign a frequency to an event is to research industry databases and locate good 
historical frequency data that relates to the event being analysed. Before applying 
historical frequency data, a thoughtful analysis of the data should be performed to 
determine its applicability to the event being evaluated [Mishra, 1992]. The analyst 
needs to consider the source of the data, the statistical quality of the data (reporting 
accuracy, size of data set, etc. ) and the relevance of the data to the event being 
analysed. Also, the data may best be utilised for safety assessment by converting a 
failure or a repair rate into a corresponding probability value. 
2.5.1 Failure databases 
The following are some of the available sources that may be useful for obtaining 
failure and repair data to carry out quantitative safety analysis. 
" FARADIP. THREE [Smith, 1992]: This database is a summary of many useful 
databases and shows, for each component, the range of failure values. The failure 
data of various components such as alarms, mechanical items and instruments is 
included in this database. 
" US Military Handbook 217: This data source is produced by the Rome Air 
Development Center under contract to the US Department of Defence and is an 
electronic failure data bank. 
" OREDA-Offshore Reliability Data [DNV, 2002]: It is a collection of offshore 
failure rate and failure mode data with an emphasis on safety-related equipment. It 
covers a great range of components and equipment. 
" Reliability Technology [Green, & Bourne, 1972]: This book contains failure rate 
data obtained mostly from US and UK atomic energy sources. 
" Lloyds Data Bank [LR, 1982]: It mainly covers the failure data in the shipping 
industries. 
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" Others: The reliability data of the various electronic and non-electronic 
components may also be obtained from various published papers and books 
[Smith, 1985]. 
It is also useful to record and utilise data from near misses and errors. Furthermore, in 
an effort to ensure that safety assessment carried out in an as efficient as possible way, 
novel techniques should integrate expert judgement with the obtained data in a formal 
manner as it will be demonstrated in the following chapters of the thesis. 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
The adoption of FSA by the IMO, together with other recommendations, has 
introduced a new dimension to the way that safety is considered within the shipping 
community, and it is rapidly gaining international acceptance as a solution, enabling 
the application of risk based techniques to international shipping. As progress 
continues, it will represent a fundamental cultural change from the present reactive 
approach to one that is proactive and soundly based on an evaluation of risk. 
Although at an early stage and despite considerable confusion in some quarters, FSA 
offers the challenge of working in an industry that will make greater use of risk-based 
approaches. FSA differs from the safety case approach recommended in that it aims to 
support the rule making process at a generic level and to provide a logical 
methodology to establish rules, which may well be predominantly prescriptive. The 
approach will encourage inter-disciplinary approaches to safety and should produce 
more effective rules, which address the problems identified in a holistic manner rather 
than in an ad hoc way. It will also allow for the aggravating human element to be 
incorporated into its process. It is necessary to establish an acceptable risk evaluation 
criteria based on cost effectiveness. It should however be noted that the acceptable 
cost would be a function of and depend on the level of risk. There is still plenty of 
space for improvement on FSA within the maritime field. 
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CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to be able to associate the content of "risk" with both engineering systems and 
organisational procedures there are three main concepts that we must introduce. The first 
is the concept of risk. Risk is defined as the product of the likelihood of occurrence of a 
hazardous event by its respective consequences. The second and third concepts needed 
introducing are reliability analysis and safety analysis. Reliability analysis of an item 
involves studying its characteristics expressed by the probability that it will perform a 
required function, under given conditions, for a pre-set period of time [Villemuer, 1992]. 
If such an analysis is extended even further into accommodating the study of the 
consequences of the failures, in terms of possible damage to property, to the environment 
and to personnel, the study is thereafter referred to as safety analysis which can be either 
quantitative or qualitative or a combination of them. 
Safety can be defined as the ability of an item, equipment, or system not to cause injuries 
to people, or material damage or other unacceptable consequences during its use 
[Villemuer, 1992]. For the sake of simplicity when we refer to an engineering system, 
organisational processes as a meaning will also be included. The assessment of risk 
associated with an engineering system can be summarised in the following three 
questions: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. What are the effects and consequences? 
3. How often will they occur? 
Safety analysis pays particular attention to the following two aspects: 
" Safety when the item operates correctly: This aspect deals with the accident 
prevention, where a large number of regulations already exist to deal with this. 
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" Safety when the item or a part of it has failed: This aspect deals with the technical 
safety of the item, which can be investigated by simply using the same tools as those 
for reliability. 
Safety analysis examines techniques, which can be applied to items in order to reach a 
safe state in case of failure [Wang, 1995]. On the other hand reliability assurance 
examines techniques in order to minimize the total number of failures. However, 
techniques designed in order to increase the safety state of an item can cause reduction in 
an item's or a system's reliability [Birolini, 1993]. For example, trying to ensure the 
clarity of drinking water within a fresh water network on board a vessel, we tend to add 
more components such as filters thus reducing the overall system's reliability. Safety is 
the ability of a system or process which does not cause, under given conditions, critical or 
catastrophic consequences [Villemuer, 1992]. If examined in a holistic way the three 
concepts of risk, safety and reliability operated as sums included partially one inside the 
other. Therefore, extending reliability in terms of hazards and consequences caused by 
the failure of the item to perform according to its manufacturer's standards, we get safety 
analysis, which in turn if analysed against all possible internal or external factors 
influencing the system that the component in question is part of, we get risk analysis. 
The answers given from questions 1,2,3 concerning risk analysis, will provide adequate 
information about the safety of the system under investigation. Such information is 
interesting, mainly for statistical reasons, but is of no practical use unless there is a 
method(s) for controlling and managing the risk levels of the specified hazards and 
bringing them down to tolerable levels. Hence, for a safety assessment to be complete, 
the topic of how we can measure risk and thus reduce it should be addressed. 
When analysts examine modern engineering systems such as vessels or offshore 
platforms, it is extremely difficult to treat the system as one entity due to the increased 
complexity that its sub-systems impose [Wang & Ruxton, 1998]. It is easier, and more 
efficient, to identify the various sub-systems and further break them down to their 
components. This will enable analysts to deal with one smaller system at a time, and as 
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soon as all of them are assessed, the sub-assessments will be combined to give a clear and 
overall risk picture of the initial system. A well-established pattern of hazard 
identification and risk assessment techniques has been introduced within the last few 
years in the marine industry [Mannan, 2005]. The analyst must choose wisely according 
to the nature and depth of analysis that he would like to go into [Hauge, 2001]. Choosing 
the proper techniques can also enable the analyst to identify a greater range of hazards 
that would have been omitted otherwise. There is a variety of techniques available to the 
analyst ranging from inductive to deductive and qualitative to quantitative. 
Uncertainty in risk analysis is a major limiting factor when trying to assess the reliability 
and hence the safety of a marine engineering system [Wang, 2001]. Cases that include 
uncertainty require techniques that can handle it in an effective and efficient way in order 
to produce rational results. These techniques assist the analyst in understanding how the 
system would have behaved when an unwanted scenario takes place. Further explanations 
will be given through the test cases of the chapters to follow. It is appropriate at this point 
to go through a review of the major risk estimation and assessment techniques currently 
used in the marine industry for the assessment of reliability and safety of systems and 
processes. These techniques are able to cover aspects of the overall risk estimation model 
[Sen et al., 1993]. Through a critical review, it is possible to identify their key points and 
address any gaps that can be covered by the novel proposed methodologies within the 
next chapters. 
Safety analysis can generally be divided into two broad categories: the quantitative and 
the qualitative analysis methods. Depending on the safety data available to the 
analyst/decision maker, either a quantitative or a qualitative safety analysis can be carried 
out to study the risk of a system in terms of probability of occurrence for each hazard and 
its possible consequences [Aldwinckle & Pomeroy, 1983]. 
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3.2 Qualitative safety analysis 
Qualitative safety analysis is used to identify possible hazards and take proper 
precautions that will reduce the likelihood of occurrence and the level of consequences 
produced by those hazards in a linguistic manner. Generally this technique aims to 
generate a list of potential failures that affect the system examined. Since this method 
does not require quantitative failure data as an input to the analysis, it relies heavily on 
engineering judgement and past experience. 
A commonly employed method in qualitative safety analysis is the use of the risk matrix 
[Halebsky, 1989], [Tummala & Leung, 1995). The two parameters considered are the 
likelihood of occurrence of the failure event and the severity of the consequences of the 
failure event. Upon identifying all the hazards within the system considered, each hazard 
is evaluated in terms of these two parameters. Qualitative methods require from the 
analyst to assign linguistic variables in order to describe accurately both the likelihood as 
well as the severity of occurrence. Variables like catastrophic, critical, marginal and 
negligible are used to describe the respective severity of the consequences caused. The 
above mentioned linguistic variables can be classified in a number of categories 
according to the area examined. Table 3.1 shows four categories and their respective 
severity consequences, hierarchically, in terms of property, personnel, environment and 
company's reputation. 
Table 3.1 Hazard consequence classification 
Category Description Property Personnel Environment Reputation 
I Catastrophic System loss Death Ecosystem Media crisis damage 
Major Major Extensive 
II Critical system 
Severe 
injury/illness localised 
referral on 
TV radio damage damage , , 
newspapers 
Minor Minor Minor 
III Marginal system 
Minor 
injury/illness localised 
on referral 
radio or TV damage damage , 
newspapers 
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Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Insignificant 
referral on IV Negligible system injury/illness localised radio, TV or damage damage 
newspapers 
Similarly Table 3.2 gives 4 linguistic variables chosen to describe the frequency of 
occurrence and/or the occurrence probability. Variables like frequent, probable, 
occasional and remote, can be used by the analyst to describe the time period that the 
undesirable event takes place. An additional quantitative column exists next to the 
qualitative one in order to give a brief indication of the time intervals that each variable 
represents [Military Standards, 1993]. 
Table 3.2 Hazard probabilities and levels 
Level Description Qualitative Description Quantitative Description 
Likely to occur several The probability of occurrence A Frequent times during the lifetime of is greater than 10' the system 
Likely to occur a few times The probability of occurrence 
2 B Probable during the lifetime of the is between 10' and 10' 
system 
C Occasional Likely to 
happen once in The probability of occurrence 2 the lifetime of the system is between 10' and 10' 
Unlikely but possible to The probabili of occurrence 
D Remote occur less than one time is between 10 and 10'3 during the lifetime of the 
system 
Based on Tables 3.1 and 3.2 the analyst is called to assess hazards and suggest 
appropriate control measures based on the frequency of occurrence and the severity of 
consequences of each hazard. Critical evaluation is of utmost importance, thus experience 
plays a very important role in decision making when it comes to qualitative techniques. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are combined in such a way as to form a risk matrix, presented in 
Table 3.3 [Halebsky, 1989]. The risk matrix in its simple form as presented in Table 3.3 
can assist the analyst to prioritise the hazards ranging from those that require immediate 
control measures, up to the hazards that require control measures only on a need to 
perform in a safe manner. The risk matrix takes the frequency of occurrence or the 
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occurrence probability of an identified hazard versus the severity of consequences that 
the particular hazard would have if it occurred, and the square in the matrix that the two 
variables meet is the base for deciding the magnitude of the control measures which need 
to be taken. 
Table 3.3 The risk matrix 
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote 
Description D 
A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 
Catastrophic 
B-1 B-2 B-3 11-4 
Critical 
C-1 (-2 C-3 CA 
Marginal 
D-1 D-2 D-3 0º-. i 
Negligible 
" The red areas A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, B-3 and C-1 require immediate action and 
control measures need to be taken. The control measures must be turned towards the 
initial design stage or re-evaluation of the process in question in order to control or 
eliminate the hazards identified to an acceptable safety level. 
" The yellow areas A-4, B-3 and C-2 have particular importance, and actions should be 
taken against the control of the consequences and hazard probabilities in an 
operational or maintenance level. 
" The green areas can be separated in two categories. The first is the one consisting of 
areas B-4 and C-3. This category's control measures should be exercised only if cost 
benefit analysis performed is acceptable. 
" For areas C-4, D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4 control measures and further actions are 
required only on a need to perform safely. 
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Further development of the risk matrix on engineering systems and port operations, can 
be seen in Table 3.4 where the analyst can make decisions based on multiple 
simultaneous consequence categories. In Table 3.4, it can be seen that after defining the 
values for the occurrence frequency, several linguistic values have been chosen for 
different hazard related categories. Consulting with industrial experts four main hazard 
categories have been identified. Property, personnel, environment and company's 
reputation are of crucial importance when trying to assess the overall imposed risk during 
the operation, installation or maintenance of an engineering system or an imposed 
organisational process. Examining the four hazard categories separately the following are 
obtained: 
1. Property: Any minor of major property damage, results in loss of operation due to 
down time, along with any costs that may be incurred for repairs or replacement. 
2. Personnel: Human injuries, no matter how minor or severe may be, can always end up 
in delays in operation of the engineering system in question. 
3. Environment: Beyond the ethics of protecting the environment any damage imposed 
to it can end up in many years of ecosystem recovery if not treated properly. 
4. Reputation: Media and the image of a company projected by them can lift or 
extinguish a company from its business area. Media crisis can cause much more 
damage than any of the above three mentioned factors if not treated properly. 
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Table 3.4 Combined risk matrix 
likely to Several times likely to Unlikely but 
happen during happen orte possible 
lifetime during 
The The The probability The 
probability provability o of occurrence i: probability o 
of occurrence is between 10-' occurrence is 
oocmrnce between 10' and I O' between 10fi 
is greater and 10 2 and 10 
than 10F1 
Frequent Probable (kccasion 1 Remote 
tlýuperty Personnel Environment Reputation Category Description I) 
System Ecosystem Media crisis A-1 X-2 A-1 A4 
lass Death damage I CctlaVrrýnhic 
Extensive B-I 112 li3 B-1 
Major mfenal tv, 
system Severe Major localLsed radio, 
dautage injwy/illnsti damage newwapers II Critical 
Miror Mr r Mnor referral C-I (-4 
Sy%Je n M nor localised on tv, radio, 
damage injury/illness; damage ne"x1pen III %krrýýicutl 9166- 
Insignificant ill 1º 2 l )- I" 
hi Insignificant referral on 
t system Insignificant localised radio, 
injury/illne: s damage newspapers IV NcxdigiNe 
I 
The risk matrix is probably the most commonly used method when qualitative assessment 
needs to be utilised. Its main aim is the estimation of the risk imposed by the occurrence 
of each hazard identified. It can handle uncertainty giving rational results based on expert 
judgements and past experience or limited statistical data. It can handle different 
simultaneous consequence categories but lacks the ability to handle multiple criteria and 
express interdependencies between systems and components at different levels. For 
example it can be appropriately used for qualitative assessment if it had to deal with just a 
single row of consequences but it lacks the ability to deal with different consequence 
cells for each consequence column. It can be utilised at either a preliminary design level 
or prior to more in-depth reliability/safety analysis of an engineering system. It usually 
follows a failure mode and effects analysis, which will be analysed in section 3.4.3 of this 
chapter. 
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3.3 Quantitative safety analysis 
Quantitative risk analysis utilises what is known and assumed about the numerical failure 
characteristics of each individual component to build a mathematical model that is 
associated with some or all of the following information [Aldwinckle & Pomeroy, 1983): 
" Failure rates. 
" Repair rates. 
" Mission time. 
" System logic. 
" Maintenance schedules. 
" Human error. 
" System layout. 
Quantitative analysis like qualitative analysis requires information concerning the 
occurrence probability or frequency of occurrence of a hazard and their respective 
severity of consequences; only this time the linguistic variables used in qualitative 
analysis need to be quantified. Quantitative risk analysis must include [Aldwinckle & 
Pomeroy, 1983]: 
9 The occurrence probability of each system failure event: A system failure, considered 
to be the main event, results from simultaneous occurrence of the basic events 
associated with each of the minimal cut sets leading to this system failure. The 
occurrence probability of a system failing may be calculated on the basis of the 
identified cut sets and failure probability data of the associated basic events. 
" The magnitude of its possible consequences: The possible consequences of a system's 
failures can be quantified in terms of possible loss of lives/human injuries, property 
damage, ecosystem damage and the reputation of the managing company which was 
affected by the consequences of the failure event. 
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Consistency checking is required to validate the results produced from quantitative 
analysis. The following studies are always useful for obtaining reliable results: 
" Sensitivity analysis. 
" Comparison with prior analysis if possible (if possible it should be stated in the case 
that no prior statistical data exist). 
" Model checking. 
3.4 Methods for Safety and Reliability Assessment 
The reliability analysis usually takes place at the end of the design process right after the 
layout of the system has been determined. The role of the analysis is to verify if the 
reliability of the system satisfies the demanded reliability standards. However, if it is 
performed at the end of the design process it becomes too costly, as usually there is not 
enough time available to introduce major changes in the system if required. Therefore, 
the results of the analysis have little influence on the system's design. The reliability 
analysis would have a major influence on the design, if it were to be applied during the 
conceptual design. This would result in a more reliable and less expensive system. A 
system that is reliable in concept, is less expensive than a system that is not reliable in 
concept, but was improved at a later phase of the design or manufacturing process 
[Dodson & Nolan, 1999]. 
A number of well-established safety and reliability analytical methods are available to aid 
assessments of a risk-based nature. The appropriate technique(s) that can be applied to 
carry out assessment tasks would depend on the clarified hazards, their available data and 
the stage reached in the analysis up to that point. 
3.4.1 Preliminary hazard analysis 
Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) was introduced in 1966 after the Department of 
Defence of the United States of America requested safety studies to be performed at all 
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stages of product development. The Department of Defence issued guidelines that came 
into force in 1963 [Military Standards, 1963]. PHA is performed to identify areas of the 
system, which will have an effect on safety by evaluating the major hazards associated 
with the system. It provides an initial assessment of the identified hazards. PHA typically 
involves: 
1. Determine hazards that might exist and possible consequence effects. 
2. Determine a clear set of guidelines and objectives to be used during a design. 
3. Create plans to deal with critical hazards. 
4. Assign responsibilities for hazard control (management and technical). 
5. Allocate time and resources to deal with hazards. 
Brainstorming techniques are used during which, the design or operation of the system is 
discussed on the basis of the experience of the people involved in the brainstorming 
activity. Checklists are commonly used to assist identifying hazards [DOD, 2000]. 
The results of the PHA are often presented in tabular form, which would typically include 
information such as but not limited to [Henley & Kumamoto, 1992], [Smith, 1992], 
[Villemuer, 1992): 
1. A brief description of the system and its domain. 
2. A brief description of any sub-systems identified at this phase and the boundaries 
between them. 
3. A list of identified hazards applicable to the system, including a description and any 
possible available references. 
4. A list of identified accidents applicable to the system including a description, 
references and a description of the associated hazards and accident sequences. 
5. The accident risk classification. 
6. Preliminary probability targets for each accident. 
7. Preliminary predicted probabilities for each accident sequence. 
8. Preliminary probability targets for each hazard. 
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9. A description of the system functions and safety features. 
10. A description of human error which could create or contribute to accidents. 
The advantages of using the PHA method include: 
1. It identifies the potential for major hazards at a very early stage of project 
development. 
2. It provides basis for design and maintenance decisions. 
3. It helps to ensure system to system and system to environment compatibility. 
4. It facilitates the basic framework for a full hazard analysis later. 
The disadvantage of PHA is that it is not comprehensive and must be followed by a full 
HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study. HAZOP will be analysed further down within 
this chapter. 
3.4.2 What-if approach 
What-if analysis uses a creative team, brainstorming "what if' questioning approach to 
the examination of a system in order to identify potential hazards and their consequences 
[CCPS, 1992]. Hazards are identified, existing safeguards noted, and qualitative severity 
and likelihood ratings are assigned to aid the risk management decision making process. 
Questions that begin with what-if are formulated by engineering personnel, experienced 
in the process or operation preferably in advance. There are several advantages and 
disadvantages in using the what-if approach [Groumpos & Merkuryev, 2002]. 
The advantages include: 
1. A team of relevant experts extends knowledge and creativity pool. 
2. Easy to use. 
3. Ability to focus on a specific element (i. e. human error or environmental issues). 
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4. Ability to address issues like minor changes of system parameters. This is also called 
sensitivity analysis as it describes how sensitive a system is in minor parametric 
alterations. 
The disadvantages include: 
1. The quality of the what-if analysis is dependent on knowledge, thoroughness and 
experience of a team. 
2. Loose structure that can let hazards slip through. 
3. It does not directly address operability problems. 
3.4.3 Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis 
Failure mode effects analysis (FMEA) [SAE, 1967) is a technique which itemises in the 
form of an inventory all failure modes of each piece of equipment and their effect on the 
system. The emphasis is on hardware failure. A risk analyst applies this technique, when 
he/she wants to answer the question "what can go wrong with this system? " 
A failure mode is the number of different ways a piece of equipment or operation can fail 
[Kumamoto, 1992], [Villemeur, 1992]. Some examples are shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Examples of failure modes 
System Failure modes 
Belt conveyor system Belt snaps 
Roller bearing fails 
Roller seizes 
Conveyor collapses 
Actuated valve in fluid pipeline Fails to open 
Fails to close 
Internal leakage 
External leakage 
Pressure control system Fails high 
Fails low 
Degraded 
Erratic 
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FMEA identifies single failure modes that play a significant part in an accident or loss 
event. The analysis is not efficient for identifying combinations of equipment failures that 
lead to accidents. Human errors are not usually considered specifically in FMEA, even 
though the effects of mal-operation are usually included in an equipment failure mode. 
3.4.3.1 Significant failure modes 
The significant failure modes for components are listed as follows: 
" Failure to open/close/start/stop or continue operation. 
" Spurious failure. 
" Degradation. 
" Erratic behaviour. 
+ Scheduled service/replacement. 
" External/ internal leakage. 
Most components would fall in one of the above categories 
3.4.3.2 FMEA Methodology 
FMEA methodology involves completing an FMEA table by systematically examining 
every piece of equipment and recording all failure modes that may be possible. For each 
failure mode, immediately effected and expected events are recorded. Table 3.6 shows a 
typical FMEA table along with a described example of the role of relief valves within a 
vessel's steering gear system. 
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Table 3.6 FMEA table 
Component Function 
Failure 
mode 
Failure 
cause 
Effect on 
the system 
Detection 
means 
Operation 
actions 
Comments 
Relief valves are Valve stuck Mechanical Incorrect Regular Renimc the I ow possibility 
used to protect open Failure operation may cheeks oft he fiaulty valve of fäilure 
the piping cause damage valve from the and replace it because the 
system from oil Valve stuck Human error to other engine room if relief valves are 
overpressure. If close components personnel to maintenance strictly 
the pressure Erosion of the system monitor of the valve is inspected from 
Relief Valve 
inside the piping Valve is valve's good impossible surveyors 
system is leaking Loss of oil operation during the 
increased above due to steering gear's 
the expected it leakage operation 
may cause 
damage to the 
pipes and 
flanges. 
Sometimes it is useful to extend an FMEA to include criticality ranking (Failure Mode, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis - FMECA). Here each failure mode would be ranked 
according to a chosen scheme. FMEA is a qualitative technique and measures of 
significance are qualitatively assessed, as shown in Table 3.1. 
Criticality analysis allows a qualitative or a quantitative ranking of the criticality of the 
failure modes of items, as a function of the severity classification and occurrence 
likelihood. As long as the probability of occurrence of each failure mode of an item can 
be obtained from a reliable source, the criticality number of the item under a particular 
severity class may be quantitatively calculated as: 
C=ýE, L, t [3.1] 
E; = Failure consequence probability of failure mode i. 
Li = Likelihood of occurrence of failure mode i. 
N= The number of the failure modes of the item, which fäll under a particular severity 
classification. 
t= Duration of applicable mission phase. 
Once the criticality numbers of the item under all severity classes have been obtained, a 
criticality matrix can be constructed to provide a means for criticality comparison. Such 
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a matrix displays the distribution of criticality of the failure modes of the item and 
provides a tool for assigning priority for corrective action. Criticality analysis can be 
performed at different system/sub-system levels and the information produced at low 
levels may be used for criticality analysis at a higher level [Wang et al., 1995]. 
An FMECA is an inductive process that involves the compilation of reliability data as 
well as the consequences imposed on the system if any of the individual items parting it 
fail. It can be integrated into the hazard identification phase of the safety and reliability 
assessment process [Wang et al., 1995]. To maximise its usefulness as a decision making 
tool, it should be initiated at the earliest stage of design, and then updated and expanded 
to lower levels as the design progresses. In the maritime industry Det Noske Veritas 
(DNV) and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) adopted the requirement for 
FMEA/FMECA in the mid 1970s and early 1980s [Coggin, 2001 ]. 
The completed FMEA or FMECA is a systematic tabulation of the effects of equipment 
failure within a process or system [Kumamoto, 1992]. Equipment failures with an 
unacceptable criticality ranking should be re-examined to verify the failure modes and 
their effects, and to reduce or eliminate them where needed [Villemeur, 1992]. 
The FMEA methodology consists of the following step [Pentti & Atte, 2002]: 
1. Define the complete functional boundaries of the system to be analysed. This is done 
by marking up a set of drawings and annotating them to show their functional limits 
and dependencies. 
2. Define the level of detail, It is necessary to decide whether the study will be 
conducted at component level, or at sub-component level. For example, if a 
centrifugal pump is one component in the system, a component level analysis might 
include the failure modes of the pump (stopped, racing, low output, cavitating, seal 
leakage, etc. ). A sub-component level analysis will have to look at each of the 
elements that make up the pump (casing, impeller, shaft, seal, drive motor, etc). 
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3. Very often, sub-component level of detail is not required, unless there is a specific 
need based on the type of application, e. g. nuclear or aerospace industry. As a 
compromise, major sub-components may be included. 
4. FMEA data sheet. The main elements of a data sheet are shown in Table 3.6. The 
sheet typically includes the following: 
9 Header information describing the system being studied, drawing references, list of 
team members, date and location of study, etc. 
" Component identified. This would include a functional identifier, (e. g. boiler feed- 
water pump), an identification tag that can be tied to a drawing, and reference to the 
system or subsystem of which the component is a part. 
" Failure mode. This should be concise and realistic. A failure frequency may be 
included, based on the information in Table 3.2. 
" Effect on system. This requires examination of the failure mode from a 
multidisciplinary perspective by the team. This mainly depends on the expertise of 
the team, and available documentation, and is the most critical aspect of the study. 
"A severity ranking may be included, based on the way the failure mode affects the 
system, using Table 3.1 as a guide. 
" Method of failure detection. For high severity (critical or higher) consequences, it is 
necessary to provide some form of failure detection. The method may detect incipient 
failures before they become critical. If no detection exists, the team may develop one 
and include it in the study recommendations. The detection method could be 
procedural, e. g. regular inspection and testing. 
" System and operator response. The response may include the following [Wang, 
1995]: 
Ability of the automatic controls to absorb the effects of failure, if the design 
includes this capability. 
¢ Ability of the operator to respond to the failure in time. This should be realistic and 
not too optimistic. 
> Resolutions on any additional hardware, or changes to procedures required. 
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The following documents are required as a minimum, for the FMEA/FMECA study: 
" Project design basis. 
" Engineering line diagrams (these are also referred to as piping and 
instrumentation diagrams or P&IDs) in the process industries. 
" Electrical line diagram. 
" System description. 
" Instrument logic or ladder diagrams. 
" Instrument loop diagrams. 
Some other additional important documents are: 
" Training manuals. 
" System operating procedures. 
" Manufacturer's manuals for equipment. 
3.5 Advantages and limitations of FMEA 
The major advantages of FMEA are the ease of construction at component level and 
quick identification of critical failures in a properly conducted study. It is useful for 
machinery and material handling systems compared to other techniques. Furthermore, for 
systems with predominantly linear interactions, FMEA provides the simplest way of 
identifying and correcting potential failures that would have an adverse effect on system 
performance. FMEA also provides valuable information on the failure modes, which 
could be used in more sophisticated techniques such as fault tree analysis for 
quantification of system failure frequency [Wang et al, 1995]. 
There are a number of limitations in the range of applicability of the FMEA technique 
such as: 
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" It addresses only one component at a time, and may not reveal the complex and 
hidden interactions in the subsystem and between subsystems in the system. 
" It does not provide sufficient detail for quantification of system consequences. 
It should be noted that FMEA and FMECA are useful when used in conjunction with 
three other hazard analysis tools. These are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) where contributing equipment 
failure leads to a stated hazard. These techniques will de described in the following 
pages. 
3.6 HAZOP 
HAZOP study, is a systematic examination of the design or operation of an installation, 
as represented by layout and engineering diagrams with all control, instrumentation and 
sequence of operations shown, all design documents and operations manuals [Kletz, 
1974]. Deviations from all design values of key parameters are studied, using guidewords 
to control the examination evaluation. Examples of such guidewords are found in Table 
3.7. 
Table 3.7 Examples of HAZOP guidewords with associated examples 
Guideword Example 
No No flow, no signal 
Less Less flow, less cooling 
More Excess temperature, excess pressure 
Opposite Cooling instead of heating 
Also Water as well as lubricating oil 
Other Heating instead of pumping 
Early Opening the drain valve too soon 
Late Opening the drain valve too late 
Part of Part of Incomplete drainage 
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In the chemical process plants, the design is given in a piping diagram. In the 
manufacturing context the operation is represented as an engineering diagram. This 
diagram is a schematic representation of the material flow with all operational controls 
and protection devices shown on each item of equipment. HAZOP study is undertaken by 
a group of senior representatives from design, project and operating personnel, using a 
comprehensive checklist of guidewords or questions about possible deviations from 
normal operations 
3.6.1 Cases to be applied 
The study is generally undertaken before the construction of new equipment, or before 
making major modifications to existing systems, in order to facilitate the recognition of a 
large number of hazards or potential operating problems which can be avoided by 
redesign or adoption of suitable operating procedures [Henley & Kumamoto, 1992). The 
earlier a potential problem is found, the less expensive it is to rectify the problem, and the 
more likely it is that the solution will in fact be implemented. It can be said that it is a 
more advanced FMEA. 
This structured simulation of the operations and deviations serves as an excellent means 
of communication between design and operating staff, and forms a useful base for writing 
operating procedures [Kletz, 1974]. While the technique appears to be time consuming at 
the design stage, costs are normally recovered rapidly by smooth and prompt 
commissioning and avoidance of further modifications during commissioning and 
subsequent operation. 
The FMEA/HAZOP study could form the basis of a statutory approval for new systems 
or significant modifications to existing systems, where the organisation seeking approval 
provides all necessary data and evaluation to the relevant authorities for consideration 
[Hendershot et al., 1998]. It may also be possible for a member of the approval authority 
to participate in the HAZOP team. 
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For existing operations, the study could be undertaken to identify possible hazards that 
are not obvious, to minimise business interruption risks and to improve operability on the 
whole by making appropriate changes to equipment, control systems, protection systems 
and to operating/maintenance procedures [HSE, 2002]. 
3.6.2 Process to be followed 
The team formally reviews each part on the engineering diagram using a series of 
questions to consider what could happen to the process, equipment and personnel in an 
abnormal situation and how that situation could arise. The team looks for every deviation 
of operational parameters in an open ended way, making the assumption that a problem 
can only arise when there is a deviation from the design or operating intentions, e. g. no 
movement or reverse movement when there should be a forward movement. 
The guidewords are applied to each parameter for that line or equipment item/ group. The 
typical parameters in a fluid system handling facility are flow, level, pressure, 
temperature and composition. In the case of materials handling, the parameters are speed, 
load, direction, impact, orientation, temperature, packaging, access, etc. 
It is essential to make the guidewords as specific as possible and appropriate to the type 
of process or operation studied, in order to make the HAZOP technique most effective 
[Henley & Kumamoto, 1992]. 
3.7 Fault tree analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a widely used tool for the systematic analysis of 
combinations of events that can lead to an incident [Veseley et al., 2002). A fault tree is a 
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logical diagram showing the different ways that a system can fail in terms of a defined 
final failure event. 
A simplified fault tree for a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) related fire event is shown in 
Figure 3.1. The tree depicts the causes of failure by working backwards from the `top- 
event', identifying all contributors to the event. The tree structure is created by tracing 
back the top-event to possible causes (failure modes or basic events), which may be 
component failures, human errors or any other events that can lead to the final incident. 
LPG fire 
occurs 
LPG leak 
not isolated 
2.36 x 10 '5/yr 
LPG leak 
occurs E 
3.3 x 10-4 /yr 
Gas 
detector 
fails 
6.7x10'2 
7.09 x 10 Blyr 
ignition 
occurs 
0.3 
Leak not isolated 
t7x 
10 'z 
5 x10.3 
Figure 3.1 FTA of LPG fire 
There is a standard nomenclature for FTA. The most commonly used symbols and their 
definitions are listed in Table 3.8 [Kumamoto & Ernest, 1996]. 
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UNDER 
INSTRUCTION 
FROM 
UNIVERSITY 
Table 3.8 Most commonly used symbols for FTA 
In general, the failure of an item, equipment or the development of an undesirable 
situation (e. g. high pressure level in tank) will create a'demand' on the protection system 
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to operate, e. g. level switch to close feed valve. The undesirable top event occurs when 
there is a demand and the protection system fails. 
A demand on the protection system to be brought into operation is generally expressed as 
a frequency (e. g. number of times/year). The chance that the 'protection system would be 
in a failed state' when the demand occurs is expressed as a probability. 
For instance, presence of gas in an LPG installation is a demand on the gas detector 
(protection system) to shut off the isolation valves. If the detection fails when called upon 
to act, or the isolation valve fails to close, then there is the chance of a fire or gas 
explosion, if the leak finds an ignition source (see Figure 3.1). 
In order to calculate the frequency of the top event, failure rate frequencies and/or 
probabilities of failure are applied to each of the basic events. There are several basic 
rules for deriving results from within fault trees and there is a logic technique called 
Boolean algebra that reduces the size of a fault tree to minimise its complexity and 
produce the minimum possible combination of basic events that lead to the occurrence of 
the top event. These minimum combination are called minimum cut-sets [Henley & 
Kumamoto, 1992], [Villemeur, 1992]. 
3.7.1 Fault tree construction 
A good summary of fault tree construction is provided by Lees [Lees, 1996], and is 
described as follows: 
"The construction of a fault tree appears a relatively simple exercise, but it is not always 
as straightforward as it seems and there are a number of traps that should be avoided" 
[Lees, 1996]. Prior to construction of the fault tree, it is necessary to properly define and 
understand the function of the system in question. Both the system itself and its 
boundaries need to be clearly defined [Fussell, 1973]. Information on the system is 
generally available in the form of functional diagrams such as piping and instrument 
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diagrams along with more detailed instrumentation and electrical diagrams. There will 
also be other information required on the equipment and its operation as well as for the 
working environment. The quality of the final tree depends crucially on a good 
understanding of the system, and time spent on this stage is well repaid. It is emphasised 
by Fussell [Fussel, 1973], that "the system boundary conditions should not be confused 
with the physical boundaries of the system". The system boundary conditions define the 
situation for which the fault tree is to be constructed. 
An important system boundary condition is the top event. The initial system 
configuration constitutes additional boundary conditions. This configuration should 
represent the system in the failed-free state. Where a component has more than one 
operational states, an initial condition needs to be specified for that component. 
Furthermore, there may be fault events declared to exist and other fault events not to be 
considered, these being termed by Fussell the "existing system boundary conditions" and 
the "not-allowed system boundary conditions" [Fussel, 1973], respectively. The principal 
elements in fault trees are the top event, primary/basic events, intermediate events, and 
the "AND" and "OR" gates. 
Some points worth taking into consideration when constructing a fault tree are: 
9 If the normal functioning of a component propagates a fault sequence, then it is 
assumed that the component functions normally. 
All inputs to a particular gate should be completely defined before further analysis of 
any of them is undertaken. 
9 Gate inputs should be properly defined fault events, and gates should not be directly 
connected to other gates. 
Each event in the tree, whether it is a top, intermediate or basic event, should be carefully 
defined. Failure to observe a proper discipline in the definition of events can lead to 
confusion and an incorrect tree. The identifiers assigned to events are also important. If a 
single event is given two identifiers, the fault tree itself may be correct, although slightly 
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confusing, but in the minimum cut sets the event will appear as two separate events, 
which is incorrect. 
For a process system, the top event will normally be a failure mode of the equipment. The 
immediate causes will be the failure mechanisms for that particular failure. These in turn 
constitute the failure modes of the contributing subsystems, and so on. The procedure 
followed in constructing the fault tree needs to ensure that the tree is consistent. Two 
types of consistency may be distinguished: series consistency within one branch and 
parallel consistency between two or more branches. Account needs also to be taken of 
events, which are certain to occur, and those, which are impossible. The development of a 
fault tree is a creative process. It involves identification of failure effects, modes and 
mechanisms [Vesely et al, 2002) Although it is often regarded primarily as a means of 
quantifying hazardous events, which it is, the fault tree is of equal importance as a means 
of hazard identification. It follows also that fault trees created by different analysts will 
tend to differ. The differences may be due to style, judgement and/or omissions and 
errors. 
It is generally desirable that a fault tree has a well-defined structure. In many cases such a 
structure arises naturally. It is common to create a 'demand tree', which shows the 
propagation of the faults in the absence of protective systems, and then to add branches, 
representing protection by instrumentation and by the process operator, which are 
connected by AND gates (Villemeur, 1992]. 
3.7.2 Dependence 
A fundamental assumption in fault tree analysis is that the events considered are 
independent, unless stated otherwise. Formally, the events are assumed to be statistically 
independent. In practice, there are many types of situations where events are not 
completely independent. In fault tree this problem was originally known as 'common 
mode failure', then as 'common cause failure' and now more usually as `dependent 
failure' [Villemeur A., 1992]. 
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After consultation, in the form of a structured interview, with several industrial experts 
(see Appendix II), the following examples of dependency chosen are as follows: 
>A single component sharing a control function and a trip function. This design is 
generally to be avoided, but some older engineering systems don't separate these 
two. An example is a control valve being used as a shutdown valve as well. 
> The failure of a piece of equipment or a component giving rise to more than one 
demand. An example is the fully pressurised cargo system on board an LPG vessel, 
causing both high pressure and low temperature conditions calling upon the 
protection system to operate. 
> Supply from a common utility such as electric power or instrument air for 
pneumatically actuated instruments. 
> Common degrading factors for several protection systems, such as vibration, 
corrosion, dust, humidity etc. 
>A fire or explosion disabling a number of pieces of equipment simultaneously. 
The problem is particularly acute in systems, such as LPG containment and gas free 
systems, where a very high degree of reliability is sought. The method of achieving this is 
through the use of protective systems incorporating a high degree of redundancy. On 
paper, the assessed reliabilities of such systems are very high. But there has been a 
nagging worry that this protection may be defeated by the phenomenon of dependent 
failure, which may take many and subtle forms [Lees 1996] 
Again, following the structured interview method, and after consultation of the same 
industry's experts (see Appendix II), the following situations, which can cause dependent 
failure, include: 
>A common utility. 
A common defect in manufacture. 
>A common defect in application. 
>A common exposure to a degrading factor. 
> An external influence. 
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>A hazardous event. 
> Inappropriate operation. 
¢ Inappropriate maintenance. 
Not all-dependent failures involve independent equipment. Another significant type of 
dependent failure is the overload, which can occur when one piece of equipment fails and 
throws a higher load on another piece of operating equipment. 
Failures caused by domino effects, and escalation faults generally, may also be regarded 
as dependent failures. Dependent failure, then, is a crucial problem in high reliability 
systems. 
Two examples are given below: 
A cable tray carries a coaxial cable, carrying signals between field instruments and 
the control room. A single cable can carry several signals. Should the cable fail due 
to a fire, impact, electrical fault, power failure etc., and then all the protection 
systems to which the cable had carried signals would be disabled at the same time. 
> In an LPG cargo tank, the safety system contains three independent oxygen 
analysers, high oxygen alarm/trip based on a two-out-of-three failure voting system. 
However, if all analysers draw a process gas sample from a single sampling point, a 
blockage of the sampling nozzle would disable all the analyser protection function 
simultaneously. 
Once the dependence potential has been identified, there are two ways of representing it 
in the tree [Vesely, 2002]: 
> Continue to enter each fault separately as it occurs in the tree, but ensuring that each 
such entry is assigned the same identifier, so that the minimum cut sets are 
determined correctly. 
> Enter the effect as a single fault under an AND gate higher up the tree. 
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A further measure, which may be taken to identify dependent failure, is to examine the 
minimum cut sets for common susceptibilities or common locations. In the first approach 
the minimum cut sets are obtained using the laws of Boolean algebra. 
In such situations, when a fault tree construction includes separate blocks for each 
demand/protection failure combination, the same block may appear in more than one 
branch; or alternatively, the same mode may appear in more than one block. The initial 
fault tree has to be `reduced' to ensure that such duplications would not distort the top 
event frequency. This `reduction' is achieved with the aid of Boolean algebra. Just as 
normal algebra adds or multiplies quantities, which have a numerical value using normal 
rules of arithmetic, Boolean Algebra operates on'logical' quantities [Wang et al, 2001]. 
The laws for simplifying sets and obtaining the minimum cut sets leading to the top event 
in a fault tree are based on the basic logic gates of AND, OR and NOT being used in 
differing combinations. Suppose """ stands for "AND" and "+" stands for "OR", and 
suppose that "A" and "B" represent the events of "not A" and "not B" respectively, 
then the typical Boolean algebra rules are described as in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.9 Boolean algebra rules 
Name of the rule AND form OR form 
Identity law A" 1= A A+ 0= A 
Null (or dominance) law A-0=0 A+1=1 
Idempotent law A" A= A A+ A= A 
Inverse law A" A=O A+ A= 1 
Commutative law A" B= B" A A+ B= B+ A 
Associative law (A " B) "C=A" (B " C) (A + B) +C=A+ (B + C) 
Distributive law A+ (B " C) = (A + B) " (A A" (B + C) =A"B+A 
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+ C) C 
Absorption A" (A + B) =A A+A"B=A 
De Morgan's law A" B=A+B A -+B =A"B 
Double Complement law 7=A 
Owing to such simplification rules, the occurrence probability of a top event can be 
obtained from the associated minimum cut sets [Bozzano & Villafiorita, 2003]. 
3.7.3 Examples of FTA 
The following example is used to demonstrate the procedure required to build and assess 
a fault tree. It can be considered as a tutorial in the construction of fault trees for those 
not being familiar with this process. 
An LPG mix system takes two chemicals Cl and C2 at a set ratio and reacts them to form 
a product P. The feed flows are independently controlled by two control valves. Should 
either control valve fail, the reaction ratio would be upset, resulting in an automatic 
shutdown. The automatic shutdown is achieved by a high C1/C2 ratio trip, shutting down 
the C1 feed. It is critical to shutdown reactant C1 as it is highly flammable. There is no 
independent shutdown valve on the Cl feed line, and the control valve is also used as the 
shutdown valve (dependence). 
The fault tree is given in Figure 3.2, 
where: 
A= Cl feed control valve fails to high 
B= C2 feed control valve fails to low 
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C= C1/C2 ratio high trip relay failure 
T= flameable CI vented to atmosphere (top event). 
Figure 3.2 Unreduced fault tree for LPG mixer 
The base event A appears twice entering an AND gate in the fault tree (Cl control valve 
fails to high). Therefore, this fault tree needs to be reduced. The fault tree can be 
represented by the following algebraic expression: 
T=(A+B) (A+ C) 
T= A A+A B+A C+B C 
Applying the Boolean reduction rules of Table 3.10, 
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T= A+B C 
The reduced tree is shown in Figure 3.3. 
T 
Release to atmosphere 
A)I 
Ratio high 
trip failure 
B) (C 
Figure 3.3 Boolean reduced fault tree for LPG mixer 
The minimum cut sets are: 
A 
BC 
In the second approach, since it is known that A causes the dependence, it can be directly 
linked to the top gate. This is possible in simple systems but can mislead in complex 
systems for which the first approach is more suitable. 
FTA can be used in both reliability and safety assessment. The principles of FTA in both 
of these assessments are the same although in reliability assessment it is usually used for 
measuring system performance while in risk assessment it is used for investigating 
undesirable events with increased severity of consequences [Wang et al, 1993]. It can be 
carried out in the risk estimation phase of the safety and reliability assessment process to 
identify the minimal cut sets associated with major brake-downs (top events) and to 
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assess the occurrence probability of each top event in order to assist in design decision 
making and hazard identification process. FTA's major disadvantage is the lack of 
handling data in cases of uncertainty and vagueness. It can only produce quantitative 
results if quantitative information is readily available from statistical data or failure 
databases. Another major drawback of the method is the lack of producing results based 
on interdependences of components within a system. Methods like fuzzy sets and 
Bayesian approach are more suited in cases with high complexity level and data under 
uncertainty. 
3.8 Event tree analysis (ETA) 
In the case of standby systems and in particular, safety and mission-oriented systems, the 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is used to identify the various possible outcomes of the 
system following a given initiating event which is generally an unsatisfactory operating 
event or situation. In the case of continuously operated systems, these events can occur 
(i. e. components can fail) in any arbitrary order. In the ETA, the components can be 
considered in any order since they do not operate chronologically with respect to each 
other. ETA provides a systematic and logical approach to identify consequences and to 
assess the probability of occurrence of each possible resulting sequence caused by the 
initiating failure event [Henley & Kumamoto, 1992], [Villemuer, 1992]. 
Event trees are primarily safety oriented by nature, being particularly suitable for the 
analysis of systems where time is a significant factor, for example, when manual 
intervention can avoid further development of an incident if applied within a specified 
time, such as a secondary cooling water system in a heat exchanger. Working forward in 
time from the failure event, the operation of each safety means or contingency plan is 
considered. When these fail to achieve the desired result, the consequence is established 
and the frequency is determined [Henley & Kumamoto, 1992], [Villemeur, 1992], 
[Birolini, 1993]. 
69 
Figure 3.4 shows an event tree analysis concerning a main engine lubricating oil pump 
that failed in its operation. A series of risk control measures are examined sequentially 
and all the possible ending scenarios are calculated based on their respective 
consequences. Multiplying the probabilities that correspond to any path from the 
initiation of the failure event to the end of any consequence, the path will give us the 
probability of occurrence of that particular scenario. 
M/E L0 PUMP FAILURE EMERGENCY PUMP IN ALARM SOUNDS IN E/R ENGINEER OF WATCH Consequence Frequency 
OPERATION CONTROL ROOM ACTS IMMEDIATELY 
NO DAMAGE 
NO DAMAGE 
NO DAMAGE 
NO DAMAGE 
MINOR DAMAGE 
MODERATE DAMAGE 
SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE 
Figure 3.4 Event tree analysis of a main engine lubricating oil pump failing 
3.9 Cause consequence analysis 
Cause consequence analysis (CCA) is nothing more than a combined FTA with ETA. 
This results in an upgraded ETA as it compiles the information gathered from the FTA 
and propagates it to the ETA. Figure 3.5 gives a schematic representation of the 
combination of the two techniques. This analytical diagram method was developed in the 
1970s at RISO National Laboratories in Denmark [Nielsen, 1977] to specifically aid in 
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I 
I11i 
tI`' Accident 
Chain 
Breakers 
Consequences 
, 
_, 
_' 
the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear power plants in Scandinavian countries 
[Villemeur, 1992]. 
Figure 3.5 Cause consequence schematic diagram 
Starting from a main hazardous event CCA is a very versatile method in terms of 
operation [IMO, 2002a]. It can continue forward towards the estimation of the 
probabilities of its respective consequences or it can go backwards towards the 
identification of the basic events that led to the initiation of the event [Nielsen et al, 
1977]. In general terms it is not preferable as it has the disadvantages of both techniques 
combined and for simple situations it provides the analyst with additional work. 
3.10 Simulation analysis 
Simulation analysis is any method imitating the behaviour of an actual system under 
reliability and safety assessment. For example, Monte Carlo simulation [Cortazar & 
Schwartz, 1998] is a simulation method that uses statistical trials in calculating multiple 
scenarios (i. e., evaluating substantive hypotheses) of the risk-based analytical model by 
repeatedly sampling values from the probability distributions for the uncertain variables 
to get an approximate solution to a problem. There is a random process where some 
parameters of the process are equal to the required quantities of the problem. Since these 
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Chain 
Breakers 
parameters are not known exactly, many assumptions are made so that the parameters of 
the process can be determined approximately. Each time a value is randomly selected, it 
forms one possible scenario and one solution to the problem. Together, these scenarios 
give a range of possible solutions/outcomes, some of which are more probable and some 
less probable. The Monte Carlo method is commonly acceptable due to the 
approximation of its results but it lacks speed and in giving a definitive point as best 
likely solution to the risk estimation problems [Armstrong et at, 2005]. First and second 
order reliability methods (Form/Sorm) provide better results in almost half the time 
Monte Carlo requires and along with this a most likely failure point among a locus of 
possible solutions. Further analysis of a modified version of Form/Sorm methods will be 
presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
3.11 Subjective reasoning analysis 
In cases where there is unavailability of data, analysts are required to produce a model 
based on subjective judgments. These mathematical models can give rational results but 
cannot accommodate cases where in-depth analysis is required. Linguistic variables are 
used while trying to give a qualitative measurement to quantities. For example, when a 
description is required to explain the transition between different levels of the same 
quantity e. g. if a cargo is examined the transition from medium to heavy cannot be a 
single point on a graph. Realistically, the weight would gradually increase towards the 
heavy condition. Subjective reasoning could be combined with FMEA and the risk 
matrix, in an attempt to give a more thorough description to the model examined. 
Problems like that are better tackled using fuzzy set theory which will be analysed in a 
more extensive way in this thesis in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
3.12 Outline of the techniques developed to deal with uncertainty 
The techniques examined in the previous sections of this chapter are commonly used 
within the marine industry framework for risk and estimation assessment. All of them 
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though show significant difficulty in tackling interdependence between the components 
of an engineering system, or dealing with vagueness and uncertainty conditions. There 
are certain techniques developed like Bayesian networks (BNs), fuzzy-logic (FL) and 
evidential reasoning (ER), which have proved efficient and effective in dealing with 
vague and uncertain conditions in cases where traditional techniques face problems. 
These techniques will be further discussed, analysed and applied through a number of test 
cases within the chapters of the thesis. 
3.12.1 Bayesian networks 
BNs are part of a class of probabilistic models with strong connections to graph theory. 
Initially their main usage was to back up logical statements based on deterministic 
production rules. The immediate advantage is that each variable may have more values 
than the traditional true and false and not all relations have to be deterministic. 
Influence diagrams, which further extend the notion of BNs by including decision nodes 
and utility nodes, have been used in human reliability assessment [Humphreys, 1995] and 
decision-making on explosion protection offshore [Bolsover & Wheeler, 1999]. A good 
reference work for the computational method underlying the implementation of them is 
included in Hugin software as described [Jensen, 1993]. Hugin software enables a 
powerful risk assessment solution that is easy to use, flexible, and appropriate for use on 
marine and offshore applications. Other renowned program packages for BN building 
and influencing include MSBNx [Kadie et al, 20011, created at Microsoft Research, and 
Netica [Netica, 2002], the commercial program developed by Norsys Software Corp. 
3.12.2 Fuzzy logic 
Fuzzy logic systems are knowledge/rule-based systems constructed from human 
knowledge in the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules [Wang, 1997]. The rules output an IF- 
THEN statement in which some words are characterised by continuous membership 
functions [Zadeh, 1965]. For example, the following is a fuzzy IF-THEN rule: 
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IF the likelihood of a hazard is frequent AND severity of occurrence is catastrophic, 
THEN risk level is high. The linguistic variables frequent, catastrophic and high are 
characterised by the membership functions. The starting point of constructing a fuzzy 
logic system (FLS) is to obtain a collection of fuzzy IF-THEN rules from human experts 
or based on the domain knowledge. As a fuzzy system is constructed from a collection of 
fuzzy IF-THEN rules, the next step is to combine these rules into a single system. 
Different fuzzy systems use different principles for this combination. An important 
contribution of fuzzy system theory is that it provides a systematic procedure for 
transforming a knowledge base into a non-linear mapping thus being able to tackle 
uncertainty and vagueness when it appears during the reliability and safety assessment of 
engineering systems and processes. Its main advantages are: 
" It provides a tool for directly working with the linguistic variables when assessing 
risks. Thus, fuzzy theory enables analysts to evaluate risks in a neutral manner. 
" Vague, qualitative or imprecise data as well as quantitative data can be used in the 
assessment and can be dealt in a consistent manner. 
" It is capable of providing a flexible framework for combining the elements of 
criticality, probability of occurrence, severity and reliability. 
3.12.3 Evidential reasoning 
Problems within the field of engineering involve both quantitative and qualitative data 
which, in the majority of times may contain some form of uncertainty or lack of 
evidence. Multiple attribute decision making requires a certain background as set by 
[Belton & Stewart, 2002], [Huang & Yoon, 1981], [Saaty, 1988]. The continuous 
development in technical complexity of engineering systems has led into the extensive 
use of safety methods that can appropriately provide a safety assurance as far as the 
operation and practice of these systems are concerned. It has not been, up until the last 
couple of decades that appropriate research has commenced in the area of evidential 
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reasoning. It started initially as an extension to research made within the artificial 
intelligence area by [Buffardi, 1998], [Yager, 1987] and [Zimmermann, 1990]. The 
upcoming results from the research followed, came from examples [Yang & Singh, 1994] 
and [Yang, 2001]. An approach based on a model evaluation analysis as well as on the 
theory of evidence was introduced by [Shafer, 1976]. Within the last few years there are 
examples of usage of an evidential reasoning (ER) approach within different engineering 
areas like ship design, marine system analysis and synthesis [Wang et al., 1995], [Wang, 
1997], [Wang & Yang, 2001], and in areas outside engineering, such as organizational 
assessment [Yang et al., 2001]. 
The safety of a large engineering system, such as a sea going vessel, is affected by a great 
number of factors associated with its design, manufacturing, installation, commissioning, 
operation and maintenance [Wang, 2001]. This means that in many cases there are 
always some parameters that are imprecisely or inaccurately known, resulting in a non- 
complete mathematical model of the system. Evidential reasoning can tackle multi- 
criteria decision making models under uncertainty conditions. 
3.13 Conclusion 
In this chapter, typical safety analysis methods were outlined in terms of their 
requirements, advantages and limitations. Some of these techniques have been 
successfully used in the industry and still continue to be used. However, the application 
of these conventional techniques to complex engineering systems and processes is not as 
straightforward as it may seem at the beginning. Certain modifications or introduction of 
novel techniques are needed to enhance the application of such methods. These 
modifications include the ability of the analysis methods to handle data that is associated 
with a high degree of uncertainty and the integration of expert opinion in a formal 
manner, where there is no bias of opinion. The following chapters examine, analyse and 
test the applicability of such novel methods. 
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CHAPTER 4. A MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING METHODOLOGY 
ASSISTING A VESSEL SELECTION PROCESS 
4.1 Introduction 
Marine engineering systems, like cargo handling machinery, are affected by a great 
number of factors associated with their design, manufacturing, installation, 
commissioning, operation and maintenance. This means that in many cases there are 
always some parameters that are imprecisely or inaccurately known resulting in non- 
complete mathematical models of the system. 
In cases like this, when experts try to assess the safety of a system they encounter the 
following problems [Wang & Yang, 2001]: 
A) Different types of assessments (numbers, linguistic terms, and/or stochastic 
values) depending on the characteristics of the decision criteria. 
B) Imprecise assessments due to insufficient data, shortcomings in expertise, small 
time intervals for evaluation or inability of the expert to provide a fully detailed 
assessment. 
C) Proper and robust aggregation of subjective and objective assessments made on 
multiple decision criteria. 
It is due to the problems identified in A, B and C that decision-making process is 
based on subjective opinions [Wang, 1997]. This occurs due to inaccurately known 
data, or parameters with a high level of uncertainty that cannot be handled properly 
with methods based on conventional mathematics. Such problems were often omitted 
even though their role within the engineering system was of high importance. 
Probabilistic decision theory can handle uncertain parameters in the aspect of 
randomness. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) methods, like fault tree analysis 
(FTA) can be used to assess system safety and the information produced can be 
utilised in building a multi-objective model for decision-making purposes. On the 
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other hand however, it is insufficient in tackling uncertainties in terms of fuzziness or 
vagueness and incompleteness. If fuzziness, such as the intersection point between 
different temperature levels, vagueness such as unreliable subjective descriptions due 
to lack of expertise or incompleteness such as lack of statistical data is actually the 
case, multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) techniques can be employed to 
process the constructed model in order to produce efficient design and operational 
solutions [Yang, 2001]. In many cases, due to lack of evidence, individuals find easier 
to provide subjective judgments using verbal grades. However, it is necessary to 
establish the fact that these grades will mean the same thing to more than one person, 
as seen in chapter 3. Therefore, descriptors like very good, good, average, poor or 
even very likely, likely, impossible, are all terms used by safety engineers and 
decision makers and have the same meaning to all of them. It is true that the 
descriptors provided before are fuzzy and non-probabilistic, and hence non- 
probabilistic methods like fuzzy sets modelling may be more appropriate to analyze 
the safety of an engineering system containing incomplete information. 
In complex marine engineering systems the problems encountered are of a dual 
nature. They contain both quantitative and qualitative assessments. What would seem 
an obvious thing to do is either to convert the qualitative assessments to quantitative 
forms by assigning a quantitative value to each qualitative assessment or to transform 
the quantitative assessments to qualitative forms by using the already defined 
descriptors (assessment grades). Multiple attribute decision-making requires a certain 
background as set by Belton & Stewart [Belton & Stewart, 2002], Huang & Yoon 
[Huang & Yoon, 1981] and Saaty [Saaty, 1988]. It has not been up until the last 
couple of decades that research has commenced in the area of evidential reasoning. It 
started initially as an extension to the research made within the artificial intelligence 
area by Buffardi and Zimmermann [Buffardi, 1998] [Yager, 1987] [Zimmermann, 
1990]. The upcoming results from the research that followed, came from examples 
given by Yang & Singh [Yang & Singh, 1994], [Yang, 2001]. An evidential reasoning 
approach is based both on a model evaluation analysis and on the theory of evidence 
as presented by Shafer [Shafer, 1976]. Within the last few years there have been 
examples of application of the evidential reasoning (ER) approach within the marine 
engineering areas like ship design [Sen & Yang, 1995], as well as in the marine 
system analysis and synthesis [Wang et. al., 1995] [Wang, 1997] [Wang & Yang, 
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2001], and in areas outside engineering, like organizational self assessment as it will 
be seen in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
It is common sense that every decision a safety engineer makes contains, to some 
extent, uncertainty and risk. The aim of this chapter is to indicate a proper course of 
action in such cases where criteria under uncertainties exist. The original ER approach 
is revisited in section 4.2 along with the rest of the techniques used to form this 
chapter. Section 4.3 contains the properties of the proposed ER approach and section 
4.4 a vessel selection assessment carried out to demonstrate the properties of section 
4.3. This chapter is concluded in section 4.5 with the discussion of results. 
4.2 Theory background 
4.2.1 Dempster-Shafer theory and evidential reasoning approach 
Evidential reasoning is a process of drawing plausible conclusions from uncertain or 
incomplete information. The theory of evidence was first introduced by Dempster in 
1967 and it was further developed by his student Shafer in 1976. Therefore it is 
common to encounter ER as the Dempster-Shafer theory (D-S theory) [Shafer, 1976]. 
The D-S theory is essentially based on probability theory, yet it is more flexible in a 
manner that it allows probability judgments to capture the inaccurate nature of the 
examined factor. This results in degrees of likelihood being measured by probability 
intervals, as opposed to point probabilities in the Bayesian approach. The D-S theory 
uses a number between 0 and 1 to set the degree of belief for a proposition, which 
could be parted from multiple grades (i. e excellent, good, average, bad). For example 
the function of a newly developed automated loading/unloading arm for Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) vessels can be evaluated as 80% excellent, 60% good, 20% 
average. Such an example clearly indicates that the evaluation can be assigned to 
more than one grade according to the supporting evidence and the subjective 
experience of the safety engineer. Another advantage of this method is the fact that 
the grades of belief do not have to sum up to 1. In the example provided before the 
evaluation could have been 60% good and 20% average. The unassigned belief, the 
remaining 20%, could be the result of uncertain data, lack of information or evidence 
or even insufficient expertise. 
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When dealing with a decision-making problem, safety engineers are asked to use their 
knowledge in terms of preference and evaluation to make the best possible decision. 
The ER approach developed by [Yang & Singh, 1994] was made specifically for 
problems incorporating both qualitative and quantitative criteria under uncertainties. 
The strongest point of ER is its ability to deal with incomplete, uncertain and vague as 
well as complete and precise data. It is also useful as it enables the experts involved in 
a decision-making problem to reach their decisions either in a subjective or a 
quantitative way. This inherently means that judgments can be made in terms of 
verbal descriptors rather than specific numbers as was clearly presented at the 
example above. 
4,2.2 Utilization of the ER approach 
The ER approach operates in a frame that employs a belief structure to represent an 
assessment as a distribution. Four evaluation grades are assumed as follows: 
H= {H,, H2, H3, H4} _ {Slightly preferred, Moderately preferred, Preferred, Greatly 
Preferred} 
Using the four evaluation grades, the assessment of an attribute Aa on an option Oi, 
denoted by S(A1(Oi))= {(ß1,1, H1), (92,1, H2), (03,1, H3), (Q4,1, H4)), where 1 ý3,, j Z) with 
n=1,..., 4, denotes the degree of belief that the attribute Al is assessed to the 
evaluation grade H. 4 
ýý 
ß , >1 cannot exist. 
4 
sý 
ßn , =1 is considered to be a 
complete distributed assessment of S(Al(01)) and 4 
glßn <1 
is considered to be an 
incomplete assessment of S(At(O1)). Within the ER approach the last two conditions 
can both be accommodated [Yang, 2001 ]. Within ER approach it is common to have a 
problem with M attributes A;, K options OO and N evaluation grades H,,, with i= 
1,..., M and j=1,..., K and n=1,..., N. It must be noted that it is possible that each 
attribute can have its own set of evaluation grades that may be different from those of 
other attributes [Yang, 2000]. 
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Based on the evidence combination rule provided from D-S theory, the ER approach 
uses an evidential reasoning algorithm to aggregate belief degrees [Yang & Sing, 
1994] [Yang & Sen, 1994] [Yang, 2001]. 
Assume that w; is the relative weight of the attribute A; and it is set that 1 zj zO and 
`! co, =1, where L is the total number of attributes in the same group for 
aggregation. To further analyze the discussion and without loss of generality the 
combination of three assessments will be presented below. Two of them are complete 
(S(A2(O1)) and S(A3(O1))) and only one is incomplete (S(A3(01))) due to uncertain or 
lack of data, or even shortage in expertise from the decision maker's side. Assume 
that the second assessment is given by S(A2(01)) = {(ß1,2, H1), (ß2,2, H2), (ß3,2, H3), 
(04,2, H4)}, and the third assessment is given respectively by S(A3(01)) _ {( ß1,3, H1), 
(02,3, H2), (ß3,3, H3), (ß4,3, H4)}. The problem is to aggregate all three assessments in 
S(A1(O1)) ® S(A2(O1)) ® S(A3(O1)) in order to achieve rational decision making 
results and obtain a clear picture of the problem addressed. 
In order to combine 3 assessments it is required to combine initially the first two and 
the combined result is then used to aggregate it with the third assessment. The same 
principle would apply if the decision maker would have to deal with more 
assessments that need to be combined. 
Firstly, take S(A1(O1)) ® S(A2(01)) for example. Let 
wto ,, 
(n=1,..., 4) and mil, 1=1 - w, 
yý=, ß., =1-w, 
mn, 2 =W 2ßn, 2 (n7-1,..., 4) and m11,2 =1 - wz 
Fn. 
1 
ßn, z =1- (02 
where each m; (j=1,2) is denoted as basic probability mass and each mjj j is the 
remaining belief unassigned to HH (j=1,2,3,4). The ER algorithm is used to aggregate 
the basic probability masses to generate combined probability masses denoted by Mn 
with (n=1,..., 4) and m11 using the following equations: 
Mn = k(mn, Imn, 2+ mnImn. z + mIJ, amn. z), (with n=1,..., 4) 
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mtj = k(mtl, ImH, 2) with 
144 ýý 
k= 1-ýý mý, mnz with (n; 4) 
d=i /=1 
The combined probability masses will now be aggregated with the third assessment 
following the same general principle. What should be done now is to aggregate 
S(A1,2(O1)) ® S(A3(Oj)) where S(A1.2(Ot)) = S(At(01)) ® S(A2(01)). 
Let for example S(Ai, z(O, ) _ {(Hi, 0.5), (H2,0.4), (H3,0.1), (H4i0)}, and S(A3(01)) _ 
{(HI, 0.1), (H2,0.3), (H3,0.4), (HO, O)}. Let also S(A1,2(O1)) be twice as important as 
S(A3(O1)). Since YL 
j w, =1 
then it is obvious that W i. 2 = 0.67 and w3 = 0.33. The sum 
of the attributes in the third assessment does not add up to 1 due to lack of data, or 
uncertainty in data or even due to shortage of expertise from the decision maker's 
side. Therefore the normalized S(A1,2(O1)) and S(A3(01)) will become: 
S(A1.2(01) = {(H 1,0.5x0.67), (H2,0.4x0.67), (H3,0.1xO. 67), (H4,0)) 
S(A3(01)) = {(H1, O. 1xO. 33), (H2,0.3x0.33), (H3,0.4x0.33), (H4,0)) 
Similarly with the equations stated above: 
mn, 1 = wý ßn, i (n=1,..., 4) and mIt, 1,2 =I- w1,2Enz, 
fln, 
1,2 =1 - 0.67*1= 0.33 ,2 ,2 .Z 
MO = W390 (n=1,..., 4) and mi1,3 =14- (3 Y9=l Pa 3= 1- 0.33*0.8= 0.736 W390 
44 
k= mr. r. z mn. 3 with (n; 4) k -0.13 
mt, I, z, 3 = (1-k)" x (m,, 1,2 x 067 x mi, 3 x 0.33 + m,, 1,2 x 067 x r[I, 3 + mj, 3 x 0.33 x 
mrº, i. ý) = 0.3 
MI, 1,2,3 = 0.3 
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Similarly for the rest 
m2,1.2,3 = 0.295 
m3,1,2,3 = 0.116 
m4,1,2,3 -0 
Therefore the unassigned belief in the combined assessment is: 
mH, 1,2,3=1 -0.3-0.295-0.116=0.289 
This results in the final set of the combined S(A1,2(O1)) ® S(A3(O1)) being 
S(A1,2,3(O1)) = `(H1ßß1,1,2,3), 
(H2502,1,2,3), H3, ß3,1,2,3), (H4, ß4,1,2,3)} 
Qi, 1,2,3 = mi, I, 2,3 / (1 - mu, 1,2,3 )=0.42 
Similarly: 
132,1,2.3 = 0.415 
ß3, i, 2,3 = 0.163 
14,1,2,3 =0 
Finally S(A1,2,3(0i)) can be obtained as follows: 
S(A1,2,3(Oi)) _ {(H1,0.42), (H2,0.415), (H3,0.163), (H41 0)}. It can be seen that from 
the combination of the assessments the unassigned belief has been dramatically 
reduced to just 0.002. It is therefore a great advantage of the ER approach to deduct 
decision results even if the data used is vague, incomplete or imprecise. 
4.2.3 Decision tables and decision trees 
A simple but effective way of aiding the decision making process is the decision 
tables and decision trees. These two formats can be interchangeable once a decision 
situation has been established in any of the two forms. In real life problems, the 
decision maker does not always know the true nature of the problem, but is aware of 
the states that exists. Due to applicability reasons in this chapter only decision trees 
will be dealt with, as they are much easier to use rather than decision tables. A 
decision table gives an illustration of a system along with all the sub-components 
involved enabling the safety engineer or the decision maker to "see" the relation of all 
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condition applicable. It also provides the flexibility to add any new data found during 
the process of decision-making [Sen & Yang, 1995]. This of course means that not 
only addition but any kind of modification can be instantly made to the decision tree 
according to the updated information on the case. 
4.2.4 Fuzzy set theory 
Zadeh in 1965 described the properties of fuzzy sets as a class of objects with a 
continuum of grades of membership in the interval [0,1] in order to deal with fuzzy 
and uncertain data that is typically represented by linguistic, rather than numeric 
variables. Each linguistic variable in fuzzy set theory (FST) is assigned a membership 
that is defined by the user. This means that each object x in a fuzzy set X is assigned a 
grade of membership by a membership function usually denoted by µ(x) whose values 
range from 0 to 1. This is not to be confused with the quantity of a probability density 
function f(x), as the integral of gx) must sum to 1, whereas in µ(x) there is no such 
restriction. 
FST has been successfully applied for a wide range of single and multiple criteria 
decision-making problems. Yager in 1981 proposed a fuzzy logic based methodology 
for making qualitative multicriteria decisions. He also applied a fuzzy multicriteria 
decision making algorithm for personnel selection process and finally in 1994 he 
proposed a multicriteria decision making approach in selecting the most suitable tool 
for a specific manufacturing application like fixture design. The concepts of fuzzy 
values managed to capture the characteristics of the data of different materials 
specified in the engineering handbooks which were multidimensional and qualitative. 
In 1998 Pan et. al. developed and used fuzzy goal programming for purchasing 
dredgers under uncertainty. In 2001 Sii et. at. applied a fuzzy logic based approach to 
qualitative safety modelling for marine systems. 
Zadeh's words give a summary of the usefulness of fuzzy approaches by saying: "a 
fundamental contribution of fuzzy logic is a methodology for computing with words 
which mimics human reasoning" [Zadeh, 1965]. 
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4.3 Operations with fuzzy sets 
Let X be a set i. e, X= {xi, x2,..., x}. The fuzzy subset of X is defined by a function 
from X into {0,1); that is the membership function. The membership function for 
each subset of X is noted by X={ µi/x1, A2/X2,,.., µ/x}, the notation of pi/xi will refer 
to the fuzzy subset whose membership value at x; is pi. Assume that A and B are 
fuzzy subsets of X. Suppose the membership values for the subsets A and B are 
denoted by µA and µe respectively. The basic fuzzy operations such as union, 
intersection, complement, Cartesian product and composition of fuzzy sets are listed 
as follows: 
(a) Union of A and B: 
TAUB = max (GA, µß); The union of A and B produces fuzzy set C with membership 
values that are the maximum of the component values. 
(b) Intersection of A and B: 
µArO = min (µA, µß). The intersection of A and B produces fuzzy set C with 
membership values that are the minimum of the component values. 
(c) Complementation of A: 
PA = 1- (A). The membership values of the complementary set A are just 1- the 
corresponding membership values of A. 
(d) Cartesian product of A and B: 
PAO = (AiiAxB) where µ''Axß = min(µ'n, dB) 
(e) Composition: Given the membership functions for the fuzzy subset A and for the 
Cartesian product of the subsets A and B, the membership function for B can be 
obtained as follows using the composition rule of inference: 
µß = JLAoAxß = (ýß)Ixn; where J. 
ip 
= max(min(µrA, /A Axp),..., min(IL At 1f'Axp)), 
j=1,2,..., n. For reasons of simplicity the subsequent fuzzy subset descriptions will 
drop the index following the division symbol and merely use ordered list of 
membership values to characterize the fuzzy subset. Therefore, the fuzzy set X will 
become, X={ µt, 142,..., µn}. 
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4.4 An novel evidential reasoning approach in marine operations and its 
application to a vessel selection process 
Decision problems are better visualized through the application of a decision tree as 
discussed in section 4.2.3. In the first level, the main concern of the problem is 
discussed. In the second level, there are several criteria, each of which has a different 
contribution to measuring and helping getting to the overall destination. Then it is 
common that many of the second level criteria could be broken further down to sub- 
criteria in order to be able to facilitate the assessment as completely as possible. The 
de-composition of these criteria reaches a point that the decision maker is happy that 
he has adequate information to start the decision process. Once the sub-division of 
criteria is complete, the decision maker will evaluate each alternative based on the 
lowest level criteria. The results will be transformed from the lowest level criteria to 
their respective upper levels and eventually towards the main goal. This is achieved 
through the application of the ER approach, which could be described as a 
hierarchical evaluation into which all criteria are aggregated into the top goal of the 
problem. 
A safety assessment framework incorporating ER approach within port operations is 
presented in this section. The proposed framework consists of the following steps: 
1. Define the problem and set the assessment grades for main goal: The first step is to 
describe the specific decision related problem in detail, either using quantitative or 
qualitative terms. 
2. Set the criteria levels and their respective grades: After the initial goal is set, the 
second level criteria are defined, along with any sub-level criteria below them, up 
until the decision maker is happy with the structure of the problem defined. 
3. Evaluate each alternative based on the sub-sequent level criteria: In order to find 
out how well an alternative performs across all criteria, the lowest level criteria 
assessment needs to be first transformed to their relevant upper levels and ultimately, 
to the top-level goal. 
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4. Use the ER algorithm: In order to make the transformation from lower level to 
upper level criteria, the information is fed into a multi criteria decision making 
software developed for analysis of multilevel decision problems. The software which 
will assist in the decision making process is called Intelligent Decision System via 
Evidential Reasoning "IDS" [Yang and Xu, 2001]. It is a windows based tool, which 
can be used to built up a model, define alternatives and criteria and perform the 
assessment for the decision maker. 
5. Rank alternatives, results and discussion: As soon as the aggregated values are 
derived for each of the vessels in question the ranking takes place according to the 
higher value in terms of preference. 
6. Decision making: Based on the combination of the steps above, the decision maker 
can now come to a certain conclusion concerning the decision problem that the 
analyst is dealing with. The results from IDS as well as the criteria and alternatives 
selected will be the prime factors that will set the boundaries for further discussion. 
This procedure will be illustrated through an example described in the next section. 
The requirements for a verification experiment are essential to identify and assess the 
validity of the results obtained. The contribution of industrial expert's judgment in the 
form of a structured interview (see Appendix III, section A), within the example 
presented was invaluable as they added to the credibility and soundness of the results 
obtained. However, a verification experiment is to be made by presenting the results 
to independent experts in the area of assessing a vessel's quality. 
4.5 A decision making based example: application of a novel evidential reasoning 
approach to a vessel selection process 
The example is chosen to demonstrate the usage of a novel evidential reasoning 
approach which can be used as a significant tool in assisting the marine industry in 
cases often met like the selection process of a vessel for a particular transfer of cargo. 
The example illustrates how evidential reasoning can be used to assess multiple 
criteria containing both qualitative and quantitative data including uncertainties in 
information. 
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Within marine industry's boundaries, the selection of a proper vessel for the transfer 
of a liquid oil cargo is a process consisting of 3 different stages. The first stage is the 
request or the invitation for a particular cargo by either a refinery with stand alone 
discharge facilities or by an independent customer who will transfer the cargo 
delivered by other means away from the initial storage tanks. Then it is the stage of 
the broker trying to find a list of proper vessels that match the criteria set by the 
charterer. Finally, there is the stage of the vessel selection among the ones pre- 
selected by the broker. 
Looking at port safety during cargo handling operations there are two main factors 
involved in this process. Initially it is the vessel that should fulfil certain 
characteristics and secondly it is the port of loading or discharge of cargo. This test 
case aims at selecting a suitable vessel and satisfying the requirements it needs to 
meet in order to approach a port on the west coast of the United States. When a 
request is made from the charterers to the brokers, concerning a particular cargo and a 
port of destination, the broker is searching, looking for the most suitable vessel in the 
market that fulfils the criteria. It is true that in the first instance, several vessels will 
match the criteria. Nevertheless this is not always the case. A vessel's dimensions and 
cargo capacity are not just the only factors affecting the decision process. Selecting 
the best vessel is a complex decision making process for the marine industry. It 
requires a number of criteria to be simultaneously measured and evaluated. Due to the 
nature of the criteria, sometimes they conflict with each other leading to one criterion 
being increased at the expense of another. 
4.5.1 Step 1: Define the problem 
The case examined is a decision making process, in selecting an appropriate oil tanker 
with capacity of 80,000 tonnes to deliver a cargo of oil to a pre-specified port of call 
chosen by the charterers. Therefore the main or top goal of this decision making 
process is to select the most appropriate vessel based on the information required 
from the charterers side, the brokers' side and the port's specifications. For simplicity 
reasons and without loss of generality it is assumed that there is just one decision 
maker in this case, the author of this thesis, who should initially define the assessment 
grades for the evaluation of the vessel based on the results of the structured interviews 
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(see Appendix III, section A). The following assessment grades have been chosen for 
this case: very bad, bad, average, good, very good and excellent. The next step is the 
definition of assessment grades for the second level criteria involved in the decision 
making process. What is more, all the sub-sequent levels of criteria should also be 
analysed up until the decision maker is completely satisfied with the overall 
assessment. It is of common sense that not all criteria will have the same assessment 
grades. It depends on the nature of the criteria and the preferences (proper wording) of 
the decision maker. Figure 4.1 illustrates the criteria used for the assessment along 
with their sub-level attributes. There are five sub-levels of assessment criteria within 
this example case. The criteria chosen are some of the most significant taken under 
consideration from the decision maker's side. 
Explaining analytically the criteria it is worth mentioning a few details for each one: 
" Integrity: This criterion is concerned with the condition of the vessel both as far as 
structural and mechanical conditions are concerned. It examines the thickness of 
the bottom plating, side shell, cargo tanks as well as brackets and frames around 
the hull, along with the reliability data gathered for the main and auxiliary 
engines. Cargo handling equipment is also investigated. Finally the actual age of 
the vessel is of great importance as the conditions of both mechanical and 
structural components are directly related to age. 
e Pollution Prevention: In order for a vessel to be able to sail it must fulfil certain 
requirements as far as pollution control is concerned. Structural characteristics 
like double bottoms and double side skins are useful as they prevent a great 
percentage of possible leakages of cargo, from being spilt into sea. Finally, the 
emission values for both NOx and COx are important in order to get in specific 
ports. The port of call is based at the west USA, where the permitted emission 
levels are low and pollution regulations are extremely strict. 
9 Vessel's Running Costs: During the operation of the vessel there are certain 
factors like fuel (by saying fuel we include factors like diesel, lubricating oil, 
cylinder oil), stores consumption and crew salary that need to be investigated. A 
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vessel that has the capability to be run with less crew members is more desirable 
in terms of daily expenditure during time at sea. 
" Restrictions on Vessel: These are imposed by geographical factors mainly. Since 
the vessel will sail from Europe to west USA through the Panama Canal it should 
have limitations as far as the draft and breadth is concerned in order to fit into the 
locks. 
Vessel Selection 
i- Integrity 
Structural integrity 
n. Bottom Shell Plating Thickness 
Side Shell Plating Thickness 
Mechanical Integrity 
J Main Engine Reliability 
a Auxilliary Engines Reliability 
r Cargo Handling Equipment 
j Loading Pumps, Valves 
Discharge Pumps. Valves 
ri Age in years 
Pollution Prevention 
Structural Analysis of Vessel 
Skin Construction 
J Single Skin Vessel 
J Double Skin Vessel 
In Bottom Plate Construction 
10 Single Bottom Plating 
J Double Bottom Plating 
in Emissions 
IN NOx Emissions 
Vj COx Emissions 
n ft Vessel's Running Costs 
r Fuel Consumption 
a Open Sea Consumption 
a Within Port Limits Consumption 
= Stores Consumption 
= Crew Salary 
u0 Restrictions on vessel 
" Draft of Vessel 
a Breadth of Vessel 
Figure 4.1. Main goal and sub-criteria levels 
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4.5.2 Step 2: Set the criteria levels and their respective assessment grades 
Table 4.1 contains the main criteria used to assess each vessel at the second level. 
Each criterion is being characterized by a set of assessment grades under which each 
vessel is assessed accordingly. Similarly, for the second, third, fourth and fifth sub- 
level of criteria similar assessment grades are defined. Assessment grades are not the 
same in each criterion as each condition can be better assessed into grades based on 
the personal intuition and personal preferences of the decision maker. In the case that 
a criterion can be evaluated in a quantitative manner, then no assessment grades are 
needed. The decision maker will be able to assign upper and lower limits within the 
criterion or, in other cases just an arithmetic value will be substantial to complete the 
evaluation of the criterion. For example, the age of the vessel is assessed into grades 
with the aid of a maximum and a minimum arithmetic limit of years. 
Table 4.1 Assessment grades defined for second level criteria 
Main criteria Assessment Grades 
Integrity V. bad bad Average Good V. good 
Pollution Prevention Worst Poor Average Good V. good Excellent 
Vessel's Running Costs V. high high Average Low V. low Minimum 
Restrictions on Vessel Bad Average Good 
In the same sense, Table 4.2 contains the assessment grades for the third level criteria, 
Table 4.3 contains the respective assessment grades for the fourth level criteria and 
Table 4.4 the assessment grades for the fifth level criteria. 
Table 4.2 Assessment grades defined for third level criteria 
Third Level Criteria Assessment Grades 
Structural Inteit Worst Poor Average Good Best 
Mechanical Inteit Worst Poor Average Good Best 
Age (in years) Quantitative 
Structural Analysis V. bad Bad Ade uate Good V. Good 
Emissions V. High High Average Low V. Low Min. 
Fuel Consumption V. High High Avera e Low 
Stores Consumption V. High High Average Low V. Low 
Crew Salary Bad Average Good High V. High 
Draft of Vessel Quantitative 
Breadth of Vessel Quantitative 
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Table 4.3 Assessment grades defined for fourth level criteria 
Fourth Level Criteria Assessment Grades 
Bottom Shell Plate Thick. V. Thin Thin Average Thick V. Thick 
Side Shell Plate Thickness V. Thin Thin Average e Thick V. Thick 
Main Engine Reliability V. Bad Bad Average V. Good Excellent 
Aux. Engine Reliability V. Bad Bad Average V. Good Excellent 
Cargo Handling Equip. Poor Average Good V. Good 
Skin Construction V. Weak Weak Average Strong V. Strong 
Bottom Plate Construction V. Weak Weak Avera e Strong V. Strong 
NOx Emissions V. High High Low V. Low 
Cox Emissions V. High Hi h Low V. Low 
en Sea Consumption V. High High Average Low V. Low Min. 
Within Port Limits Cons. V. High High Average Low V. Low Min. 
Table 4.4 Assessment grades defined for fifth level criteria 
Fifth Assessment Grades 
Level 
Criteria 
Loading Malfunction Very Unreliable Average Reliable Very Fully 
Pumps, Unreliable Reliable Operational 
Valves 
Discharge Malfunction Very Unreliable Average Reliable Very Fully 
Pumps, Unreliable Reliable Operational 
Valves 
Single V. Weak Weak Good Strong V. Strong 
Skin 
Vessel 
Double V. Weak Weak Good Strong V. Strong 
Skin 
Vessel 
Single V. Thin Thin Adequate Thick V. Thick 
Bottom 
Platin 
Double V. Thin Thin Adequate Thick V. Thick 
Bottom 
Plating 
4.5.3 Step 3: Evaluate each alternative based on the sub-Sequent level criteria 
Some of the criteria presented are of quantitative nature. In order to proceed to upper 
level transformation they are required to be converted using a method named utility 
theory. Take for example the sub-criterion "age in years" under the age group of 
criteria. Age as an upper level criterion is defined by five assessment grades (very 
bad, bad, average, good, excellent). "Age in years" is defined within numbers 3 and 
15, with 3 being an excellent case scenario and 15 the worst-case scenario. In order to 
make the transformation the interval between 3 and 15 needs to be divided into certain 
intervals, adequate enough to match the assessment grades of the upper level. 
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Table 4.5. Transforming a quantitative sub criterion to the associated upper level 
qualitative criterion 
Age Very bad Bad Average Good Excellent 
Age in years 15 12 9 6 3 
Assessment grades 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
According to the information given in Table 4.5, Vessel 3 is said to have an "age in 
years" of 14. This value is 33.3% very bad and 66.6% bad, since it is in-between the 
values of 12 and 15. When a vessel is evaluated on "age", for example, sub-criteria 
such as structural and mechanical integrity along with their respective sub-criteria are 
additionally taken into consideration. All sub-attributes are assessed using subjective 
judgments. Due to the fact that a different number of grades are used for the upper 
level criterion and the sub criteria, the decision maker needs to establish basic rules 
concerning the sub level criteria and their association to the upper level criteria. 
4.5.3.1 Rule based information transformation technique 
The creation of unique evaluation grades is used in order to facilitate raw data 
collection. The grades defined will need to be transformed for assessment of a general 
attribute. The transformation takes place with the aid of the decision maker's 
expertise and knowledge. These transformations are called rules. Both qualitative and 
quantitative data can be easily transformed in this manner. 
4.5.3.2 Qualitative data transformation technique 
In assessment, different words may be used to describe equivalent standards. Such 
equivalence can be established using equivalence rules. For instance a "very 
unreliable" loading pump/valve, means that the quality of the pump/valve is "poor" as 
far as the operation is concerned. Then an evaluation grade "very unreliable" in 
loading pumps/valves assessment is said to be equivalent to a grade "worst" in quality 
assessment which characterises the mechanical integrity of each vessel. Similarly, if 
"unreliable" is equivalent to "poor", "normal" to "average", "reliable" to "good" and 
"very reliable" to "excellent", then it can be said that the set of grades (very 
unreliable, unreliable, normal, reliable, very reliable) in loading pump/valve 
assessment is equivalent to the set (worst, poor, average, good, excellent) which 
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defines the mechanical integrity of each vessel. Suppose each grade H,,,; of a basic set 
H' means a grade H. of a general set H or more analytically, 
H= {H, n=1,..., N}. 
H'= {H.,, i, n=1,..., Ni}. 
H,,,; means H,,, with n=1,..., N. 
Then with N= Ni the basic set H` is said to be equivalent to the general set H. 
Suppose H` is equivalent to H and N= Ni. Then a general assessment would be: 
S(e; ) = {(H,,, /3,,; ), n=1,..., N) is said to be equivalent to a basic assessment S`(e; ) 
{(H,,,;, 'y,,,; ), n =1,..., N; } if and only if 9,,,; = -.,, i, n =1,..., N. 
In general, it may not always be the case that N= Ni. It is also common that H,,,; in H' 
may not exactly mean any single grade in H but a number of grades in H to certain 
degrees. For instance a "very weak" double bottom plate might mean that the quality 
of the plate is between "worst"' and "poor" in structural integrity. Generally, if a grade 
H,,,; in H` means a grade Hi in H to a degree of a,,,, (1= 1,..., N) with 0 Sai,, g and 
'NI a,,, = 
1, then it can be said that H,,,; is equivalent to {(H1, ai, n), I=1,..., 
N}. Taking this last equation as granted, a basic assessment S'(e; ) is said to be 
equivalent to an upper level more general assessment S(e; ) if and only if 
N 2 
a,,,, y,,., with 1= 1,..., N. The implementation of the transformation process is 
M-1 
done through the development of matrix equations [Yang, 1999]. IDS software has 
this algorithm of transformation between different levels of assessment built in for the 
ease of the decision maker to speed up the decision-making process. 
4.5.3.3 Quantitative data transformation technique 
A quantitative basic attribute can be assessed using numerical values. In this case, 
equivalence rules also need to be extracted from the decision maker to transform a 
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value to an equivalent expectation so that the quantitative attribute can be aggregated 
in conjunction with other qualitative attributes. To carry out such a transformation, it 
is fundamental for the decision maker to provide rules relating each evaluation grade 
to a particular value. For instance, the actual numerical age of a vessel "3" may mean 
that the quality of the vessel is "excellent" as far as an overall condition of the vessel 
is concerned. In other words, the age of "3" years is equivalent to "excellent" overall 
condition. Similarly, age values like 6,9,12 and 15 years old may mean that a general 
overall condition of a vessel is "good", "average", "bad", "very bad" respectively. In 
general, suppose a value hn,; for an attribute ei is judged to be equivalent to a grade H 
with hn, 1 meaning H (n = 1,..., N). Without loss of generality suppose e1 is the "age" 
attribute, with h,,. I, 1, a smaller value being preferred more than hn, 1, a larger value. Let 
hN,; be the largest feasible value and hj.; the smallest. Then a value hj on ee may be 
represented using the following equivalent expectation: 
S'(hh)= {hn,;, Ynä), n =1,..., N} where Ynj = (hn, i - hh) / NJ h J), 'Yn-I, i - Yn j1 if 
hn, 1? hj_hn-t,, [Yang, 1999]. 
As in the qualitative transformation, the development of matrix equations was 
necessary to characterise the transformation process. It is worth mentioning that when 
the term "equivalent transformation" is used in this chapter it means that the 
underlying utility of an original assessment is equal to that of its transformed 
assessment. This means that the completeness or incompleteness should be retained 
after the transformation between different utility planes takes place. 
4.5.4 Step 4: Use the ER algorithm 
The assessment values given by the decision-maker are used within the IDS software 
and the aggregated results are extracted for the main criteria level (second level) and 
presented in Tables 4.6,4.7,4.8 and 4.9. The values within the cells indicate the 
degree of belief assigned to each assessment grade respectively. Tables 4.6,4.7,4.8 
and 4.9 are also of outmost importance as an external observer can see the strong and 
week points of each one of the vessels selected in respect with the associated criteria. 
All values were derived from the IDS software. 
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Table 4.6 Combined assessment grades of all the vessels for integrity 
Ji 
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Table 4.7 Combined assessment grades of all the vessels for pollution prevention 
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Poor Good Excehent 
Table 4.8 Combined assessment grades of all the vessels for vessel's running 
costs 
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Table 4.9 Combined assessment grades of all the vessels for restrictions on vessel 
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The assessments in Tables 4.6,4.7,4.8 and 4.9 need to be propagated to the top level. 
In doing this, the IDS software produces the results shown in Table 4.10. The 
numbers under each grade indicate the aggregated assessments (or degrees of belief) 
of the decision maker. 
Table 4.10 The overall assessment of the vessels selected 
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4.5.5 Step 5: Alternatives ranking, results and discussion 
The best way to rank the vessels following Table 4.10 would be through their 
respective utility values generated by quantifying the assessment grades at the top 
level. This is due to the fact that there are close similarities in the values indicated in 
Table 4.10. IDS uses the concept of a utility interval to characterize the unassigned 
degree of belief (or unknown percentage). The ER algorithm produces a utility 
interval enclosed by the two extreme cases where the unassigned belief goes either to 
the least preferred grade (minimum utility) or goes to the most preferred grade 
(maximum utility). 
A graphical representation of utility intervals is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The vessels 
are ranked based on the average utility but sometimes this can lead to mistaken 
results. In order to be able to say that one vessel is better than another, the preferred 
vessel's minimum utility must be equal or greater than the compared vessel's 
maximum utility. Therefore it is up to the decision maker to choose the boundaries of 
comparison. In Figure 4.2 the minimum utility value is represented by red colour, the 
average utility value by green colour and the maximum utility value by blue colour. 
Ptari gng. ofi emsidyreý; rrJ `Jessei Selection 
1.0001-1 
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0.80011 
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Figure 4.2 Ranking of vessel's utility values 
Vessel 5 
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In this example the comparison of minimum and maximum utility values will be used. 
Maximum and minimum utilities are given by IDS (see Appendix III section D). 
Hence, from Figure 4.2, having found maximum and minimum utilities the average 
utility is calculated and used to rank the vessels within the selection process. The final 
ranking of vessels is as follows: 
Vessel 5 is more preferred than Vessel 1, which is more preferred than Vessel 4, 
which is more preferred than Vessel 2, which in turn is more preferred than Vessel 3. 
4.5.6 Step 6: Conclusion 
In the example examined, an ER approach was used in order to tackle the problem of 
the vessel selection incorporating both qualitative and quantitative information. The 
information provided by the brokers in this instance, contained a small percentage of 
uncertainty in terms of the data provided, as seen in each of the main criteria, due to 
the factors influencing the proper gathering of data like incomplete report on the 
specified vessel by the independent surveyor that checked it. Nevertheless the 
problem of assessing both quantitative and qualitative data remained, as well as trying 
to cope with incomplete information in many cases. The steps followed within the 
framework set at the beginning have been able, with the aid of IDS to give adequate 
results that the decision maker can use even though some data was missing. A very 
important aid in this case of uncertainty is that the data could also be presented in the 
form of degrees of belief, so that assessment could be made on different levels. 
The vessel selection for a particular cargo is a very important procedure as it involves 
a large capital sum to be invested both for the transport of the cargo as well as for the 
operation and maintenance of the vessel before, at the time and after the transfer of 
the cargo. The broker who is going to make the selection will be solely responsible for 
the selection of the vessel according to the sources of information the analyst has. It is 
imperative for him to make the best possible selection as he will receive success fees 
after the transfer takes place; hence it is in the best interest of the analyst to select the 
best possible vessel. 
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IDS software aids in cases of decision making as it enables the decision maker to have 
both tabular and graphical data at hand to make any necessary comparisons. The 
combination of the usage of IDS along with the case of a vessel selection can prove to 
be extremely useful as vessel selections are common in a weekly basis within the 
marine industry. It can provide the appropriate foundation which can be adjusted to 
any type of vessel with minor modifications and eventually provide a better 
comparison tool. The results produced from IDS match to a great extend the initial 
descriptions and assessment data used for each one the vessels in question, thus 
validating the ranking procedure. 
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CHAPTER 5: MARINE SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND BAYESIAN 
NETWORKS 
5.1 Introduction 
Bayesian networks (BNs) are a class of probabilistic models with strong connections 
to graph theory. Initially their main usage was to back up logical statements based on 
deterministic production rules. The immediate advantage is that each variable may 
have more values (also named states) than the traditional true and false and not all 
relations have to be deterministic. 
BNs have already been extensively used in areas away from the marine industry such 
as artificial intelligence. Additionally, Microsoft uses BNs in order to operate the 
troubleshooting section of Windows [Microsoft, 2003]. The need for increased safety 
levels is more than obvious throughout the last 10 years. Engineering systems are 
becoming increasingly advanced and complex, creating the need for appropriate data 
and reliability logging. 
Most marine engineering systems utilise the aid of sensors in different points of 
operation in order to record operational and reliability figures. The databases created 
using the readings taken from the sensors are invaluable because if they are combined 
with appropriate risk estimation methods, they can reduce the probability of hazards 
and failures within an engineering system. As systems are more complex, the 
engineers are required to analyse them as accurately as possible [Wang et al, 1996]. 
Conventional risk estimation techniques like fault tree analysis and event tree analysis 
use the conventional work / fail states to describe the function of an engineering 
system. This is not adequate, as a component or even the system itself can be 
governed by a number of states exceeding work and fail. This requires the use of a 
method, which can provide credible results in such a manner, which will make them 
easily presentable as well as being able to update the model built with new data 
without having to re-build it from the beginning. BNs can provide this tool to 
accommodate such a need [Frühwirth, 1993]. They are flexible enough to be 
combined with other risk estimation techniques, and at the same time being able to 
deal with both quantitative and qualitative data, and allow an easy data update, 
consistent throughout the whole model. 
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5.2 Background theory/definitions. 
A BN consists of a set of nodes and a set of directed arcs. Each node represents a 
probability value and each arc indicates the dependence between the probabilities. In 
probabilistic reasoning, random variables (abbreviated, r. v) are used to represent 
events and/or objects in the world. By making various combinations to these r. v, any 
state can be modelled [Jensen, 1993]. Thus, this will involve computing joint 
probabilities of the given r. v. Unfortunately, the task is nearly impossible without 
additional information concerning relationships between the r. v. In the worst case 
scenario, the probabilities of every node combination should be readily available, 
which eventually would be very hard to calculate. 
On the other hand, consider the chain rule as follows: 
P(A1, A2, A3, A4, A5) = P(A1 I A2, A3, A4, A5) P(A2 I A3, A4, A5) P(A3 I A4, A5) 
P(A4 I A5) P(A5). 
Bayesian networks take this process further by making the important observation that 
certain r. v. pairs may become uncorrelated once information concerning other r. v. is 
known [Pearl, 1988]. More precisely, the following independence condition may be 
applied: 
P(A I Cl, ..., Cn, U) = P(A 
I Cl, ..., Cn) 
for some collection of r. v U. This can be 
interpreted as saying that A is determined by Cl, ..., Cn regardless of U. 
Combined with the chain rule, these conditional independencies allow us to replace 
the terms in the chain rule with the smaller conditionals. Thus, instead of explicitly 
keeping the joint probabilities, all we need are smaller conditional probability tables, 
which can then be used to compute the joint probabilities. 
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5.3 Inference 
There are two types of computations performed with Bayesian Networks: belief 
updating and belief revision [Pearl, 1988]. Belief updating concerns the computation 
of probabilities over random variables, while belief revision concerns finding the 
maximally probable global assignment. Model update is performed in accordance 
with observations using Bayes rules [Bayes, 19891. For random variables X1 and X2, 
Bayes rules state: 
P(X1 I X2) = P(X2 I Xl) P(XI) /( ýarr r 
P(X2 I Xl = x; ) P(Xl = x; )) [5.1) 
Assume X2 is observed to be in state xx. Applying [5.1] to each state of X1 the 
probability distribution P(X1 I X2 = xx) is computed as follows: 
P(X1 1 X2 = xj) = P(X2 = xJ 1 X1) P(X1) 7 (Z. , , 
P(X2 = xj 1 X1 = x; ) P(X1 = x; )) 
[5.2] 
Computations like [5.1 ] and [5.2] can be performed for larger networks and the model 
allows exploitation of the way to answer queries and to investigate different scenarios. 
Belief revision can be used for modelling explanatory/diagnostic tasks. Basically, 
some evidence or observations are given, and the task is to come up with a set of 
hypotheses that together constitute the most satisfactory explanation/interpretation of 
the evidence at hand. This process has also been considered abductive reasoning in 
one form or another [Hobbs et al, 1988], [Shanahan, 1989], [Peng & Regia, 1990], 
[Santos, 1994] and [Charniak et al, 1994]. 
Although performing belief revision and updating (even approximating methods) 
have been shown to be quite hard [Dagum & Luby, 1993] special network topologies 
contain certain algorithms that perform well, such as junction trees [Pearl, 1988]. 
Various approaches to reasoning with Bayesian Networks include stochastic 
simulation, integer programming, and message passing. In this chapter focus will 
therefore be exclusively on algorithms based on junction trees. 
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5.4 Decision and junction trees 
5.4.1 Decision trees and decision problems 
Any case which requires choices to be made among alternative courses of action with 
uncertain consequences is described as a decision problem, whose structure is 
determined by three basic elements [Jensen, 1993]: 
1. A set {a;, i r= I} of available actions, one of which is to be selected. 
2. For each action a;, a set {EE, jE J) of uncertain events describing the uncertain 
outcomes of taking action a;. 
3. Corresponding to each set {EE, jE J}, a set of consequences {cc, je J}. 
Suppose action a; is chosen; then one and only one of the uncertain events Ey jeJ, 
occurs and leads to the corresponding consequence cj, jEJ. In such cases, the 
decision problem can be represented schematically by means of a decision tree as 
seen in Figure 5.1. 
Cj 
Ei 
a; 
Figure 5.1 Decision tree 
The circle represents a decision node, where the choice of an action is required. The 
square represents an uncertainty node where the outcome is beyond our control. 
Following the choice of an action and occurrence of a particular event the branch 
leads to the corresponding consequence. It becomes clear from the decision tree 
representation that identification of any a;, ieI, can be done using the combination of 
{E;, je J} and {c;, je J}. This means that choosing a; as an optimised solution for 
the uncertain scenario labelled by the pairs (Ei, ci), j r= J, it is possible to write a; = {cj 
I EE, jE J}. 
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5.4.2 Junction trees 
Extending the decision tree into more complex situations, the junction tree is born 
[Jensen & Dittmer, 1994]. It is a graphical representation of the model dealt with. The 
nodes of the junction tree are called cliques as each consists of a set of variables from 
the original network (decision tree). When there are loops in the BN, local 
propagation will not work, because of double counting evidence, In fact, local 
propagation is correct if and only if the graph is triangulated, i. e., there are no cordless 
cycles containing a number of nodes (more than 4). Intuitively, triangulation connects 
together those nodes that feature in a common term when summing out. The order of 
summing terms out is equivalent to the elimination order used to triangulate the graph. 
Finding an order that minimises the sum of the clique size (which determines the 
computational complexity) is not particularly hard. The maximal cliques in the 
triangulated graph are the clusters, which can be joined together to form a junction 
tree. This has the property that if x is a member of junction tree nodes i and j, then x 
must be a member of every node on the path between i and j. This property (called the 
junction tree property) ensures that local propagation of information leads to global 
consistency. The triangulation procedure is only defined for undirected graphs. It is 
not sufficient to simply ignore the direction of the arcs in the original BN, since 
directed and undirected graphs have different independence properties [Jensen & 
Dittmer, 1994]. In particular, parents who share a common child might not be 
independent in a directed graph but will be independent in an undirected graph unless 
the parents are connected (otherwise, the child would separate the parents). Hence we 
must first "moralize" the BN, i. e., connect together "unmarried" (non-connected) 
parents who share a common child, and then drop the directionality on the arcs. After 
moralization, it is possible to proceed with triangulation as before. Once we have the 
(undirected) junction tree structure, we can either root it, thus converting it into a tree- 
structured BN, define the cliques for the new cluster nodes, and apply Pearl's junction 
tree algorithm [Pearl, 1988], or we can leave it as an undirected tree, define potential 
functions for the new cluster nodes, and apply a local message algorithm specifically 
designed for undirected graphs. The latter approach is what is usually meant when 
people talk of the junction tree algorithm. The undirected formulation is slightly 
simpler because it is symmetric. The methodology used to construct a junction tree is 
based on the algorithm created by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [Lauritzen & 
Spiegelhalter, 1988] and is described as follows: 
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The moralisation step connects all variables in the set pa(xi) U x;, where pa is the 
parent variables of x;. 
1. Deletion. Delete the directions on all arcs. 
2. Triangulation. The cliques are identified by successive elimination of the variables 
as follows; a variable may be eliminated if all neighbours are mutually connected. 
The eliminated variable and its neighbours then form a clique. If the neighbours 
are not mutually connected, fill-in links are added to the graph to obtain full 
connectivity of the variables in the clique. If at any point a clique is formed so that 
it consists of a subset of an existing clique, it should be deleted. When all 
variables are eliminated, all cliques are identified. The undirected graph consisting 
of all the initial variables and all the links is called a triangulated graph. 
3. The cliques are connected so that the junction tree property is obtained. 
In order for a junction tree (JT) to be valid it should follow the JT property [Lauritzen 
& Spiegelhalter, 1988]. This states that all cliques on the path between two cliques Al 
and A2 for example must contain the intersecting set of variables Al n A2. This set 
S= Al f1 A2 is called the separator set. An example is shown at Figure 5.2 
(a), (b), (c), (d) of how a JT is formed 
EBE CA 
C ýý DCD 
a 
C 
Figure 5.2 Formation of junction tree 
b 
d 
106 
In Figure 5.2 (a) The initial decision tree has taken the proper form of a BN. 
In Figure 5.2 (b) The arcs are deleted and parent variables (B and D leading to E) are 
connected. 
In Figure 5.2 (c) The elimination process begins by deleting the variable which has 
common parent variables. Hence E is eliminated. E belongs to the clique of {BDE} 
and the remaining graph appears as shown above. 
In Figure 5.2 (d) Variable A is chosen to be eliminated, thus forming the clique 
consisting of {A, B, C}, and the remaining variables form the last clique of {B, C, D}. 
Equally to A, any other variable could have been eliminated, as long as the junction 
tree property is maintained. 
The cliques formed were {A, B, C}, {B, D, E}, {B, C, D}. The next step is to arrange 
them in such a way that the JT property is maintained. This means that a common 
separator set should exist in between the first and the last clique. Taking the first 
combination sequence of {A, B, C}, {B, D, E} and {B, C, D} there is {A, B, C} (l 
{B, C, D} = {B, C} which is not contained in the intermediate clique. Similarly, 
{B, C, D) n {B, D, E}= {B. D} which is not included in the intermediate set. Looking 
at {B, D, E} n {A, B, C} = {B} which is included in the intermediate clique. This means 
that the last tree satisfies the JT property. 
5.5 Marginalisation 
From the updated joint table the marginal distributions of each individual variable 
may be found by summation over all other variables. This is known as sum- 
marginalisation [Vellido, & Lisboa, 2001): 
P(x, ) = J: P(U), where P(U) is the joint probability table derived by the product of 
z, FU 
all clique tables divided by the product of all separator tables. These are created by the 
insertion of probability tables to the cliques and their respective separators tables as 
soon as the junction tree is constructed. 
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Sum-marginalisation has the property that the order in which the individual variables 
are marginalized out does not change the result. The same operation may be 
performed when a finding has been inserted. 
It is seen that all marginal probability distributions conditional on the given evidence 
may be obtained from the updated joint distribution. In a similar manner, a finding 
may be inserted in a clique table. Similarly, any variable or set of variables may be 
marginalised out. 
5.6 Message passing 
For large networks, Bayes' simple rule becomes unruly, therefore it is necessary to use 
a message-passing algorithm. The sum-product algorithm is a general form of the 
forward-backward algorithm [Kschischang, 2000]. It attempts to compute various 
marginal functions associated with the global function in a factor graph. Once one or 
more nodes have been observed to be of some value, messages are passed inward 
from an arbitrary set of nodes at the edge of a graph. When they reach an edge, their 
direction is reversed, and when they reach their origin, they are absorbed. 
The first messages are passed from some set of single connected function nodes to the 
variable nodes that they depend upon. No computation is necessary in this step 
because the messages are simple identity messages that specify the knowledge stored 
in the function that creates them. The variable nodes then pass the same identity 
message along to the next function node that they are connected to. These steps are 
marked I and 2 respectively in Figure 5.3. 
ýl 
ic6 ýJ 
vigure 5.3 message passing pattern tor the sum-product algorithm 
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Assuming that a finding f (f is a form of a likelihood vector taking values between 0 
and 1), is to be inserted into a clique A, the value off is computed, then multiplied by 
P(U). The message towards clique B is computed by marginalising out all other 
variables than those of the separator. The updated separator table remains the same no 
matter if the message was sent from I to 2 or from 2 to 1. Each message is received 
according to that same argument. The sum of these computations becomes the 
message to the next variable, marked 3 in Figure 5.3. Step 4 is the same as step 2. In 
step 5, the functions at the periphery of the graph reverse the flow of messages, 
performing the same marginalisation as in step 3. Steps 6,7, and S follow the same 
procedure, in the reverse path. 
5.7 Max-propagation 
Max-propagation is an alternative type of propagation by which, given evidence on 
one or more variables, the most probable configuration of the rest of variables in the 
network can be identified. A configuration is a set consisting of exactly one state from 
each variable. Max-propagation thus identifies the configuration which best explains 
the observed evidence. It can be compared to a minimum cut-set obtained from a fault 
tree. 
The configuration of maximum probability may be identified by a procedure based on 
message passing in the junction tree (D'Ambrosio, 19991. Instead of the message type 
described above, max-messages are computed by replacing summation with 
maximisation. This creates a message, which is composed by the maximum 
probability of each state along a certain path. Exactly as before, the message needs to 
be collected and distributed along the nodes of the BN. 
5.8 Finding the M most likely configurations 
Once the most probable configuration of variables (MI) has been identified by the 
method of max-propagation, the second most probable configuration (M2) can be 
found by a procedure, which again is based on insertion of evidence and subsequent 
max-propagation. The key is that the second most likely configuration will differ from 
the most likely in at least one of the variables. First an ordering of the number of 
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variables in the network is formed. The procedure is to insert evidence and perform 
max-propagations N (N=1,2,3,..., N) times. All propagations should defer for at 
least one variable between them. The algorithm created by Nilsson [Nilsson, 1998], is 
considered to be the most effective in this type of calculation but it was not yet 
incorporated into the Hugin software [Hugin expert, 2003]. 
5.9 D-separation 
Pearl, Geiger and Verma, computer scientists at UCLA working on the problem of 
storing and processing uncertain information efficiently in artificially intelligent 
agents, solved this mathematical problem in the mid 1980s [Pearl, 1996], [Geiger & 
Heckerman, 1995], [Verma, 1993]. Pearl and his colleagues realized that uncertain 
information could be stored much more efficiently by taking advantage of conditional 
independence, and they used directed acyclic graphs (graphs with no loops from a 
variable back to itself) to encode probabilities and the conditional independence 
relations among them. D-separation was the algorithm they invented to compute all 
the conditional independence relations entailed by their graphs [Pearl, 1988]. Spirtes, 
Glymour and Scheines, working on the problem of causal inference at the Philosopy 
Department at Carnegie Mellon University in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
connected the artificial intelligence work of Pearl and his colleagues to the problem of 
testing and discovering causal structure in behavioural sciences [Spirtes et. at, 1993]. 
Eventually, Pearl and his colleagues proved many more interesting results about 
graphical models, what they entail, and algorithms to discover them. In 1994, Spirtes 
proved that d-separation correctly computes the conditional independence relations 
entailed by cyclic directed graphs interpreted as linear statistical models [Spirtes, 
1994], and in the same year Richardson [1994] developed an efficient procedure to 
determine when two linear models, cyclic or not, are d-separation equivalent. In 1996, 
Pearl proved that d-separation correctly encodes the independencies entailed by 
directed graphs with or without cycles in a special class of discrete causal models 
[Pearl, 19961. Also in 1996, Spirtes et. at, proved that d-separation works for linear 
statistical models with correlated errors. Therefore, it should be obvious that d- 
separation is a central idea in the theory of graphical causal models. 
The "d" in d-separation and d-connection stands for dependence. Thus if two 
variables are d-separated relative to a set of variables Z in a directed graph, then they 
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are independently conditional on Z in all probability distributions such a graph can 
represent. Roughly, two variables X and Y are independent conditional on Z if 
knowledge about X gives you no extra information about Y once you have knowledge 
of Z. In other words, once Z is known, X adds nothing to what is known about Y. 
A path is active if it carries information, or dependence. Two variables X and Y might 
be connected by lots of paths in a graph, where all, some, or none of the paths are 
active. X and Y are d-connected, however, if there is any active path between them. 
Let's examine on what makes a path active or inactive. A path is active when every 
vertex on the path is active. Paths, and vertices on these paths, are active or inactive 
relative to a set of other vertices Z. First let's examine when things are active or 
inactive relative to an empty Z. To make matters concrete, consider all of the possible 
undirected paths between a pair of variables A and B that go through a third variable 
C. 
1) A --> C --> B 
2) A <-- C <-- B 
3) A <-- C --> B 
4) A --> C <-. B 
The first is a directed path from A to B through C, the second a directed path from B 
to A through C, and the third a pair of directed paths from C to A and from C to B. If 
these paths are interpreted causally, in the first case A is an indirect cause of B, in the 
second B is an indirect cause of A, and in the third C is a common cause of A and B. 
All three of these causal situations give rise to association, or dependence, between A 
and B, and all three of these undirected paths are active in the theory of d-separation. 
If the fourth case is interpreted causally, then A and B have a common effect in C, but 
no causal connection between them. In the theory of d-separation, the fourth path is 
inactive. Thus, when the conditioning set is empty, only paths that correspond to 
causal connection are active. A path is active in the theory of d-separation just in case 
all the vertices on the path are active. Since C is the only vertex on all four paths 
between A and B, it must be active in the first three paths and inactive in the fourth. In 
the first three, C is a non-collider on the path, and in the fourth C is a collider. When 
the conditioning set is empty, non-colliders are active. Non-colliders transmit 
information (dependence). When the conditioning set is empty, colliders are inactive. 
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Colliders do not transmit information (dependence). Now consider what happens 
when the conditioning set is not empty. When a vertex is in the conditioning set, its 
status can be either active or inactive. Consider the four paths above again, but now 
let's consider the question of whether the variables A and B are d-separated by C. 
1) A --> C --> B 
2) A <-- C <__ B 
3) A <-- C --> B 
4) A --> C <-- B 
In the first three paths, C is active when the conditioning set was empty, so now C is 
inactive on these paths. To fix intuitions, it is necessary to interpret the paths causally. 
In the first case the path from A to B is blocked by conditioning on the intermediary 
C, similarly in case 2, and in case 3 there is conditioning on a common cause, which 
make the effects independent. 
In the fourth case, C is a collider and thus inactive when the conditioning set is empty. 
This can also be made intuitive by considering what happens when looking at the 
relationship between two independent causes after conditioning on a common effect. 
Consider the following example, in which there are two independent causes of a car 
refusing to start: having no gas and having a dead battery. 
dead battery --> car won't start <-- no gas 
The fact that the battery is charged means nothing about whether there is gas, but the 
statement that the battery is charged after the car won't start means that the gas tank 
must be empty. Therefore, independent causes are made dependent by conditioning 
on a common effect, which in the directed graph representing the causal structure is 
the same as conditioning on a collider. David Papineau [Papineau, 1985] was the first 
to understand this case, but never looked at the general connection between directed 
graphs interpreted causally and conditional independence. 
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5.10 Proposed methodology 
The system described, an LPG reliquefaction plant, imposes a high risk factor as there 
are a number of components involved which, if not operated properly, can result in 
probable destruction of property, injuries or even fatalities. A safety framework 
incorporating the BN approach within the plant operation is presented in this section. 
The proposed framework consists of the following steps: 
Step 1: Analyse the engineering system and make the logical determinations between 
the factors (components) involved in each BN. Assign appropriate nodes and 
directional arcs to model the operation of the network. 
Step 2: The constructed BN is further developed into a junction tree. The junction tree 
follows a certain order of construction: 
" Moralisation. The moralisation step connects all variables in the set pa(xi) U x; for 
all i, with pa(xi) being the set of parent variables of the variable x;. 
" Deletion. The direction of all arcs is deleted from the BN. 
" Triangulation. The cliques are identified by successive elimination of the variables 
in the following way. A variable may be eliminated if all its neighbours are 
mutually connected. The eliminated variable and its neighbours then form a 
clique. If the neighbours are not mutually connected, fill-in links are added to the 
graph to obtain full connectivity of the variables in the clique. If at any point a 
clique is formed so that it consists of a subset of an existing clique, it is 
superfluous and should be deleted. The undirected graph consisting of all the 
initial variables and all the links (both original and fill-ins) is called a triangulated 
graph. The formed cliques arc then connected in order to form the junction tree. 
Step 3: Before insertion of evidence (failure rates/probabilities of failure), the 
separator table needs to be found between two adjacent cliques containing the 
common information for both of the cliques. For example, for cliques Y and Z, this is 
done by performing a sum-marginalisation of the separator set S= YnZ so that the 
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separator table is = P(S) contains the common information about Y and Z as seen in 
the theory section. 
Step 4: Once the junction tree has been established as well as the sum-marginalisation 
of the separator tables, the assignment of states and probability tables/evidence 
(containing the failure rates/probabilities of failure from the failure databases) may 
commence with the aid of Hugin software [Hugin expert, 2003]. Each clique is dealt 
separately. The principles of message passing between two nodes within a BN are 
applied in this step. It is assumed that failures follow an exponential distribution 
within a preset time t=1,000,000 working hours. The value of t was selected as 
1,000,000 hours in order to match the criteria established by well known failure 
databases such as the OREDA database published by DNV which uses the same 
period of time for estimation of the component's failure probabilities. 
Step 5: Having the evidence (failure rates/probabilities of failures) on one or more 
variables, the most probable configuration of the rest of variables in the network can 
be identified. A configuration is a set consisting of exactly one state from each 
variable. Max-propagation is used to identify the configuration which best explains 
the observed evidence inserted in a BN's junction tree. The most probable 
configuration can be seen as a cut-set obtained from a fault tree analysis. 
Step 6: Discussion of results obtained from Hugin software, and means of reducing 
risk to as low as reasonably practicable levels. 
Step 7: Conclusion. Having obtained the results from the software as well as having 
the reliquefaction plant modelled by BN an overview of the process will be given 
stressing the advantages of using a technique such as Bayesian Networks for risk 
assessment. 
Hugin software will be used for the computation of steps 4,5 and 6. An analytical 
explanation of each step and how it is related to the test case given in the next section. 
Hugin software will produce the results concerning the most probable configurations 
of components within the reliquefaction plant. 
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5.11 Test case: Risk assessment of an LPG reliquefaction plant through the 
application of Bayesian Networks 
5.11.1 The reliquefaction plant; functions and operation 
Butane and propane, liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) cargoes were carried initially 
under pressure into tanks tested for 50 psi, from 1941 to 1959. In 1960, the manager 
of Shell company's French fleet realised that if the cargo was cooled, its density 
increased and more cargo could be carried in the same ship. Additionally, if this lower 
temperature could be reliably maintained at all times, the lower design pressure would 
permit a reduction in tank scantlings with appropriate savings in tank weight and cost. 
The efficiency of cargo handling has been increased over the years reaching today 
with the fully refrigerated LPG vessels capacities between 20,000 and 80,000 m3. 
With the exception of fully pressurized gas carriers, means must be provided to 
control cargo vapour pressure in the cargo tanks both during loading and passage. In 
the case of LPG and chemical gas tankers some form of reliquefaction plant is fitted. 
This plant is specifically designed to perform the following essential function 
[ISGOT, 2001]: 
" To cool down the cargo tanks and associated piping before loading. 
" To reliquefy the cargo vapours generated by flash evaporation, liquid 
displacement and boil-off during loading and return it to the cargo tanks. 
" To keep the cargo at a temperature and pressure within the design limits of the 
cargo system during transport. 
This test case is intended to demonstrate the application of Bayesian Networks to 
assess the probability of hazards imposed by the operation of a reliquefaction plant. 
Failures to the plant can result in loss of cargo, damage to property, injuries and even 
fatalities. 
There are three main types of reliquefaction plants operating today [ISGOT, 2006], 
[LPG/C Melina, 1980]: 
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" The direct system: 
Boil-off vapours from the cargo tank are drawn off by the compressor and 
compressed. The compression process increases the pressure and the temperature of 
the vapour allowing it to be condensed against seawater in the condenser. In the cargo 
condenser the gas is cooled and liquefied at a temperature of 5 to 10°C above the 
seawater temperature. The condensed liquid is then flashed back to the tank via a 
float-controlled expansion valve (Joule-Thompson valve). This cycle is suitable where 
pressures are relatively high as in the carriage of semi-refrigerated products (high 
boiling point cargoes). 
9 The indirect system. 
Indirect cooling is used for cargoes, which cannot be compressed for chemical 
reasons. The boil-off passes from the tank under its own pressure to a condenser for 
better efficiency. The common refrigerants are hydrogen, helium and propane. The 
refrigerant from the cargo condenser is compressed and then condensed against 
seawater. The condensed liquid is returned to the bottom of the cargo tank by gravity. 
If the evaporator is arranged below the dome, a pump has to be installed for cargo 
liquid return. 
" The cascade system. 
This is the system that will be analysed with the aid of Bayesian Networks. A cascade 
system is a reliquefaction plant where the compressed cargo vapour is condensed by 
evaporation of a liquid refrigerant gas such as R22. The heat from the cargo 
evaporates the R22, which is compressed, condensed in a seawater-cooled condenser, 
and cooled by passage through an expansion valve. Today, this system is the most 
common cooling process for large fully refrigerated LPG ships. The main advantage 
of the cascade system of reliquefaction is that the same refrigerant is used for all 
cargoes, which means that a plant can be designed with the temperature of the 
seawater coolant as the only variable, and since the maximum temperature of the 
seawater likely to be encountered in service can be easily ascertained, it is not too 
difficult to design a plant capable of working within these conditions. 
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The maximum temperature of the cooling water for the plant is usually around 35°C, 
and it is very unlikely that warmer cooling water will be met in service. The cycle is 
also more efficient (better cooling effect), as the R22 (type of refrigerant) temperature 
in the cargo condenser can be below 0°C. Additionally, for more advanced types of 
ships which carry products whose critical temperatures are below that of seawater 
(like methane -162°C for example [Wikipedia, 2006]), the cascade or even double 
cascade system is the only method available. 
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Figure 5.4 LPG reliquefaction plant 
Examining Figure 5.4, the cargo carried in the LPG cargo tank is propane. Boil-off 
creates propane vapour, which is transferred out of the cargo tank by means of a 
suction pump. The vapour follows the vapour line and passes through a liquid 
separator, which is used to gather the liquid droplets contained within the vapour. 
This gathering takes place due to the fact that only vapour should be inserted into the 
compressor. As soon as all liquid is left in the separator, the remaining vapour is 
inserted to the first stage compressor. A filter is situated just before the suction of the 
compressor to collect any impurities in the vapour. The compressor has liquid high- 
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level alarms in case liquid is passed through the plant, which will be damaging to the 
compressor. The vapour leaving the first stage low-pressure compressor is passed 
from an intercooler for further cooling. The intercooler uses the condensed liquid at 
the end of the cycle as a refrigerating mean to the vapour. As soon as the temperature 
is brought down, the cooled-down vapour goes into a second stage high-pressure 
compressor. The vapour is then directed into a cargo condenser, which uses an 
external refrigerating network based on freon R22. Just above the condenser an 
uncondensed vapour-gathering chamber is situated. It is used to hold gases like 
nitrogen, which has been used earlier to inert the cargo tank, as these gases can cause 
extremely high temperatures and pressures at the cargo condenser. After the cargo 
condenser the saturated liquid proceeds to a liquid receiver, which has a level alarm to 
maintain a constant level. This receiver ensures that adequate liquid exists in the plant 
so that all machinery will operate without any problem. The liquid is transferred from 
the liquid receiver through an expansion valve back to the intercooler used for cooling 
down the vapour from the first stage compressor, proceeding through the pipeline and 
sprayed back into the cargo tank. 
Taking a closer look at the reliquefaction plant there are a few details which should be 
mentioned concerning certain components: 
" Cargo condenser: The freon cooled cargo condensers are horizontal steel drums 
which contain a number of steel tubes used for evaporated liquid freon. The end 
plates are fitted with baffle plates so that the evaporating freon passes backwards 
and forwards through the tubes. The baffle plates are so arranged that the number 
of tubes through which the freon passes is a geometric progression. That is, 
through three tubes in the first pass, nine on the return, twenty-seven in the third, 
eighty-one in the fourth and so on, so that the freon is being continuously 
expanded. The admission of liquid freon is controlled by a thermostatically 
controlled expansion valve located immediately outside the condenser. 
" Cargo liquid receiver: The condensed liquid from the cargo condenser is collected 
in the liquid receiver. The level in the receiver operates a float valve governing the 
main valve in the liquid outlet pipeline. A hand operated by-pass valve is also 
fitted. 
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" Cargo intercooler: In the two-stage compressor, the discharge temperature of the 
first stage is so high that if the hot vapour was fed directly to the suction of the 
second stage, the high pressure discharge temperature would be excessive and the 
compressor would stop itself on the high pressure / high temperature cut-out. 
Therefore the temperature of the low-pressure discharge is reduced by spraying in 
the liquid from the condenser, which quickly evaporates and so cools the vapour 
before it passes to the second stage. The liquid injection is controlled by a float, 
which, via a controller, operates a valve permitting sufficient liquid to enter the 
inter-stage cooler to maintain a low level of liquid. If the level of the liquid rise, a 
float switch will stop the compressor to prevent liquid entering the suction. The 
high-pressure suction draws vapour from the top of the inter-stage cooler. A liquid 
droplet trap is placed between the inter-stage cooler and the compressor high- 
pressure suction to remove and liquid droplets. Any liquid collected in the trap, 
will be drained back into the inter-stage cooler. When the compressor stops, the 
drop in lubricating oil pressure operates a controller, which closes a valve and 
shuts off the liquid injected into the inter-stage cooler. 
5.11.2 Analysis of steps incorporated in the methodology 
Step 1: The reliquefaction system is analysed and appropriate BN(s) are constructed. 
The purpose of this step is to give a graphical representation using BNs, of the 
operation of the reliquefaction system and the way that its components influence one 
another. After the initial position of nodes and arcs Figure 5.5 is derived. 
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Figure 5.5 Bayesian representation of the reliquefaction system components 
For simplicity of calculations, Figure 5.5 presented, will be broken down to three 
smaller BNs as shown in Figure 5.6 (a), (b), (c). 
Figure 5.6 Reliquefaction plant components (a) 
Figure 5.6 Reliquefaction plant components (b) 
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Figure 5.6 Reliquefaction plant components (c) 
Step 2: The methodological steps will be analytically applied to Figure 5.6 (a) to show 
the full extent of the methodology process. Exactly the same procedure is followed to 
derive results from Figures 5.6 (b) and 5.6 (c). The constructed BN in Figure 5.6 (a) 
should be transformed into a junction tree. This is achieved as follows: 
Moralisation: Since there are only 3 nodes included in this example no moralization is 
required. 
Deletion: The direction of all arcs is deleted from the BN as shown in Figure 5.7. 
Figure 5.7 Deletion process of directional arcs within a BN 
Due to the number of three nodes, triangulation in this case consists of all 
components. Assume that Suction Valve = A, Liquid Separator =B and Compressor 
No. 1 = C. Therefore the clique formed is {A, B, C}. Similarly for Figures 5.6 (b) and 
Figure 5.6 (c) the cliques formed are {C, D, E}and {E, F, G} with D= Intercooler, E 
Compressor No. 2, F= Uncondensed gas chamber and G= Cargo Condenser. 
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Step 3: Before the insertion of evidence the separator tables need to be found between 
two adjacent cliques containing the common information. Taking the above identified 
cliques by pairs {A, B, C} n {C, D, E} = {C} and {C, D, E}n {E, F, G} = {E} are 
obtained. { C) and {E} are the separator tables. 
Step 4: The number of states and their identification should be assigned to each node 
included in the cliques found before. The states are the same for all the nodes. The 
assignment of two states, Operating and Not Operating governs all components of the 
BNs in this test case. Insertion of failure probabilities is required at this stage. The 
information used is taken from the OREDA handbook [OREDA DNV, 2002], as well 
as from expert's judgements with field experience (marine engineers, academics). 
Figure 5.8 refers to clique {A, B, C} 
BNs 
" Compressorl 
D 89.77 
mwj' 40 Liquid-Separator 
93.00 Operating 
7.00 Not Operating 
-' ! Suction-valve 
95.00 Operating 
0 5.00 Not Operating 
M Operating 
7.00 Not Opera 
Compressorl 
Operating 
1 10.23 Not Operatin 
Figure 5.8 Assignment of states and failure probabilities to the nodes within the 
BN 
Figure 5.8, illustrated in Hugin software, falls into the area of d-separation. The 
relation between the nodes can be qualitatively expressed by stating that the suction 
valve and liquid separator have a common effect towards the proper operation of the 
I" compressor. Stating that the liquid separator is operating properly has no actual 
meaning. Stating that the liquid separator is functioning properly while the 
compressor is not operating means that there is something wrong with the suction 
valve from the cargo tank. Therefore, independent causes are made dependent by 
conditioning on a common effect. 
The information provided in Figure 5.8 can be utilised in a different way as to 
determine elements as requested by the decision maker/safety engineer. If compressor 
1 is in the state of non-operation, what is the probability of the liquid separator being 
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in the same state? All that is needed is to set the compressor in the 100% non- 
operating status and propagate the new piece of evidence throughout the network, 
(using the message passing technique) thus updating all nodes with the new 
information inserted. As can be seen from Figure 5.9, the insertion of new evidence 
was successful and the probability of the liquid separator being into the non-operating 
state is estimated to be 0.5862. 
_ "° BNs 
Compressorl 
O- 
10 Liquid_Separator 
41.38 Operating 
58.62 Not Operating 
40 Suction_Valve 
89.83 Operating 
D 10.17 Not Operating 
Figure 5.9 Insertion of new evidence, BN update and estimation of failure 
probability of a node given further information 
Step 5: As can be seen from Figure 5.9 if a 100% non-operation state exists for 
compressor 1, it has to be the result of one of the states from each node. At first 
glance, it seems that if the liquid separator is in the non-operating state and the suction 
valve at the operating state the compressor will be at the non-operating state. This is 
not always the case as from time to time values may differ. It is therefore necessary to 
estimate what is the most probable set of configuration of the states that leads to the 
failure of the compressor's operation. Using the principle of max-propagation as 
stated in the theory section the most likely combination of states is revealed leading to 
the failure of the compressor. Figure 5.10 illustrates the most likely combination of 
states by assigning them with a value of 100.00. 
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Q BNs 
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Liquid_Separator 
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Figure 5.10 Most likely combination of states leading to failure of compressor 
Step 6/7: Having gone through the process of building a BN and assigning proper 
states to the nodes, the insertion of probabilities of failure has given the opportunity to 
derive several results as to the behaviour and the consequences of non-operation of 
the system elements. In all cases of creation of a BN, the information inserted into the 
child nodes comes from a combination of marine expert's judgements (academics, 
engineers) along with parametric learning from several failure databases. Using the 
aid of Hugin software, it is very easy to determine conditional interdependences in 
order to calculate the probability of occurrence of any state within a node. 
Additionally, by being able to derive the most likely combination of states, the 
decision maker/safety engineer will be able to determine the areas in which further 
analysis should take place in order to improve either operating or design factors 
through reducing the probabilities of occurrence of certain states reduced. Having 
seen the analysis concerning a small set of nodes, the process can be expanded to 
accommodate larger engineering systems. Knowledge of interdependence and the way 
one component is affecting the other is crucial as it will allow the decision maker / 
safety engineer to produce the proper estimations as far as the operating states are 
concerned. 
Examining the fully constructed BN in Figure 5.5, the information concerning each 
node is fed into Hugin software. Figure 5.11 illustrates the assignment of states and 
failure probabilities to the nodes within the BN used to describe the system reliability 
during the operation of a reliquefaction system operating on board an LPG vessel. 
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Figure 5.11 Assignment of states and failure probabilities to the nodes within the 
BN 
In a similar manner as before, any node can be given a 100% value to any state in 
order to see how the rest of the states change as the BN is updated by the insertion of 
new information. Figure 5.12 illustrates the condition that the system reliability is at a 
non-operating state, meaning total fault during the functioning of the plant. Figure 
5.12 also gives the update values in all node states. Again in this case the advantage of 
a BN at the update and propagation stage of information is clear. In the same sense, 
any node of the system could be isolated in order to see how this change would affect 
the rest of the system. In this way, the experts can either suggest operational changes 
or, when funds are available, try to redesign the system by making it as failure-proof 
as possible. 
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Figure 5.12 Insertion of new evidence, BN update and estimation of failure 
probability of a node given further information 
The last part of the BN analysis requires the identification of the combination of each 
particular state, which will lead to the isolated state selected. Using Figure 5.13, it is 
seen that the node in question is the system reliability. As it can be seen in order for a 
system to be in a completing non-operative state, it does not mean that all nodes 
(system components) have to be in a non-operating state. The combination of a few 
vital components can prohibit the system from operating properly. The calculations 
were made using Hugin software. The state in red represents the isolated condition, 
which is caused by the combination of the rest of the states within the BN. The states 
included within the most likely combination are given a designation of 100%. This is 
not considered to be a number, as the total percentage of the two states will exceed 
100%. This is considered to be a symbol given by the software's developers to 
designate which state is included in the combination. 
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Figure 5.13 Most likely combination of states leading to failure of compressor 
5.12 Conclusion 
Bayesian networks have proven to be an excellent tool concerning the analysis of 
system reliability, enabling answering questions concerning either the operation or 
reliability of the system in an efficient, fast and easy to understand way. The initial 
problem is the formulation of appropriate junction trees, but as soon as this is 
determined, the process is easy to follow in order to derive adequate results. It can 
certainly be expanded for more analytic use within the marine industry specifically 
when it comes to calculating the reliability and safety of an engineering system. 
Following the proposed methodological steps, insertion of new evidence, update and 
re-compilation of the model constructed are performed easily. A BN has the main 
advantage over other commonly used techniques for risk estimation (fault tree, event 
tree) that apart from the graphical representation of the problem and its results, the 
decision maker / safety engineer can insert any specific state to each variable so that 
the analyst can describe the system in question with greater accuracy. Techniques like 
BN, fault tree analysis and event tree analysis, can either be used as stand-alone risk 
estimation methods or can be combined to derive more accurate results. They can 
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complement each other according to the nature of the problem. For example an event 
tree can be converted into a BN to increase the states within each consequence 
produced. An additional advantage of a BN is the ability to combine several influence 
diagrams, something that cannot be tackled by conventional risk estimation methods. 
What is more, BNs are flexible enough to tackle qualitative and quantitative data. 
Based on the engineering evolution which sets an increasing number of sensors for 
monitoring purposes at almost all marine engineering systems, BNs will have a vast 
range of data that can be combined to produce interdependence reliability estimations. 
This on the other hand is their main limitation. The complexity of calculations 
becomes harder when the numbers of nodes start to increase. Therefore it would not 
be recommended for computations within very large and combined networks. The 
elements of BNs are simple, yet when combined they can form a wide range of 
engineering models, as the majority of operation and reliability aspects can be 
captured. 
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CHAPTER 6. A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE VARIABLES 
TRANSFORMATION IN FORM/SORM METHOD FOR ESTIMATION OF 
THE MOST LIKELY FAILURE POINT 
6.1 Introduction 
The Form/Sorm method has initially been proposed by Hasofer and Lind [Hasofer & 
Lind, 1974] for normal vectors X and was extended later to arbitrary distributions by 
Rackwitz and Fiessler [Rackwitz & Fiessler, 1978]. Its main computational task is the 
calculation of the location of the most likely failure point (or ß-point) by a suitable 
search algorithm. The distribution function of X must be differentiable. Usually, the 
probability estimate is sufficiently accurate for most practical purposes. What is more, 
for applications within the field of toxic hazards, it is proposed as a means for 
performing sensitivity analyses, possibly in parallel with a risk calculation carried out 
by conventional methods. 
In this chapter, the basis of the method is outlined, the theory and factors influencing 
the calculations are analysed and a test case examining the risk arising from the 
operation of a port cargo handling crane is presented. Calculations use, as a 
consequence model, commercial software for the prediction of failure points. The use 
of a proposed screening procedure utilising the sensitivity formulas that the method 
provides, in order to identify the most significant uncertainties, is demonstrated. 
The identification of a single set of input values containing sufficient information to 
summarise (at least approximately) the entire risk analysis is considered to be an 
important feature of the method and is proposed as the basis of a means for assessing 
the validity of the consequence model. 
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6.2 The Form/Sorm Method 
6.2.1 Background theory 
Assume that a calculation of a quantity Q is being estimated by means of a 
mathematical model, which may range in complexity from a simple expression to 
complicated reliability software. The model requires a number of input quantities, 
which may be subdivided into two groups. The first contains inputs, whose values are 
either readily available or, are known within an uncertainty, small enough not to 
influence the final results. This group of inputs will be characterised as constants in 
this chapter. The second group, which is of particular interest in this chapter, contains 
quantities whose values are uncertain. Each of these latter quantities should be 
represented not by a single value x; but by a random variable Xi with an appropriate 
probability distribution [Lin & Kiureghian, 1986]. These uncertain input quantities are 
characterised as basic variables. It should be noted that each of these basic variables 
mentioned, needs to be represented by a single value X; each time a simulation of the 
model is run. 
Hence, the calculation performed by the model can be represented as: 
Q° Q(X) = Q(X1, X2q....., XN) [6.1] 
where X is the vector of the N basic variables and the constants in the calculation 
have been included implicitly in equation [6.1 ]. 
Let a safety margin of 
M-Qum'Q [6.2] 
where, Qjim is the maximum acceptable value of the quantity Q, and the condition 
Q(x) < Qlim [6.3] 
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defines states that are in the "pass" region (Rp). The condition 
Q(x) > Qlim (6.4] 
defines states that are in the "fail" region (RF). Finally, the equality 
Q(x) = Qºim [6.5] 
defines an N-1 dimensional surface which marks the division between the two 
regions and which is known as the failure region boundary or failure surface; x was 
used instead of X as we do not want to define a vector but a distribution. 
Assume that a best-estimate calculation of Q is made, and that Q< Qiim. A number of 
factors need to be addressed within a safety case in order to perform all the necessary 
reliability calculations. 
i) The most likely combination of states which can cause Q or Q(X) (since 
Q=Q(X)) to exceed Qi, m. 
ii) The probability PF that Q will actually exceed Qi; m given the uncertainties 
within the calculations. 
iüj The degree of sensitivity that the failure probability has according to each 
variable. 
Form/Sorm method can provide solutions for factors i, ii and iii as mentioned above. 
6.2.2 Location of the most-likely failure point 
The most likely failure point (MLFP) method works on a different principle from 
commonly used failure estimation methods like the Monte Carlo simulation. Referring 
to Figure 6.1, it is assumed a case of LPG cargo been released to the atmosphere from 
a safety relief valve. Assume that Dd contour in the diagram denotes the limit after 
which, the atmosphere contains gas in such a percentage that can be easily ignited. 
The means of the distributions in the process of calculating the percentage of gas in 
the atmosphere are located at point 0, which in the case presented is within the pass 
region [Scott, 1992]. 0 is considered to be the best estimate point (BEP). The further 
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point 0 lies away from the contour, the smaller the probability that the quantity Q(X) 
will exceed Qum as stated before. 
Wind 
speed Dd 
Gas release rate 
Figure 6.1 Contour based on the Monte Carlo simulation 
The principle of the MLFP method is firstly to define a standardised coordinate 
system in which this distance can be expressed, and then calculate the distance by 
finding the point of closest approach of the contour to 0 as seen in Figure 6.2. Finally, 
to estimate Pf by performing an analytic integration over a region which, 
approximates the failure region [Evans et al, 1993]. Pf is the failure probability 
predicted by the calculation. In order to achieve that, it is required to transform the 
set of variables used in the problem addressed in such a format that can be readily 
usable to give results. The most common case is that the initial set of variables, noted 
N, is going to be parted from variables being both correlated and non-normally 
distributed. In order for this set to be usable in risk estimation, it is required to be 
transformed into another set of N' independent and normally or log-normally 
distributed variables which can be used on a standardised co-ordinate system. 
131 
0.204 
. OD4 
rate 
Figure 6.2 Contours passing from the fail and pass regions, for estimation of 
BEP 
The transformation to the standard coordinate system is achieved using the following 
method. Assume that an input quantity x to the consequence model is uncertain. This 
uncertainty is represented by a continuous probability distribution px(x) or 
alternatively, by the cumulative probability distribution (the integral of px(x)) Px(x). 
The value of x is converted to the value of an alternative variable ux by means of the 
following equation: 
(D(ux)=Px(x) [6.6] 
where 1(u) = 0.5(1+erf(u/'2) [Mitchell, 1996] is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution; that is the cumulative distribution corresponding to the normal (i. e 
Gaussian) density distribution 0 for a variable of mean 0.0 and standard deviation 1.0. 
erf is the error function for each element of x, and it is noted as erf = 
_r2 
xf e'12 dt . 
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Therefore, 4(u) = 
e2_r (6.7] 
Each variable ux has a standard normal distribution and is referred to as the standard 
normal variable corresponding to x. The best estimate values for uncertain variables 
are taken to be those by the medians of the probability distributions. In this chapter, 
the combined distribution is a function of the distance from the BEP and the circles 
shown in Figure 6.3 represented by contours of constant probability density . The 
point of closest approach therefore also possesses the maximum probability density 
(in the transformed system) and it is known as the most likely failure point (MLFP). 
Assuming that the distance (essentially the combined number of standard deviations) 
Us 
Figure 6.3 Representation of the MLFP from the BEP at the centre of axis 
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from the BEP to the MLFP is ß, then the integral of the probability density over the 
region beyond the failure surface in Figure 6.3, relative to the position of BEP, can be 
estimated as P1 using the following equation: 
Pý _ (D(-ß) [6. $] 
The above equation applies to any number of uncertain variables. 
6.2.3 Estimation of the failure probability Integral 
The failure probability Pf is calculated as the integral of the joint probability 
distribution over the entire failure region (RF) [Kendal et al, 1994]. Therefore: 
PF 
RF 
O. (u)(du) [6.9] 
where ýu(u) is the joint probability density function for the random variables u and RF 
is the failure region. Since the u values are all uncorrelated, 4(u) becomes: 
N 
0. (u) =110,, (ut) [6.10) 
r=I 
where O,,, (u, ) is the standard normal probability density function 
u2 
4(u) ei 
, 
j2-; r 
The integral in Equation [6.9] usually cannot be evaluated as it stands since the shape 
of the failure region boundary (failure surface) is unknown and, even if it were known 
exactly, the required calculation would be too complicated to perform. The Form and 
Sorm methods allow this integral to be evaluated approximately by representing the 
shape of the failure surface in the vicinity of the MLFP. 
6.3 The Form approximation 
The first order reliability method (Form) approximates the failure surface as the 
tangent line, plane or hyper plane (depending respectively upon whether N is 2,3 or > 
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3) at the MLFP. The Form approximation to Pf is then easy to evaluate. Since the joint 
probability density distribution in u-space is rotationally symmetric about the origin, it 
is possible to transform the co-ordinate system by rotating about the origin to produce 
new axes (zi,... zN) such that zN passes through the MLFP (the orientation of zi,... zN. I 
relative to zN is not relevant here). In this case the Equations [6.9] and [6.10] become 
[Mitchell, 1996]: 
N 
Pf= J.... J-ý J1&, )dz,... dzN [6.11] W 
where 0 is the distance from the origin to the MLFP. 
The subscript 1 on Pf denotes the first-order approximation. Since it is possible to 
separate the variables, each integral can be carried out separately. The integrals from - 
oo to +oo are all equal to 1.0 having as a result the following: 
00 
Pf, =j O(z v )dzN [6.12] 
_ ý(-ß) [6.13] 
where c is the cumulative lognormal distribution ((D(y) = '/2 [1+ er«yI2)]. 
Expression [6.13] is the first order approximation to Equation [6.9]. 
In order to obtain a better estimation of the value of Pf the Sorm approximation is 
used by just adding a number of extra evaluations of Q. 
6.4 The Sorm approximation 
The basis of the second-order reliability method (Sorm) will not be discussed in detail 
in the chapter. However, calculations using the commercial structural reliability 
package Sysrel [Strurel. 2000], gave adequate Sorm estimates of Pf. The Sorm 
approximation uses information about the curvatures of the failure surface at the 
MLFP, which are approximated as parabolic, paraboloidal or hyper-paraboloidal, 
depending on the number of uncertain variables, to derive an improved estimate of Pr. 
The Sorm failure probability PQ may be evaluated exactly by means of an analytical 
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integral [Bjerager, 1990] as follows: 
N-I I 
Pa = cD (-ß)rj (1+V(-P)kj) Z [6.14] 
where k; are the surface curvatures referred to above, and y= 
0. 
The N-dimensional integral [6.11) with the failure region boundary described by 
Equation [6.14] can be reduced to an integral over a single variable, and can thereby 
be evaluated by numerical methods. 
6.5 First-order importance and sensitivity measures 
The Form/Sorm method, in addition to providing estimates of Pf, produces useful 
additional information concerning the sensitivity of the results to variations in the 
input quantities, allowing the user to judge which variables of the analysis are of most 
importance. 
6.5.1 Sensitivity of the quantity of interest to variations in the basic variables 
The constrained minimisation calculation referred above, produces values given by 
the equation VQ = [aQ/äu1, aQ/öu2, ..., öQ/öuN] at various points in its search 
including the initial (e. g. median or mean value) point and the most-likely failure 
point. The sensitivity of Q to small changes in each x; at these points may therefore be 
calculated as: 
(IQ = 
aQ au' 
3xß 3u1 öx, 
and since it is stated at the beginning that V(ui) = Pi(xi) [6,15]: 
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au, 
__ 
P1 (x, ) 
ox, Ku, ) 
[6,16] 
where pi(xi) = 
2P 
represents the probability density function appropriate to the ith- 
r 
variable evaluated at x; and ß(u1)= 
D is the standard normal density function aul 
evaluated at u;. Therefore by combining the above two mentioned equations: 
aQ 
_ 
p, (x, ) (aQ 
öxt q5(ut) au, 
[6.17] 
These rates of change represent the quantities estimated in traditional sensitivity 
analyses. 
6.5.2 Importance of contribution of each variable to the failure probability 
In addition to the type of sensitivity information discussed previously, it is clearly of 
interest to determine which variables have the most influence on Pf, which means, for 
which variables it would be better to reduce the uncertainty as much as possible 
[Scott, 1992], [Kendall et at, 1994]. The most immediate results of this are the relative 
sizes of the values of u; at the MLFP since these represent the numbers of standard 
deviations, and hence the probability density for each variable 
The most immediate piece of information arises from the co-ordinates of the MLFP. 
Since ß largely determines the failure probability and since, 
a2 ýý u2 
2 
1=1 
(6.18) 
where, u; m with i=1... N are the co-ordinates of the MLFP as mentioned further above, 
then the fractional contribution I; of the ith uncertain variable can be expressed as: 
i 
1_ 
urm 
and it may be seen that the values of I; sum to 1. 
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The values of I; or ýI;, if the value is assumed to be normally distributed, are directly 
related to the sensitivity of Pn to changes in the parameters of the probability 
distributions (i. e. µ or Q) for each variable [Evans et al, 1993]. The values of Ii 
provide a guide as to the relative importance of the variables in terms of their effect 
on determining the failure probability. 
6.6 Effect of replacing an uncertain variable by a constant 
When performing an uncertainty analysis, one of the most useful pieces of 
information is a measure of the effect of replacing an uncertain variable by a constant, 
thereby allowing the unimportant variables to be filtered out and so reducing the 
dimension N of the failure region [Lin & Kiureghian, 1986]. 
When a variable x; is replaced by its mean value pi, then the change of Aß in the 
distance from the origin to the MLFP is given by: 
ýý3 = -Y 2-1] [6.20] 
If I; is small, it can also be stated as: 
Ap = 
B' 
[6.21] 
and hence, 
A,, j = 
0(QýQI, 
[6.22] 
All variables whose combined effect upon ß (or Po) is less than some threshold value 
can be omitted. 
6.7 Points in Form/Sorm worth reviewing 
It is appropriate here to review the ways in which the importance and sensitivity 
formulas described in the previous sections may be used and, particularly, to 
emphasise some of their limitations. 
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Firstly, it is anticipated that the analyst will, in addition to deciding if the failure 
probability is acceptable, wish to ascertain which variables are the most important in 
determining the failure probability. When this has been decided, it is further assumed 
that he/she will require some indication of the expected benefit (in terms of reduction 
in Pf) as a result of a reduction in the standard deviations of particular variables. This 
information can then be used for further analysis, if necessary. Probability 
distributions assigned to the uncertain variables might represent different 
circumstances, for example [Kaimal & Finnigan, 1994], [Madsen et al, 1986]: 
1. The variable represents a well-defined physical quantity, whose exact value is not 
known (e. g. the tensile strength of the material from which an LPG tank is 
constructed). 
2. The variable represents a fitted parameter, whose value appropriate to the 
circumstances being analysed is uncertain (e. g. the wind speed and direction). 
3. The quantity is genuinely variable with time, so that the value at the time of 
occurrence of the incident being analysed is not predictable (e. g. the quantity of 
hydrocarbon in gaseous form present in a tank). 
Although the circumstances represented by the distribution do not affect the 
calculation or the interpretation of the results, they may influence the choice of 
variables for which a reduction in standard deviation is to be attempted. It is worth 
mentioning that the derived sensitivities apply to the first-order approximation for the 
failure probability. The term "most likely failure point", can be misleading in some 
cases. When the best-estimate point (BEP) lies in the pass region, then the MLFP does 
indeed represent the most likely combination of input quantities giving rise to failure. 
However, if the BEP is in the fail region, then the MLFP becomes the most likely 
combination of input quantities giving rise to a pass. The MLFP should be interpreted 
as the point on the boundary between the pass and fail regions (failure surface) with 
the highest probability. 
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6.8 Background of variable transformation theory using the conventional 
Rosenblatt method 
Form/Sorm method and in extension MLFP estimation, require that the N uncertain 
input variables should be transformed into N' variables that are (a) independent and 
(b) normally, or log-normally distributed as it will be presented in the test case. The 
requirement (b) is straightforward for any variable, provided that the input variables 
are independent between them. The possibility of a general means for deriving a set of 
N independent normally or log-normally distributed random variables in order to 
represent a joint probability distribution F(x1, x2,..., XN) of N interdependent variables 
may be seen from the following general expressions from probability theory. If A and 
B represent 2 events and P(A) is the probability of A occurring and, P(Br)A) is the 
probability of A and B occurring together, then the probability of B occurring, given 
A has occurred [P(B/A)] is given by the following expression in the set theory 
[Rosenblatt, 1952]: 
P(B/A) = P(BnA)/P(A) [6.23] 
P(BnA) = P(B/A)P(A) [6,24] 
If events A and B are independent, then Equation [6.24] becomes, 
P(Br)A) = P(B)P(A) [6.25] 
In the case of N events Eh.... EN, Equation [6.24] can be generalised to 
P(EinE2n... EN) = P(EN / E, nE2n... EN. I) x P(EN. 1 / E1nE2n... EN. 2) X.., X 
P(E2 / E, ) x P(E1) [6.26) 
Let E; be the event that the random variable Xi takes on a value less than or equal to 
the value x; for i= 1... N. The probability P(EinE2r ... EN) is then conventionally 
written as F(x1, x2,..., XN) where F is the joint cumulative probability distribution for 
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random variables X1... XN. In this case, Equation [6.26) becomes: 
F(xt, xz,..., XN) = F(xN/(XI=xl) n (X2=x2) n... n (XN-I=xN-1) x 
F(XN-1/(XN-1=XN-1) n (X2=x2) (1... (1 (XN-2=XN. 2) x... x 
F(x2 / (Xi=xj)) x F(xi) 
where F(x1) is the cumulative probability distribution for X1, i. e. 
(6.27) 
F (X]) = $XN ý' ..... 
i f(x,, x2,..., xN)dx, dx2... dxN [6.28] 
00 
In general F(x; /(X1=x1) n (X2=x2) 0 ... n(X;. 1=x;. i)) is the cumulative probability 
distribution for random variable X;. 
Equation [6.27] represents the joint probability distribution F(xi, x2,..., XN) as the 
product of N separate terms. If each term in the product is considered as representing 
the probability distribution of a single random variable U; then, by using Equation 
[6.25] which can be generalised as well to N terms, these variables must be 
independent. Therefore it is defined that: 
(D(ui) = F(xi) 
(D(u2) = F(x2/(Xt=xi)) 
CD(UN) = F(XN / (Xi=xi) n (X2=x2) n... il 
(XN. I=XN-1)) [6.29] 
where, (D is the cumulative normal distribution, and variables u;, with i=1... N, are 
independent and lognormally distributed, as required, and the product of CV(ui) 
c«(u2)... c(UN) is equal to the original joint probability distribution as in Equation 
[6.27]. Therefore, given a vector of values of the original variables (XI, X2... xN) these 
values can in principle be transformed into values of the independent normally 
distributed variables u; by means of the following sequence [Rosenblatt, 1952]: 
ut =( [F(x1)] 
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U2 = (D''[F(x2) / (X1=x1)) 
UN = c-'[F(XN) I (X1=X1) r (X2=X2) X1... (1 (XN. I=XN. j)] 
The method that Rosenblatt proposed, and which is briefly described above is the one 
traditionally used for cases of variable transformation from one set to a proper one 
used within the failure probability calculations. What follows below is a different 
method of variable transformation applied to both normal and lognormal distributed 
variables, called the Nataf transformation. It is shown in the test case that according to 
the problem addressed a better failure probability estimation can be derived using the 
Nataf method [Nataf, 1962]. 
6.9 Modified variable transformation method: The Nataf method for correlated 
variables 
The property of correlation is a special case of that of interdependence and implies a 
linear relationship between pairs of random variables as it is will be shown further 
down. For the case of two random variables X1 and X2, the covariance between them 
is given by (Lin & Kiureghian, 1986]: 
Cov(X1, X2) = E(X1X2) - E(X1)E(X2) [6.30] 
where E represents the expectation value, which itself is defined as: 
E(X) = fxf(x)dx (6.31 1 
for a single variable, and 
E(X1X2) = fý f 
ýxix2 
f(x,, x2)dxidx2 [6,32) 
for the product of variables X1, X2. 
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The correlation coefficient for random variables X1 and X2, symbolised as p is 
defined as: 
P= 
Cov(X1, X2) 
(7,0'2 
[6.33) 
where QI and a2 are the standard deviations of X1 and X2. With the definition given in 
Equation [6.33], the value of correlation coefficient is limited to -1: 5p: 51. 
Although it is common to view p as a measure of the interdependence of random 
variables X1 and X2, it is nevertheless the case that strongly interdependent variables 
may have p=0. An example of this would be a joint distribution which is constant 
over a unit circle, i. e. [Scott, 1992]: 
f(x1, x2)= 1/tfor xI2+x2251 =p=0 
Evaluation of p for this distribution yields a value of 0, and yet Xi and X2 are 
interdependent, since the range of one depends upon the value of the other, 
Conversely though, random variables, which are independent, always have a 
correlation coefficient of zero. For variables whose joint distributions are not 
precisely known, or for cases where the joint distribution is to be approximated, it 
may be convenient not to specify the entire joint distribution RXI , x2) but only [Kendal 
et al, 1994]: 
(1) The marginal distribution gxl) of Xl. 
(2) The marginal distribution 1(x2) of X2. 
(3) The degree of correlation p between them. 
This gives the opportunity to estimate apart from the effect of the uncertainty in the 
input values used, the effect of any possible correlation between them, This can only 
be done using the Nataf transformation. 
143 
6.9.1 The Nataf Method 
The principle of the Nataf transformation (see also Equation [6.32]) is to construct a 
pre-specified form of joint probability distribution gxi, x2), which preserves the 
marginal distribution of each variable and the correlation between them, according to 
the following formula [Nataf, 1962]: 
g(xi xi) = .f 
(x1). f (xz) q$(z1, z2, r) O(ZI)q5(z2) [6.34] 
where, 4 (zI, z2, r) is the bivariate standard normal probability density distribution, with 
correlation coefficient r, where -1 5rS1, and the quantities f(xi) and «x2) are 
normally distributed. The relationship between r and the quantity p, defined in the 
previous section, is explained as follows. The bivariate standard normal probability 
density distribution has the explicit form of [Nataf, 1962]: 
[-ZC (t, -2nlts+ss )) 
4(zl, z2, r)= 22e 
[6.35] 
where, c2 =1- r2 [6.36] 
Equation [6.34] is related to the variable transformation procedure described in the 
MLFP section, where a basic variable x is transformed into a new variable u by 
having a standard normal distribution. In the case of Equation [6.34] though, the new 
variables noted zl and z2 are still correlated with correlation coefficient r. However, 
because of the definition of the joint normal distribution (for two or more variables), it 
is possible to transform variables zj and z2 to ui and u2, which have standard normal 
distributions and are independent, so completing the transformation from xi, x2 to ui 
and u2. Considering only two variables, the transformation is as follows: 
ui=az1 +bz2 [6.37) 
u2=bz2+az2 [6.38] 
where, 
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a= 
('+c 
ý[6.39] 
and 
b= ßc2 [6.40] 
Assume a quantity y; (x; -µi)/a;. p is estimated by: 
[6.411 p= J5y? y20(zI, z2, r)dzldz2 
00 
There are therefore, three possible approaches to the problem of deriving r from the 
specified value p. 
(1) Solve equation [L] numerically. 
(2) Use the formulas given by [Liu, et. all, 1986]. 
(3) Use the approximation presented here that r=p. 
The latter approach is acceptable because, 
" If p is being used as the varied parameter in a sensitivity survey, it is equally 
permissible to specify r as the varied parameter, rather than p. 
" Again from [Liu, et. All. 1986], it is indicated that r and p do not differ 
significantly in most cases. 
As soon as the above process completes and the joint probability distributions are 
derived the failure probability integral over the failure region is estimated as well as 
the MLFP, and the Form and Sorm approximations. The example presented is 
indicative of the difference between the results that the two methods used, Rosenblatt 
and Nataf produce and eventually show that the Nataf transformation is a better way 
to transform the basic input variables. In both cases, the same reliability software 
Sysrel [Strurel, 2000] was used. 
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6.10 Test case and comparison of transformation results 
For a new automatic container crane., there are two different braking conditions to be 
provided for normal operations and emergency conditions. All brakes should be 
capable of rapidly stopping the crane plus the working load from maximum full load 
speed without the aid of regenerative braking. One of the main braking systems of the 
crane is the long travel braking system. It should be able to arrest the crane from full 
speed. The crane's ability to stop is greatly affected by the braking system's ability to 
prevent skidding. In crane locations where prevailing winds can cause problems, 
arrangements are provided to tackle this situation. These are: 
" "Drop in" type storm pin. 
" Hydraulic or gravity operated rail claws or clamps. 
" Hydraulic or gravity operated wedge type skid brakes, 
" Cam brakes. 
Given a case where a crane is in operational condition, the crane's anemometer has 
been set to bring the crane into stop at a wind speed of 20 mph. The crane is equipped 
with hydraulic operated wedge type skid brakes. Strong winds start blowing at a speed 
of 25 mph. The emergency stopping condition of the crane is activated. At that time 
the crane was at maximum full load speed carrying a 40 TEU container. A number of 
parameters governed by uncertainty are involved in the complete description of the 
test case (see Table 6.1) and should be included in the calculations required to 
estimate the probability of failure of the cargo crane brakes. 
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6.10.1 Define quantity Q 
A few relatively simple mathematical equations are used to model the quantity Q 
which is the stoppage of the container at full operating speed during heavy winds 
condition. Assume that the quantity Q described in the first section of this chapter is 
represented by: 
N (LIXJ, with the failure surface defined by the condition [6.42] Q- 
r=t 
Q =1. o [6.43] 
This function has been chosen to represent a simple way of using the modified 
Form/Sorm method. The analysis that will be performed contains a number of X; 
variables which are either normally or log-normally, distributed. From Equations [6.1] 
to [6.5] it is seen that in our case the MLFP is going to be at position xi = X2 = X3 
_... = XN = 1.0 [Mitchell, 1996]. 
6.10.2 Set the variables 
The probability distribution for 6 of the variables Xi was each selected to be log- 
normal, although normal variables would also fit the conditions. In this case the 
quantity Y=InX is normally distributed with mean m and standard deviation s. 
The standard normal variables ui are therefore defined as: 
Y, Y -M 
s 
[6.44] 
With this assumption, the expression for the failure probability takes a particularly 
simple form. Taking logs of Equations [6.42] and [6.43], the failure surface can be 
expressed by the following condition: 
N 
y, =0 or by using Equation [6.44] it becomes: 
r=ý 
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N Nm Zu, _- 
-1 
s 
which is the equation of a hyper-plane in u-space. The Form approximation for this 
problem will therefore be exact, with the failure probability being calculated as 
b(-ß), as mentioned at the MLFP section, where ß is the closest approach of the 
hyper-plane to the origin. Because of the symmetry that values present, the point of 
closest approach to the BEP will have u1=u2=... =UN so, 
tu, 
=Nuc 
where, 
uc= -m/s 
and hence 
I 
NZm 
s 
The test case was performed for values of N being 2,5,10. As it is obvious, normal 
and log-normal distributions were used in this example. Since each variable is 
different and a number of parameters influence their effect on the total system, each 
variable will have a mean and a standard deviation. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the 
variables used, along with their respective distributions and Table 6.2 gives the values 
of their means, standard deviations and medians for each distribution. 
Table 6.1 List of uncertain variables along with their respective distributions 
Variables presenting uncertainty Distribution type 
Wind speed Normal (1) 
Rain severity Lognormal (2) 
Frost conditions Normal (3) 
Wind stability/vibrations of crane Lognormal (4) 
Level of lubrication of steel wires Lognormal (5) 
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Grip level of rail clamps Normal (6) 
Level of cleanliness of crane rails Lognormal (7) 
Level of lubrication of hoist ropes Lognormal (8) 
Failure of wind arrestors Lognormal (9) 
Failure of seals at limit switches Normal (10) 
The quantities m and s above related to µ and a by the use of the following 
expressions [Madsen et a], 1986], [Kaimal & Finnigan, 1994], [Panofsky & Dutton, 
1984]: 
NZ 
m=In 
(2 
+a2)2 
and 
[(P2ý2 z 
. 
NZ 
The median value of X, xmw, is given by 
Xmed 
µ 
(2 
+v2)2 
Therefore the values of in, s, and xcd are given at Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Values of M. s, Xmed for normal and lognormal distributions 
Distribution µ a m s Xmed 
(1) 10 5 2.191013317 0.472381 8.944 
(2) 5 2 1.53522791 0.385253 4.642 
(3) 3 1 1.045932031 0.324593 2.846 
(4) 0.5 0.5 -1.039720771 0.832555 0.353 
(5) 2 0.2 0.688172015 0.099751 1.990 
(6) 2 0.4 0.673536824 0.198042 1.961 
(7) 1 0.5 -0.111571776 0.472381 0.894 
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(8) 3 1 1.045932031 0.324593 2.846 
(9) 1 1 -0.34657359 0.832555 0.707 
(10) 6 4 1.607897079 0.606403 4.992 
The results from the calculations are given to the Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Column 1 of 
each table gives the value of N and columns 2 and 3 respectively the following 
quantities: 
ng = number of evaluations of VQ (vector quantity of Q). 
na = number of additional evaluations of Q (general quantity calculated by the 
consequence model) performed in order to locate the MLFP. 
In most cases VQ is calculated numerically, requiring ng evaluations of Q. The total 
number of evaluations of Q is given in column 4 of Tables 6.3 and 6.4. In order to 
reduce the effect of particularly favourable or unfavourable initial points, each case 
was repeated 5 times with different random number set for each run. The entries 
showing the numbers of VQ and Q evaluations are therefore averages of 5 separate 
runs, rounded to the nearest whole number. The results shown at Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
indicate that the Form method can be very promising if appropriate variable 
transformation is used. The last two columns of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 compare the Form 
result for the MLFP with that for the analytic expression for P. The two sets of values 
are seen to agree to 2 or 3 significant figures. Furthermore, Table 6.5 illustrates the 
difference of using Rosenblatt and Nataf variable transformation techniques within 
the same software. The results, Pn in Rosenblatt and Nataf, are presented against the 
results (Pf) for the same case deducted by using Monte Carlo method, which will be 
used as a reference and comparison point for the final discussion. Table 6.6 indicates 
the number of model runs required for running the Form method and the Monte Carlo 
respectively. 
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Table 6.3 Normal distribution, form calculations 
N ng n$ Eval. Q CD Form 
2 6 22 34 3.870x10' 3.868x10' 
5 7 28 63 2.618x10' 2.613x10 
10 7 26 98 3.928x10' 3.918x10' 
Table 6.4 Lognormal distribution, form calculations 
NI ng na Eval. Q b Form 
2 5 21 30 2.780x10" 2.799x10' 
5 7 27 61 1.760x10" 1.759x10' 
10 7 27 97 9.402x10' 9.397x10" 
Table 6.5 Comparison of failure probabilities 
Transformation Nataf Rosenblatt Monte 
Method FORM FORM Carlo 
N ns na Q Pf, ns na Q Pf, Pf 
2 3 17 23 2.780x10' 9 14 32 2.788x10' 2.780x10' 
5 6 22 52 1.759x10' 4 6 26 1.756x10' 1.760x10' 
10 7 29 99 9.400x10' 6 8 68 9.402x10' 9.402x10' 
The results deducted in Table 6.5, are compared with the results estimated by the 
Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, Table 6.6 demonstrates the speed of estimation of 
results of each one of the distributions selected, by comparing the number of model 
evaluations for each case. 
Table 6.6 Comparison of model evaluations required by Form and Monte Carlo 
methods 
Number of evaluations 
Distribution N FORM Monte Carlo 
Log-normal (a) 2 
5 
34 
63 
258 
3820 
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10 98 2.5x10 
Log-normal 2 30 36 
(b) 5 61 57 
10 97 106 
6.11 Discussion of results and conclusions 
This chapter was developed to indicate the usability of Form/Sorm method and to 
present a different technique for tackling with uncertainty and vagueness in cases that 
fuzzy variables need to be taken under consideration for the calculation of failure 
probabilities. Its strong points are the transformation of the basic uncertain variables 
chosen to a common utility plane and an estimation of the most likely failure point 
among them. 
The functionality of the variable transformation methods was tested by application on 
a simple port cargo handling crane system. The results derived were presented in 
comparison between both Rosenblatt and Nataf transformations and were also put 
against the results of Monte Carlo simulation which is considered a benchmarking 
method. This comparison was made in order to test the efficiency, reliability as well 
as accuracy of the technique. Failure probability estimates were obtained for ten 
model evaluations for NS10 where N is the number of uncertain variables represented. 
The results indicate that their approximation using Nataf transformation is closer to 
the values deducted from the Monte Carlo simulation. It is worth mentioning at this 
point that for a decision maker who prefers to calculate Pf using Monte Carlo, an 
initial Form/Sorm search for the MLFP provides a suitable result for subsequent 
optimisation of the Monte Carlo calculations by means of importance sampling. It is 
advisable that further investigation would take place into examining the Form/Sonn 
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method using the Nataf variable transformation by applying it into more complicated 
systems. The main advantage of Form/Sorm against the Monte Carlo is the lesser 
duration of time it takes to complete the probability estimates. In addition, as 
presented in the test case, for Pf of 10-2 or less Form/Sorm can offer a better 
alternative to Monte Carlo simulation method when a fast first calculation of 
probability estimates is required. The graphical representation of the MLFP as it can 
be seen from Figure 6.3 can assist in a quick ranking of uncertain variables in order 
of importance according to their distance from the BEP and the contour of the 
pass/fail region, creating a useful by-product of Form/Sorm method, 
Summing the above points, it is concluded that the Forrn/Sorm method using the 
Nataf variable transformation technique is sufficiently robust and efficient enough to 
be considered for use on a routine basis for the assessment of confidence in calculated 
safety margins. 
153 
CHAPTER 7: ORGANISATIONAL SELF-ASSESSMENT PERFORMANCE 
IN TERMS OF SAFETY MATURITY USING TIIE EVIDENTIAL 
REASONING APPROACH 
7.1 Introduction 
Public concern about the safety of large and complex marine engineering systems has 
increased nowadays more than ever before. Many major corporations are either hiring 
or developing specific departments dealing with safety issues. This dictates a course 
of action towards increase in performance, specifically if the company is dealing with 
safety related matters. Unavoidably, this generates the question of how a company can 
be determined as better compared with one providing the same services or even how it 
would measure the extend to which it has further increased or decreased its 
performance throughout a fixed time interval. Comparison and self-assessment are the 
two key factors dealt with in this chapter. 
The methodology proposed in this chapter assigns five linguistic variables to describe 
the maturity self-assessment standards. Sharp et al., presented a list of eleven 
characteristics in his paper [Sharp et al., 2002] trying to assess the organizational 
maturity in terms of design for safety of offshore applications concerned. These 
characteristics were identified and itemised in three main groups, representing formal 
safety implementation and a longer-term investment in safety. As soon as the levels of 
maturity were established, the levels of design for safety were set. The latter levels 
produced the eleven elements of safety, which were assigned a value from one to four 
in order to assess the performance and organisational maturity of any company. This 
model though, fails to give an accurate image of the status of the company's 
operation. The lack of criteria, the lack of using linguistic variables and the lack of 
stages of comparison set it as an incomplete model. Moore and Bea [Moore & Bea, 
1995] on the other hand tried to give a set of five categories under which 
classification of safety factors addressing organisational self-assessment is concerned, 
They established a model based solely on graphical representations, giving only a 
minor weight to the analysis of the factors leading to the problem by assigning them 
all with the same three linguistic variables. This of course compromises the validity of 
154 
the method, as an independent assessor or a decision maker may try to express each of 
the criteria influencing the comparison process by using a set of linguistic variables 
matching the specific criterion. The advantage of the method proposed by Moore and 
Bea, compared to Sharp's method was that it indicated the interdependence between 
the factors involved in the test case, even if that occurs at a preliminary surface level. 
Mannarelli in his paper [Mannarelli et al., 1996] described a method under which a 
model is developed to compare maturity and error, in high and low risk organisations 
according to human error reliability in other operational or design stages. 
In order to help managers and other executive members diagnose the root cause of 
organisational problems and challenges, by giving guidance towards a proper 
management of change, this chapter presents a distinctive approach incorporating 
evidential reasoning. This enables a fast and reliable self-assessment and comparison 
with other companies in the same field. The purpose of the methodology proposed is 
to identify and underline the factors producing ineffective outcomes. In the same 
sense the method can be used to examine the factors affecting an organisation's 
ability to meet critical organisational challenges such as sudden changes in 
governmental regulations, major shifts in customer expectations or even new 
competitive threats. Then decisions are made based on the organisation's capacities 
and prospects for planned change. 
The organisations that will incorporate the concept and the approach presented here 
into their own decision-making will need to look for the sources and challenges that 
need to be dealt with and act upon them. After deciding which changes to implement, 
they need to obtain periodic feedback on the implementation processes and outcomes. 
They will need to use this feedback for their benefit in order to see what further 
changes are required, along with certain adaptation to several influencing factors. As 
it will be seen from this chapter, several levels of criteria appear within the decision 
making process. They are broken down to extend the analysis as much as possible.. 
This method can create a connection between theory and practice, by opening a broad 
spectrum of organisational theory and research but at the same time responding 
directly to the distinctive conditions shaping organisational operations and change 
options. 
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Weisbord's six-box model [Weisbord, 1976] is a straightforward and easy to use 
method to model the main criteria before the application of ER takes place. The six- 
box model aims at preparing the ground for the creation of the criteria seen in Section 
7.3. In presenting it, Weisbord tried to gather years of consulting experience and 
provide users with six key factors any problem may generate. The model's ease of 
comprehension and its potential use in management development made it a widely 
spread cited material in organisation's development texts [French & Bell, 1995], as 
well as being recommended as the diagnostic model of choice when diagnosis is done 
under time constraints or when organisational participants do not have any prior 
knowledge of open system concepts [Burke, 1982]. The starting point of the model is 
the identification of those organisational outputs with which both the external 
customers and the internal producers are dissatisfied. Identification of these outputs 
leads the participants towards the sources that cause the dissatisfaction from both 
sides. Internal producers are the key players during decision making within an 
organisation, and if they are not satisfied, organisational ineffectiveness exists and 
needs to be dealt with. 
General managers and human resources (HR) specialists often question whether their 
organisation is developing the HR programmes and practices that are most critical to 
the success of a project. One way to answer this question is through benchmarking 
[Glanz & Dailey, 1992]. This technique involves measurement of a key HR practice, 
followed by a comparison between practices in the focal organisation and the best 
practices of other organisations in order to target several areas for further 
improvement. In very large multinational organisations, practices from other units 
within the same organisation can be used as internal benchmarks. Benchmarking had 
its origins in investigations performed by an independent firm concerning another 
company's practice code in functional areas, such as production or distribution, in 
which the second firm has an outstanding reputation [Tucker et. al, 1987). 
Benchmarking can help HR managers decide which current practices should be 
encouraged and which new practices initiated. HR practitioners can also use 
benchmarking to help justify investments in particular HR practices. As soon as the 
six-box model is built and combined with ER, the organisation's managers will be in 
a position to know if their performance can be used as a benchmark for others within 
the same field. 
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7.2 Background theory of evidential reasoning (ER) 
The background information on ER was given analytically in Chapter 4, in sections 
4.2.1,4.2.2 and 4.2.3. What will be seen in the next sections is the development of a 
methodology based on ER approach and existing organisational methods. 
7.3 Methodology of the organisational self-assessment and comparison model 
This model has been developed in order to ensure the quality of service of the 
organisation which, will meet both the appropriate target set as well as the time 
constraints imposed, up until the completion of the project. 
There are four factors, which should be taken into consideration in order to achieve 
the required results. The factors in sequential order are: 
1) Gathering of data in order to obtain a comprehensive overview of operations. The 
focus of data should be on the core problems and challenges that need to be met. 
2) Use of theoretical frames to organise core problems and challenges and to link 
them into the organisational features. 
3) Development of a model that captures the nature of the ineffective outcomes. 
4) Feedback gained from the model and the relevant acquired data. 
The organisation at the beginning will need to form an initial model, which contains 
the elements that will be explored for the safety project in question. Then it needs to 
present the problems or the challenges, which should be tackled at the diagnostic level 
(2"d level criteria as it will be seen further down). The organisation will seek to clarify 
the nature of these problems and develop a preliminary view of organisational 
strengths and weaknesses. During these stages, the organisation will also try to judge 
the likelihood that members will co-operate with data-gathering activities, the 
prospects for involving external participants in the diagnosis and the organisation's 
receptiveness to feedback. The level of feedback achieved, and the way it implements 
changes within the organisation is described by the linguistic variables characterising 
the maturity levels (top level criterion). 
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7.4 A modified ER approach methodology in organisational self-assessment 
A generic comparison framework is proposed through the following steps to assist in 
the application of the methods discussed in the theory section of this chapter. The 
main aim is to present a credible means of comparison, which at the same time could 
be used as a self-assessment tool, if required, to measure performance and set the 
benchmarking levels within similar companies. The following steps describe the 
process followed in order to reach adequate results. 
Step 1. Create and adjust a six-box model based on leadership. Create an itemised list 
of main factors influencing each one of the six boxes. 
The six-box model shown in Figure 7.1 exists to contain the possible causes of 
dissatisfaction with organisational products or services. Each box represents a cluster 
of frequently occurring organisational problems. It is essential to analyse the content 
of the boxes before proceeding to the proposed methodology as they will be used 
along with the principles of evidential reasoning. 
" Helpful mechanisms. Refers to internal procedures for coordination, control, 
communication and information management that are intended to help employees 
in their work roles. 
" Relationships. Refers to both within and among organisational units, including 
conflict resolution arrangements. 
Leadership. Appears as the common point for the remaining five boxes because 
Weisbord [Weisbord, 1976] assumes "that leaders and their choices, including 
those concerning the organisation's mission and strategy play a very important 
role within the organisational effectiveness. Leaders are defined as the key 
decision makers". 
" Structures. Refers to the division of work between several teams or individuals 
operating within the safety-oriented company. 
  Strategy. Extends the vision of the leaders in such a way as to be clear to the rest 
of the involved teams. 
  Rewards. Refers to the proper distribution of rewards after the completion of a 
project or after a successful self-assessment. 
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Leaving aside the simplicity of this model, when it is ready to be incorporated with 
the ER regime a few weaknesses are to be addressed. Its major weakness is the lack of 
a firm theoretical foundation. Weisbord did not provide clear guidelines as to which 
would be the best way to combine the boxes and particularly how to explain the "gap" 
between two boxes. Therefore, the model is deceptively simple [Burke, 1994]. To 
apply it either as a self-assessment tool or as an initial form of a comparison tool, 
analysts need to work out a complex combination of "gaps" between the boxes. 
Figure 7.1 The six-box graphical model [Weisbord, 19761 
Figure 7.1 is analysed to its components so that the itemised list of criteria can be 
properly assigned. The list of factors is derived as described before under the 
guidance of expert judgements. Examining the diagram it is obvious that the 
leadership of the company is responsible for the majority of actions and it is the main 
factor that will affect the overall performance of the company. Therefore, the top goal 
(i. e. organisational maturity) will be assigned to the leadership box. 
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Table 7.1 shows the list of the remaining boxes along with the factors assigned to 
them in each case. These factors will form part of the second level (main criteria) 
criteria in the methodology towards the decision-making model. 
Table 7.1 List of remaining boxes and main criteria factors assigned to then 
Strategy Safety strategy and planning processes 
Structures Safety data, information and safety knowledge 
Rewards Measurement and benchmarking 
Helpful mechanisms Innovation and research 
Relationships Management and human resources HR 
A preliminary mathematical model can be constructed on the basis of Bayesian 
theory. Dependence and independence exists between all 6 boxes as illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. The preliminary model can be considered as proposed below: 
Suppose each of the boxes is considered as a random quantity XI, X2... Xn, and also 
suppose that a predictive model is assumed which specifies that for all n, the joint 
density function can be written as p(XX2,..., Xn) _ f[ p(Xi) so that Xi are 
independent quantities. It then follows straightforwardly that for any 15 m: 5 n, 
p(Xm+i,..., XIX1,..., Xm) = p(Xm+i,..., Xn). This model will produce an initial 
arithmetical value for each set of X1,..., X,,, which will defer according to the 
company examined. Additionally, the assignment of linguistic variables can 
strengthen the model as a credible comparison or self-assessment tool, as further 
uncertainties can be covered through the assignment of linguistic variables. ER and 
Intelligent Decision System (IDS) [Yang & Xu, 2001] will address this problem. 
Step 2. As soon as the factors are itemised, the top goal assessment grades are set to 
the common box influencing all others (usually the leadership or management). All 
assessment grades ranging from the top goal to the last sub criteria level have been 
chosen by the author of this thesis, after consultation with industrial experts in the 
form of a structured interview (see Appendix IV). 
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The assessment grades are assigned to the top goal criterion, expressed through the 
leadership box. Table 7.2 shows the assessment grades selected. 
Table 7.2 Assessment grades defined for organisational maturity 
Top goal Assessment Grades 
Maturity Initial class Repeatable Defined class Managed class Optimised 
level performance class performance performance class 
performance performance 
Starting from the best result a company can achieve and ending with the worst, the 
five levels are proposed as follows: 
" Optimised. The organisation has strongly integrated a constant improvement 
process at its operation. It is the best in its class and the results are used as 
benchmarking for other. 
" Managed. The organisation has a fairly good improvement process. It produces 
good results, lays down the requirements and tries to meet them through feedback. 
" Defined. Systematic process based approach. The organisation has a fixed 
processes path and tries to adopt the early stages of the improvement trends. 
" Repeatable. The organisation tries to do what has already been done without being 
able to define the actual process to achieve it. 
" Initial. When all the above characteristics stop to exist the organisation is 
struggling to deal with the problem faced. 
Consultants and researchers draw a very wide range of definitions and measures of 
organisational effectiveness. To contribute to successful diagnosis, the effectiveness 
criteria in use should be appropriately chosen to describe as extensively as possible all 
the aspects of the organisation in question. The number of criteria reflects the 
problem's multidimensional nature [Denison & Mishra, 1995]. In order to reach the 
stage of assigning values to these linguistic variables another set of criteria (2"d level 
criteria) needs to be proposed as seen in Step 3. 
Step 3. The main factors (second level criteria) associated with the rest of the boxes 
that have already been itemised in Step I are given their respective assessment grades. 
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Following a process similar to Step 2 the assignment of assessment grades is given to 
the main criteria used for comparison. Table 7.3 shows the proposed respective 
assessment grades along with a separate analysis for each one of them. 
Table 7.3 Assessment grades defined for second level criteria 
Main criteria Assessment Grades 
Safety Data, Information 
and Knowledge 
Very little Little Average Enough More than 
enough 
Innovation & Research Very basic Basic Normal Advanced Excellent 
Management and H. R Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Measurement and 
Benchmarking 
Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Safety Strategy and 
Planning Processes 
Reactive approach Stable approach Pro-active approach 
" Safety data, information and knowledge. This is mainly the research that will be 
done from the organisation's side in order to assess the usage of safety-related 
historical data that can relate to the particular case examined. 
" Innovation and Research. This depends on the effort put in from the company 
itself. More advanced companies will have their own R&D departments to tackle 
complex projects assigned to them. Another option would be to hire an external 
research source like a university to assist with unknown projects. 
" Management and human resources. This is probably one of the most important 
factors of the 2"`' level criteria as the assignment of appropriate personnel is taking 
place along with a clearly defined hierarchy structure as to the way that 
encountered problems are to be solved. 
" Safety strategy and planning processes. The ability of planning ahead and creating 
different safety scenarios is shown with this criterion. The innovation of the team 
dealing with a problem is expressed through the safety strategy and the planning 
process of the company. 
Step 4. Sub-criteria are assigned according to the nature of the main factors 
respectively. 
Second level criteria are further extended to 3rd level criteria. It is always within either 
the decision maker's or the independent assessor's power to analyse all criteria up to a 
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point where he/she feels comfortable that all aspects have been thoroughly examined. 
3rd level criteria are further extended as proposed in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. Analysis of a 
representative two levels of criteria along with their respective assessment grades can 
be found in Appendix IV section B. 
Table 7.4 Assessment grades defined for third level criteria 
ird level criteria Assessment Grades 
Organisational Updates Not very often Often Regular 
Educational Background 
and Further Training 
Very poor 
background 
Poor 
background 
Average 
background 
Good 
background 
Very good 
background 
Supply Management Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Design Management Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Application of Technical 
Standards 
Very loose Loose Normal Strict Very strict 
Self-Assessment Tools Very few A few Average Enough More than 
enough 
Port Securit Measures Ver loose Loose Normal Strict Very strict 
Independent 
Com arison Sources 
Not very often Often Regular 
Table 7.5 Assessment grades defined for fourth level criteria 
4` level criteria Assessment Grades 
Technical Chapters Very few A few Average Enough More than 
enough 
Literature Review and Never A little Normal A lot Continuous 
Research of new Tech. 
Number of Employees None A few Average A lot Whole staff 
from Higher Education 
Level of Funding for Very low Low Normal High Very high 
Employee Training 
Comparison of Income Lower Same Higher 
between 2 Sequential 
Years. 
Customer Satisfaction Very bad Bad Normal Good Very good 
Forms and Reviews 
Increased Security Very low Low Normal High Very high 
Personnel 
Regular Content Control Never A little Normal A lot Continuous 
Increased CCTV Never A little Normal A lot Continuous 
Throughout Terminal 
Step 5. In order to find out how well an alternative performs across all criteria, the 
lowest level criteria assessment needs to be first transformed to their relevant upper 
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levels and ultimately, to the top-level goal. The analytical description of the ER 
algorithm is given in Chapter 4 within the sub sections of 4.5. 
Step 6. In order to make the transformation from lower level to upper level criteria, it 
is required to feed the information into multi-criteria decision-making software 
developed for analysis of multilevel decision problems. The software which will assist 
us in the decision making process is called Intelligent Decision System via Evidential 
Reasoning "IDS" [Yang & Xu, 2001]. It is a windows based tool, which can be used 
to built up a model, define alternatives and criteria and perform the assessment for the 
decision maker. 
Step 7. As soon as the aggregated values are derived for each of the companies 
compared, the ranking takes place according to the overall performance degrees. 
Step 8. Based on the combination of the steps above, the proposed methodology will 
give the assessor the ability to come to certain conclusions concerning the comparison 
problem that he is dealing with. The criteria and alternatives selected will be the 
prime factors that will set the boundaries for further discussion. 
This methodology will be illustrated through a test case described in the next section. 
The requirements for a verification experiment are essential to identify and assess the 
validity of the results obtained. The contribution of expert engineers and academics 
within the test case presented was invaluable as they add to the credibility and 
soundness of the results obtained. Weighting factors can also be assigned. For 
simplicity of calculations it is assumed that all factors have the same weighting factor 
as far as the final assessment is concerned. 
7.5 Test case 
An independent source is required to assess the organizational maturity overall 
performance of four similar organizations Companyl, Company2, Company3, and 
Company4. All of the four companies compared, deal with safety-oriented projects. A 
short description on the profile of each of these 4 companies is given in Appendix IV 
in section C. The aim of the test case is to show how the methodology steps can be 
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utilised in a way that produces credible comparability results concerning the overall 
performance of each one of the companies. This means the identification of the 
company with the highest overall score, but at the same time being able to assess the 
four companies in relation to any of the main criteria identified. For example, 
company Cl may have a higher overall score than C2 does, but when it comes to 
comparing a specific main criterion C2 may have a higher score than CI does for this 
particular criterion. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates a graphical representation of the main goal along with all levels 
of main and sub-criteria. 
-- ------------ 
-". "fil Pt-14 101 YA 
Safety data, information and knowledge 
- Organisational updates 
-j Technical reports 
-; Literature review and research of new technologies 
Innovation & research 
- Educational background and further training schemes 
Number of employees coming from higher education 
J Level of funding for further emploee training 
Management and human resources 
J Supply management 
Design management 
Measurement & benchmarking 
-; Independent comparison sources 
ý- Self-assessment tools 
J Comparison of income between two sequential years 
J Customer's satisfaction forms and reviews 
r- A Safety strategy and planning processes 
: 7- Application of technical standards 
- Port security measures 
Increased security personnel 
Regular content control 
Increased CCTV throughout the terminals 
Figure 7.2 Hierarchy of main and sub-criteria 
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7.5.1 The ER assessment tables 
The assessment values given by the author, who is the decision maker in this case, are 
used within IDS software and the aggregated results are extracted for the main criteria 
level (second level) and presented in Tables 7.6,7.7,7.8,7.9 and 7.10. The numbers 
within the cells indicate the degree of belief assigned to each assessment grade 
respectively. Tables 7.6 to 7.10 are also of outmost importance as an external observer 
can see the strong and weak points of each one of the companies selected in respect 
with the associated criteria. All values were derived from the IDS software. 
Table 7.6 Combined assessment grades for all companies of safety data, 
information and knowledge 
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Little Enough 
Table 7.7 Combined assessment grades for all companies of innovation & 
research 
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Table 7.8 Combined assessment grades for all companies of management and 
human resources 
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Table 7.9 Combined assessment grades for all companies of measurement & 
benchmarking 
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Table 7.10 Combined assessment grades for all companies of safety strategy and 
planning processes 
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Stable approach Unknown 
The assessments in Tables 7.6 to 7.10 need to be propagated to the top level. In doing 
this, the IDS software produces the results shown in Table 7.11. The numbers under 
each grade indicate the aggregated assessments (or degrees of belief) of the decision 
maker. 
Table 7.11 Combined assessment grades for all companies of the top goal 
(organisational maturity) 
i'; iribýliiid 
l1J`Ji`JJJlý rJi on Or ýpin] J: 1-]! nsil fralrtr]ty J&Jri1 
100.00% 
80.00% 
60.00% 
40.00% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
Company i. 
Company 
Company 3 
itIeI Repeatable Defined Managed Optimised Unknown 
Company 1 6.53% 455% 22.43% 4409% 19.69% 2,71% 
Q Company 2 0.00% 0.00% 26.79% 45.16% 27.24% 0.80% Company 4 
Q Company 11.08% 11.42% 59.05% 12.56% 5.59% 0.31% 
Company 4 0.00% 0.00% 11.47% 
- 39.43% 1 48.93Ir - --00.17% % 
7.5.2 Alternatives ranking, results and discussion 
The best way to rank the companies following Table 7.11 would be through their 
respective utility values generated by quantifying the assessment grades at the top 
level. This is due to the fact that there are close similarities in the values indicated in 
Table 7.11. IDS, uses the concept of utility interval to characterize the unassigned 
degree of belief (or unknown percentage). The ER algorithm produces a utility 
interval enclosed by the two extreme cases where the unassigned belief goes either to 
the least preferred grade (minimum utility) or goes to the most preferred grade 
(maximum utility). A graphical representation of utility intervals is illustrated in 
Figure 7.3. The companies are ranked based on the average utility. The worst possible 
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Initial Repeatable Defined Managed Optimised Unknown 
utility value is represented by green colour, an average utility value is represented by 
blue colour and the best possible utility value is represented by magenta colour. 
! J. 1Jity JcJt wial . rar, ! )r, ani. alr of . IJ rrisibilty 1 'aJ 
1.0000 
0.9000 --- 
0.8000 r 
0 
, 
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Vtiorst possible Average Best possible 
  company 1 
  Co y2 
" Company 3 
6 Company 4 
IN rst possible Average Best possible 
s Company 1 0.6511 0.6647 0 6782 
Company 2 0.7451 0.7491 0.7531 
Company 3 0.4739 0.4754 04770 
Company 4 0.8424 0.8432 0.8441 
Figure 7.3 Ranking of utility values 
Having found maximum and minimum utilities the average utility is calculated and 
used to rank the maturity level within the selection process. The final ranking of 
companies is as shown in Figure 7.4: 
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Figure 7.4 Graphical ranking of companies compared 
Company 4 is more preferred than company 2, which is more preferred than company 
1, which is more preferred than company 3 in terms of overall organisational 
maturity. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In the example examined, an ER approach was used in order to tackle the problem of 
comparing different companies in terms of organisational maturity incorporating both 
qualitative and quantitative information. The problem of assessing both quantitative 
and qualitative data remains to cope with incomplete information in many cases. The 
steps followed within the methodology set at the beginning have been able, with the 
aid of IDS, to give adequate results that the decision maker can use even though some 
data was missing. A very important advantage in this case is that data could also be 
presented in the form of degrees of belief, so that assessment could be made at 
different levels. The results produced from this test case are validated against the 
current status of the 4 companies that have been assessed. The final ranking of the 4 
companies matches closely their actual current status thus proving the proposed 
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combined methodology applied in this chapter a robust tool for organisational 
comparison. 
IDS software aids in cases of decision-making as well as comparison of similar items. 
It enables the decision maker or the assessor to have both tabular and graphical data at 
hand to make any necessary comparisons. The combination of the usage of IDS along 
with the case of the organisational maturity assessment can prove to be useful as 
safety related company selections are common within the marine industry. It can 
provide an appropriate foundation which can be adjusted to any type of company with 
minor modifications and eventually provide a better comparison tool. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Review 
The research in this thesis was motivated by the requirement to tackle uncertainty and 
human element problem issues in the marine and offshore industry. As such, several 
powerful and efficient tools and techniques were employed in the development of 
integrative risk-based analytical models for maritime application domains. The 
development phases for the models had to be supplied with data and uncertainties 
were handled via inference processing that are based on sound theorems, rules or 
logic. The proposed methodologies were also enabled via resourceful maritime case 
studies in order to demonstrate their practicality. This falls into place with the overall 
aim of this thesis. 
Before the scene of this thesis was set, background research revealed that safety in the 
marine industry was previously a case of being reactive in terms of responses after the 
occurrence of a major accident. A change in this culture would enable proactive 
approaches to be applied, and as such, near misses and incident occurrences would be 
taken under consideration. Formal safety assessment (FSA) is the main framework 
required reviewing in the marine industry in opposition to the safety case required for 
offshore installations. On the basis of FSA concepts, a proposed framework for the 
risk-based assessment settings of this research has been developed in a generic sense 
to be effectively applicable to all ship types, offshore installations, their 
systems/subsystems and the maritime environment. The framework incorporates risk 
analysis for which data was obtained from industrial databases and/or by expert 
judgement. A review of the fundamental FSA principles was presented. Established 
methodologies concerning safety and reliability analytical tools were reviewed in their 
application to generate domain models. 
Multi-criteria decision making synthesis based on ER is utilised as a selection tool 
when dealing with an organisational vessel selection process. All the mentioned 
proposed models have their respective test case to demonstrate their applicability 
within a marine engineering and organisational regime. Bayesian network (BN) was 
adopted as the modelling tool that deals with the random/inherent uncertainties and 
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also enables a powerful marine decision-support solution. In this thesis it is called to 
deal with cargo handling engineering systems such as an LPG's reliquefaction plant. 
First and Second order reliability methods (Form/Sorm) using a specific variable 
transformation methodology for variables that are ruled by uncertainty or vagueness, 
present a Cartesian coordinate system where the most likely failure point can be 
calculated when searching an overall failure probability. Organisational self 
assessment is an upraising issue within the marine industry specially when it comes to 
safety related assessment. When dealing with complex engineering systems, it is 
required both from the public view and from the organisation handling the system that 
safety standards are met and hopefully exceeded. Organisational self assessment in 
terms of safety maturity has been an issue evidential reasoning (ER) and the six box 
model are called to assess. The proposed combination of these two techniques 
provides a tool able to create a risk modelling plane making the ranking of companies 
working in the same area viable even if some comparison data is governed by 
uncertainty or vagueness. 
Following the review of the research conducted within this thesis, it can be confirmed 
that not only has the work followed a logical sequence, but that most importantly, the 
aim and objectives of this thesis have been successfully achieved. Collectively, each 
one of the developed tools for the risk-based analytical modelling can be integrated 
into the proposed framework given by the FSA approach. 
8.2 Principal statements 
The undertaken research has resulted in the following principal statements: 
" Where it is difficult to describe the basic failure events of a system using 
probabilistic risk analysis methods, subjective reasoning analysis has been 
more appropriate to assess the safety of the system. Also, the information 
from one technique/tool, such as a risk contribution tree (RCT), can be used to 
process the information produced using another technique/tool, such as a BN. 
Therefore, the use of well-established safety and reliability analytical 
techniques (e. g., event tree and fault tree) and/or the developed risk-based 
analytical tools (e. g., fuzzy logic and Bayesian network) in an integrated 
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manner may make safety assessment comparatively efficient and convenient 
since safety information and the advantages of each method may be more 
efficiently explored. 
" The current FSA is an appropriate proactive approach for ensuring improved 
maritime safety and environmental protection, though the overriding problem 
on the handling of uncertainty and the human element issue is still not well 
embraced in such risk-based practice. Maritime industry today chooses to 
adopt aspects of established FSA techniques like FTA, ETA and RCT. This is 
despite the fact that it can integrate the application of newly developed (e. g., 
BN and ER) risk analysis methods in a transparent and justifiable manner. 
However, choosing only the established techniques it falls short of the 
unrivalled handling for the different types of uncertainties presented in each 
study. 
" Results from the BN risk-based analytical modelling that were undertaken for 
an LPG's reliquefaction plant indicate that BNs are promising techniques for 
maritime risk analysis. These BNs can also be expanded to form influence 
diagrams, which permit rapid development of a practical decision model. 
" The ER approach when combined with the six-box model proposed by 
Weisbord can form through a multi-criteria decision making framework a 
powerful ranking tool addressing the organisational issues of safety maturity 
self assessment. Because of the flexibility that the six box model presents it 
can leave space to decision makers to expand to further areas at an 
organisational and management level. 
8.3 General limitations 
The developed risk-based analytical models provide useful integrative tools for a 
proactive maritime world but have limitations owing to the complex nature of 
marine engineering systems and organisational processes. Some of the imposed 
limitations include the following: 
" Conditional probabilities are more difficult to obtain, especially if the 
probability is conditioned on several states. Many of such probabilities 
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required to quantify a BN cannot be derived from databases and scientific 
literature. Therefore, they may need to be taken from domain experts, based on 
their knowledge and experience. 
" No industrial data could be found for situations of maritime near misses and 
errors and neither has any such subjective judgement been made available by 
the maritime industry for qualitative risk-based reasoning to be enabled. This 
is due to the lack of validation of subjective opinions against approved models. 
All the case study data used in this study, are those from accident database 
and/or the opinion of experts. 
9 While the FSA is intended to address safety and environmental aspects, the 
scope of this study was confined mainly to engineering and organisational 
systems and processes . 
These limitations did not alter the validity of the conclusions and generalisations of 
the conducted research. Nonetheless, tackling these limitations should enable the 
advancement of the integrative risk-based modelling to safety-critical maritime 
systems. 
8.4 Proposed future work 
Based on the principal statements and the general limitations there are areas 
concerning the risk based analytical modelling where further analysis needs to be 
undertaken. Further or future work could be undertaken in the following areas: 
" Sensitivity analysis in BNs is broadly concerned with understanding the 
relationship between local network parameters and global conclusions drawn 
based on the network. A key aspect of sensitivity analysis is the number of 
considered parameters. The simplest case involves one parameter at a time, i. e., A 
single parameter can only be allowed to change in the network to ensure a query 
constraint. Single parameter changes are easy to visualise and compute, but they 
are only a subset of possible parameter changes. Thus, a recommendation of great 
interest is that of changing multiple parameters in the network simultaneously to 
ensure the query constraint. 
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0 The combined risk matrix presented in Chapter 3 can form the basis of 
categorisation of all the processes taking place on board a vessel. An easy to 
follow guide can be formed to give an initial qualitative assessment of processes 
according to the case examined which then can be fed into a multiple criteria 
decision making synthesis based on evidential reasoning to choose to deduct 
quantitative assessments of those processes. 
" The developed risk based methodologies can be used to tackle issues of 
environmental safety. Coast guards and classification societies have started paying 
great attention to bilge and sludge systems on board vessels. Risk modelling can 
be applied to those two networks separately along with their respective machinery 
in order to ensure that the probability of the system failing and its respective 
consequences remain low enough. This is so that any kind of pollution through 
either the 3-way discharge valve or any other wrongly connected bilge or sludge 
line can be avoided. 
" Further expansion of the combined ER and six box model can be utilised to assess 
the severity of consequences in terms of company reputation that an incident may 
cause. Possible combination with risk modelling techniques like fuzzy logic (FL) 
or Petri nets can be of usage specially at the duality level of cause and 
consequence. 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
In total, this research has been successful in meeting its aim of generating proactive 
risk-based analytical models that implement novel techniques within a maritime 
safety framework via its set objectives. Whilst the FSA has provided an elegant route 
to the application of the well-established safety and reliability analytical techniques 
for conducting risk analysis, the risk-based analytical modelling of IIN, ER and 
Form/Sorm has been developed to provide powerful tools for uncertainty treatment. 
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Appendix I 
Common hazard categories on board 
A. Shipboard hazards to personnel 
1. Asbestos inhalation. 
2. Burns from caustic liquids and acids. 
3. Electric shock and electrocution. 
4. Falling overboard. 
5. Pilot ladder/pilot hoist operation. 
B. Hazardous substances on board vessel 
Accommodation areas: 
1. Combustible furnishings. 
2. Cleaning materials in stores. 
3. Oil/fat in galley equipment. 
Deck Areas: 
4. Cargo. 
5. Paint, oils, greases etc. in deck stores. 
Machinery spaces: 
6. Cabling. 
7. Fuel and diesel oil for engines, boilers and incinerators. 
8. Fuel, lubricating and hydraulic oil in bilges, save ails, etc. 
9. Refrigerants. 
10. Thermal heating fluid systems. 
C. Potential sources of ignition 
General: 
1. Electrical arc. 
2. Friction. 
3. Hot surface. 
4. Incendiary spark. 
5. Naked flame. 
6. Radio waves. 
Accommodation areas (including bridge): 
7. Electronic navigation equipment. 
8. Laundry facilities - irons, washing machines, tumble driers, etc. 
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Deck areas: 
9. Deck lighting. 
10. Funnel exhaust emissions. 
11. Hot work sparking. 
Machinery spaces: 
12. Air compressor units. 
13. Generator engine exhaust manifold. 
D. Hazards external to the ship 
1. Storms. 
2. Lightning. 
3. Uncharted submerged objects. 
4. Other ships. 
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Appendix II 
Structured interview on marine systems involving duality 
The following set of questions was asked in the sequence presented to the following 
industry's experts (Technical manager of Interunity Management Corporation, Chief 
engineer of LPG vessel and company's senior technical superintendent) in an attempt 
to identify a number of possible examples stating dependency and dependent failures. 
1. Based on your experience of on-board engineering systems please indicate any 
situations you have encountered where either a component or a system can 
operate in a dual manner. 
2. Please state if applicable, any cases where failure of a system or component 
can cause a demand to deal with more than one system simultaneously. 
3. Apart from component and system failure are there any other external factors 
linked with the required operability of a component or a system? 
4. Would you be able to mention some factors you consider important either 
internal or external, ranging from the design to the operation phase of a system 
that if applied can cause dependent failures within a components or a system 
or even a number of systems. 
S. Do you believe that all-dependent failures involve independent equipment? 
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Appendix III 
Structured interview on vessel selection process 
Section A 
In order to derive the assessment grades for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
level criteria a structured interview has been presented to the director of Interunity 
Management Corporation, a company managing LPG vessels bound to operate within 
very strict safety levels. Similar interviews took place in the premises of two broker 
companies involved in cases of vessel selection, Clarkson and Himatiki Marine Ltd. 
Finally the opinion of a Bureau Veritas' field surveyor was taken into consideration 
through the structured interview, The questions used for the structured interview were 
as follows: 
1. If you would like to assess a vessel for transporting a specific cargo at a 
specific port in the west USA, how many describing variables would you use 
in order to describe it accurately and what would these linguistic variables be? 
2. What, in your opinion, are the most significant factors influencing the 
selection process of a vessel? Having defined those factors what kind of 
description variables would you use in order to assess them as accurately and 
in a holistic way as possible? 
3. The most significant factors in the vessel selection process identified in the 
previous question, are a bit generic in their form as they stand. Trying to focus 
into more specific areas contained in each factor separately, what would you 
think that these specific areas would be? How far would you consider that an 
analysis of factors should proceed in terms of subsequent levels of expanding 
detail, in order to reach a stage where one can claim that each factor is 
thoroughly examined? 
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4. Again, after having identified the depth of analysis in terms of describing 
variables, how many and what kind of assessment grades would you think that 
each describing variable would need in order to be defined accurately? 
Section B 
This section is used to give a description of the 2"d level's assessment grades. The 
description of each of these criteria is given in Step I in section 4.5.1. The 
identification of these assessment grades was a result of the structured interview of 
section A. In a similar manner the rest of the criteria and their sub-Sequent assessment 
grades are produced. 
As far as the 2 °d level of criteria is concerned the assessment grades are explained as 
follows: 
Integrity V. bad bad Average ' Good V. good 
Very bad: The vessel's integrity both at a mechanical and structural level is 
unacceptable. There are a lot of class outstanding remarks and a probable detention 
between the last two special surveys. The majority of the vessel's certificates have 
expired. 
Bad: The vessel's integrity condition can be at a very bad state at either the 
mechanical or the structural side. Class outstanding remarks that have not been 
resolved yet will be noted in the vessel's class records. Some certificates will have 
expired. 
Average: The vessel's integrity condition is at such a state that can barely pass the 
margin between being acceptable or unacceptable. The majority of its certificates are 
still valid but more work is required it to bring it to the pass region. 
Good: The vessel' integrity is above the average condition within the acceptable 
region. The vessel's certificates are updated and in the vessels' class records some 
recommendations may appear. 
Very good: The vessel is newly built within the last five years. It is insured at a 
reputable classification society, with no remarks in its class records. 
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Pollution Prevention I Worst I Poor ! Average' Good V. good I Excellent 
Worst: The vessel has a recorded history of major pollutions. The pollution 
prevention plan is non existent. SOLAS (Safety of Life At Sea) and other 
international regulations on pollution safety are not followed. Various coast guards do 
not permit entrance of the vessel in several ports. 
Poor: The vessel has a history of a couple very minor pollutions. The sludge and bilge 
networks are connected thus giving raise to the possibility of discharge of sludges at 
sea. Coast guards have not denied access to the vessel in ports but have it in a black 
list for extensive check over when it arrives. Emissions are usually above permitted 
limits. 
Good: The vessel does not have a recorded history of pollutions. Class remarks in 
terms of sludge and bilge networks appear in the vessel's class history. The state of 
the vessel indicates some negligence in terms of pollution training as far as personnel 
is concerned. Emissions are at a marginal level of passing the permitted limits. 
Very good: The vessel is in a state both mechanically and structurally very sound in 
terms of pollution. The vessel has double bottoms and double side skins installed 
bearing in mind the reduction of the probability of spillage of cargo in cases of light 
collision. 
Excellent: The vessel is newly built within the last 3 years with the latest technology 
in pollution prevention and cargo purification systems. Automation controls are 
installed monitoring the piping networks for oil contents. Personnel are trained at a 
very high level in terms of pollution prevention and pollution fighting. 
Vessel's Running Costs I V. high f high I Average Low V. low `Minimum 
Very high: Main engine and auxiliary engines operate with lots of leakages. Personnel 
are overpaid. Oil consumption keeps on increasing on a monthly basis. No automation 
machinery is installed on board thus more personnel are required. 
High: Either the main engine or the auxiliary engines have faults increasing their daily 
consumption of fuel. Bad maintenance also increases the monthly oil consumption. 
Automation controls are primitive thus more personnel are required. 
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Average: There is a fragile balance between consumption and maintenance. The main 
engine and auxiliary engines are maintained at an acceptable level giving raise to a 
mediocre amount of money required to keep them running at appropriate levels. There 
are automated controls for the significant cargo procedures. 
Low: The vessel is well maintained at an engineering level. Both main engine and 
auxiliary engines operate without significant problems that require large down time to 
be resolved. Fuel and oil consumption levels are within acceptable limits. 
Very low: The vessel is at a very good condition with the technical department 
monitoring consumptions on a daily basis. New parts are used to substitute worn parts 
at intervals stated by the manufacturer leaving very small margins for functional 
failures. Automated systems control the majority of cargo and engineering processes 
on board the vessel. Personnel are reduced due to automated systems installed and 
paid at an average market price. 
Minimum: The vessel is newly built within the last 2 years. It is fully automated thus 
having only the minimum manning requirements. Main and auxiliary engines are 
brand new with sensors installed indicating if the associated systems function as 
required. Oil and fuel consumptions are at optimized levels. 
Restrictions on Vessel Bad Average Good 
Bad: The vessel exceeds the maximum permitted geographical elements of the 
destination port such as the maximum permissible draft. Additionally for the 
particular case examined the vessel even if it matches the required size does not meet 
the maximum permissible breadth requirement of the Panama Canal. 
Average: The vessel is just at the limit of the elements governing the position of a port 
making it the captain's responsibility, if selected to carry the cargo, to ensure the 
safety of the vessel itself as well as of its cargo. 
Good: The vessel fulfills all the navigational requirements leading to the designated 
port of call. 
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Section C 
This section contains some general information concerning the overall condition of 
each vessel in question. 
Vessel 1: This vessel has a good maintained overall structure and engineering systems 
such as the main and the auxiliary engines. Just had a major servicing period after a 
special survey dry dock which resulted in 300 tones of steel to be changed where 
needed and a full overhaul of the main and auxiliary engines bringing above the 
average selection standards. It is exactly due to the special survey amendments that 
pollution control systems have been checked and updated accordingly making it a 
strong candidate for the USA port of call. Due to the fact that a complete overhaul is 
made to its engines it is expected to maintain reasonably low daily running costs. It 
complies with all the geographical requirements in terms of draft and breadth as it is 
due to pass from the Panama Canal. 
Vessel 2: This vessel has moderately decent auxiliary engines but the main engine 
need overhauling in cylinders 4 and 6. The structural integrity of the vessel is in an 
average state with a number of brackets and longitudinal frames needing immediate 
replacement due to extensive rust levels. Cargo tanks have lost almost 80% of their 
protective coating and side ballast water tanks have lost the majority of their anodes 
thus having very increased level of cavitations especially at their lower levels. Due to 
the badly maintained main engine current emission levels are above the permitted 
limits imposed by the U. S Coast Guard. Currently the vessel has high daily running 
costs as the main engine works inefficiently. The vessel has a breadth similar to the 
breadth of the Panama Canal making it a questionable candidate for the cargo to be 
transported. 
Vessel 3: This vessel is in its last charted voyage. Owners are considering scrapping it 
after delivery of the next cargo. Both structurally and mechanically the vessel is in a 
bad condition with numerous steel plates requiring immediate replacement both in 
cargo as well as in external areas of the vessel. Both main and auxiliary engines have 
passed the overhauling limits in an attempt from the owners side to save some funds. 
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Emissions are beyond the acceptable limits due to improper operation of the main 
engine and the cargo's purifiers require cleaning. Sludge and bilge networks have not 
been checked for a number of months leaving questions as to where the sludges are 
disposed. Being a very old vessel automation control are non existent thus having 
more personnel on board. Daily running costs have made this vessel not worthy of sea 
going passage and that is why owners decided to scrap it. The design characteristics 
of this vessel do not meet the Panama Canal requirements but it was put among the 
other vessels due to its capacity. 
Vessel 4: This vessel is in a good condition even though it is near its first decade of 
age. It is well maintained and recently was converted from single to double side skin. 
Main engine and auxiliary engines meet the manufacturer's inspection criteria thus 
having a few problems during their operation. It is mainly due to the properly 
maintained main engine that emissions are kept just below the permitted limits. 
Sludge and bilge networks have had some piping parts changed and a new three way 
valve has been installed along with an oil content measuring device in an attempt to 
try and reduce given sludges to minimum levels. The overall vessel's running costs 
are kept in a low level as automated controls are installed for cargo handling 
operations. Average fuel and oil consumption are kept within reasonable levels and 
with proper engineering maintenance they can be kept stable. 
Vessel 5: This is a newly built vessel, well maintained from the very beginning both 
in structural and engine aspects. It was delivered with a special structural coating thus 
the overall condition of its cargo and ballast tanks is very good. The emission levels 
are kept way below the permitted limits and individual manuals have been prepared 
for both sludge and bilge networks along with the vessel's pollution certificates and 
the automated controls ensuring that the level of oil content in bilges is kept to an 
absolutely minimum level. It is due to the installation of a number of automated 
systems that personnel is kept at an absolute minimum. With generally no problems in 
the engine's operation the overall vessel's running costs are very low and the vessel 
leaves a respectable profit to its owner at every voyage. It meets all the geographic 
and structural criteria of the designated port of call. 
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Section D 
The maximum and minimum utility values are given from the following equations: 
Min. Utility = 
{[(Degree of belief assigned under grade very bad + unassigned degree of belief) x 
utility of grade very bad] + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade bad x utility of grade bad) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade average x utility of grade average) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade good x utility of grade good) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade very good x utility of grade very good) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade excellent x utility of grade excellent)). 
The maximum utility is given as follows: 
Max. Utility = 
{[(Degree of belief assigned under grade very bad x utility of grade very bad) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade bad x utility of grade bad) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade average x utility of grade average) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade good x utility of grade good) + 
(Degree of belief assigned under grade very good x utility of grade very good) + 
[(Degree of belief assigned under grade excellent + unassigned degree of belief) x 
utility of grade excellent]). 
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Appendix IV 
Structured interview on organizational maturity of self assessment 
Section A 
In order to derive the assessment grades for the first, second, third and fourth level 
criteria a structured interview has been presented to the director of Interunity 
Management Corporation, a company managing LPG vessels bound to operate within 
very strict safety levels. The same set of questions have been presented to a safety and 
quality surveyor from Bureau Veritas as well as to the owner of Safetec 
Developments, a newly built company operating in the area of marine and port safety 
in Greece. All three interviewees had a briefing from the author of this thesis 
concerning the six-box Weisbord model and the factors it incorporates, as it was 
necessary for the construction of main criteria and their subsequent level of criteria. 
The questions used for the structured interview were as follows: 
1. If you would like to assess the level of maturity of a company dealing with 
marine and port safety issues, how many describing variables would you use 
in order to describe it accurately and what would these linguistic variables be? 
2. Having discussed the basic factors used in Weisbord's six-box model and 
leaving leadership aside, what kind of short descriptions would you use for the 
rest of them if you were trying to associate them with the operation of a 
company dealing with marine and port safety issues? 
3. Having defined the description for each of the remaining factors of 
Weisbord's six-box model, how many assessment grades would you think 
would be appropriate to be used for each one of the discussed descriptions and 
what would these be? 
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4. The described factors from Weisbord's six-box model are a bit generic in their 
form as they stand. Trying to focus into more specific areas contained in each 
factor separately, what would you think that these specific areas would be? 
How far would you consider that an analysis of factors should proceed in 
terms of subsequent levels of expanding detail, in order to reach a stage where 
we can claim that each factor is thoroughly examined? 
5. Again, after having identified the depth of analysis in terms of describing 
variables, how many and what kind of assessment grades would you think that 
each describing variable would need in order to be defined accurately? 
Section B 
This section is used to give a description of the 3rd and 4th level criteria along with an 
explanation of what do the respective assessment grades mean in 2nd and 3"' level 
criteria. 
As far as the 2 °d level of criteria is concerned the assessment grades are explained as 
follows: 
Safety Data, Information Very little Little Average Enough More 
and Knowledge than 
enough 
Very little: The company uses less than minimal if not at all historical statistical data 
relevant to a case examined. It is very unlikely to do any research in failure databases 
or other places that may contain statistical data. 
Little: The company uses only the minimal of statistical data relevant to the case 
examined. Research is only in terms of a couple of major incidents relevant to the 
case examined. 
Average: The company uses statistical data from only a few major past cases well 
renowned for their statistical results. Research is only to the level of outcome reports 
from these major cases. 
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Enough: The company has a well documented file containing data from major and 
minor incidents relevant to the case examined. It will have done research on a regular 
basis to make sure that the majority of similar incidents are documented and verified 
from reputable sources. It will use the data acquired in the process of risk estimation. 
More than enough: The company keeps a monthly record of all major, minor and near 
misses that have been documented in any way. It keeps log data going several years 
back thus been able to produce trend lines for a case examined. The level of 
uncertainty is greatly reduced due to a wealth of statistical data. 
Innovation & Research Very Basic Normal Advanced Excellent 
basic 
Very basic: The company has not appointed anyone for dealing with research and 
development issues. Complex cases cannot be dealt appropriately, thus loosing time 
and money. 
Basic: The company does not have anyone appointed for dealing with research and 
development issues. It uses personnel based on recent relevant past experience or first 
degree relevant to the basics of safety. 
Normal: The company filters its employees and appoints a couple of persons, usually 
those with the greater experience to tackle the complex issues raised. The educational 
levels of employees go slightly beyond the first degree. 
Advanced: There is a small group of persons specialized in specific areas working 
together in order to resolve complex issues. All of them have degrees in Masters level 
any their leader usually holds a PhD in the safety area that the company is dealing 
with. 
Excellent: The company has a dedicated R&D department parted from personnel at 
PhD level. Usually, it co-operates with universities and other scientific and academic 
sources to ensure that all complex issues are dealt woth high standards of knowledge. 
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Management and H. R I Very bad I Bad I Average I Good I Very good 
Very bad: The company has no standards on selecting employees nor does it provide a 
defined role for each employee within the company. The company faces great 
problems in resolving problems of personnel. 
Bad: The company has indifferent standards in the selection process of its employees. 
There is a basic hierarchy structure which cannot be followed due to insufficient 
managerial knowledge. Problems are dealt and resolved with a lot of delays. 
Average: The company has some selection standards mainly based on past experience 
of its employees. There is an appointed human resources manager who operates on his 
own trying to deal with personnel problems. 
Good: The company has set specific standards to be met by its personnel according to 
the position in question. There is a human resources department trying to resolve any 
issues raised from personnel. 
Very good: The company filters all personnel trying to identify the best person based 
on academic qualifications and past experience for each individual position. There is a 
structured hierarchy as to the way that problems are handled and a dedicated 
department well organized with processes and appointed personnel trying to resolve 
problems in the fastest possible manner. 
Measurement and Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Benchmarking 
Very bad: The company does not have any intention to assess its performance in the 
marine and port safety field either on its own or compared with a better company. 
Bad: The company does not have any way to measure its own performance and 
always seems to lack behind as it tries to compare itself in terms of clients with 
leading companies in the area. 
Average: The company struggles to assess its own performance using very simplistic 
models based for example on annual revenue but is aware of its status compared to 
similar or better companies. 
Good: The company has appointed a person dealing with internal quality issues trying 
to develop basic self assessment reports which are examined usually at the end of 
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each year. It has a solid knowledge as to where it stands compared with similar 
companies and a good view of the targets it needs to set to improve upon them. 
Very good: The company has a separate department dealing with internal quality 
issues. Analytic self assessment reports are received from each department and 
assessed at regular intervals through the year. The gaps are identified and work is 
done to improve upon them. The company stands as a benchmark for others to use. 
Safety Strategy and Reactive approach Stable approach Pro-active 
Planning Processes approach 
Reactive approach: The company cannot propose possible Biture scenarios and new 
hazards that may give rise to a specific situation as it only operates on granted 
evidence. 
Stable approach: The company maintains a stability between reactiveness and pro- 
activeness. It records the data after the occurrence of an incident trying to identify 
some key future scenarios which could give rise to similar consequences. It develops 
a list of highly possible future hazards leaving others without further examination. 
Pro-active approach: The company has a well recorded hazard list from past 
experience and due to high level of innovation and research it is enabled to identify 
different categories and future hazardous scenarios giving a better approach to future 
safety planning. 
The 3`' level criteria are as follows: 
o jjV 6jfkres Very loose ooseAs es ý` r des 1 r 
Org ffi dates 8 MY HER 
E ARLWbVhd Very poor Poo Average Good Very good 
and Further Training background background background background background 
Supply Management Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Design Management Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Application of Technical 
Standards 
Very loose Loose Normal Strict Very strict 
Self-Assessment Tools Very few A few Average Enough More than 
enough 
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Organisational Updates I Not very often I Often Regular 
Organisational updates: The company ensures to distribute to its employees 
documents concerning new rules, new methodologies and generally new tools that can 
assist in the improvement of overall personnel knowledge. 
Not very often: The company distributes updates to its personnel a couple of times per 
years. 
Often: The company distributes updates to its personnel on a 3-month period. 
Regular: There is a dedicated person who deals with updates and distributes them 
around the department on a monthly basis. 
Educational Very poor Poor Average Good Very good 
Background and background background background background background 
Further Training 
Educational background and further training: The company is assessed based on the 
educational level of its employees and the intention to further train them in order to 
improve their level of knowledge and thus improve the overall service quality 
provided by the company. 
Very poor background: The company has employees with no academic qualifications. 
It spends no amount of money to further train them. 
Poor background: The company has very few employees with first degree academic 
qualifications and aims in training only a small percentage of them. 
Average background: The company has the majority of its personnel with first degree 
academic qualifications and tries to train further those that demonstrate overall good 
performance. 
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Good background: The company has set very high standards in selecting its 
personnel. The majority of the personnel are educated to a Masters level and aims in 
training as many as costly possible on a yearly basis, 
Very good background: The company aims to the highest of educational standards at 
a PhD level and dedicates a significant capital to further train its employees with 
regular training updates within the year. 
Supply Management ý Very bad Bad ý Average ý Good Very good 
Supply management: The company ensures that all employees have the appropriate 
tools to maximize their potential in terms of the quality if service provided. 
Very bad: The company does not provide the employees with any tools such as 
laptops, cars or mobile phones. 
Bad: The company has provided only a few persons with items such as a laptop and 
those are mainly department managers. 
Average: The company has updated the information technology area within its 
premises giving no importance to external tools. 
Good: The company has latest technology tools which are distributed according to the 
needs of each department. The employees working far from the office premises are 
provided with laptops and mobiles phones. 
Very good: The company has taken great care in providing car, mobile phone, laptop 
and all necessary means for an employee to operate to the required standard either 
within or out of office premises. 
Design Management Very bad Bad Average Good Very good 
Design management: The company ensures that appropriate and revised plans are 
drawn at the design phases of implementation of a project so that no other 
modification will be required at the commission or operation phase of the same 
project. 
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Very bad: The company pays minor attention to the design process leaving gaps and 
problems that will be encountered at further stages. 
Bad: The company pays attention to the degree that only the vital systems of a project 
work properly leaving the majority of sub-systems with a simple check over. 
Average: The company tries up to a point to make sure it has covered all major 
possible problems no matter if it is a major or a minor system. It is mainly due to lack 
of expertise that omissions are found at a later stage. 
Good: The company has an appropriate department dealing only with the design 
stage. All systems are treated with equal importance trying to avoid as many problems 
at a later stage as possible. 
Very good: The dedicated design department operates on a pro-active approach 
during the design stage considering and eliminating as many as possible of the 
problems that may be encountered at a later stage, 
Application of Technical Very loose Loose Normal Strict Very 
Standards strict 
Application of technical standards: The company ensures that all research and 
application is within the certified technical standards recommended by either the 
European Union or any other governmental organizations. 
Very loose: The company does not care about any of the standards imposed thus 
creating non certifiable projects in the majority of cases. 
Loose: The company only considers the absolute necessary standards than need to be 
followed: 
Normal: The company maintains a balance of the standards that need to be followed. 
It applies the significant leaving space for free movement in several cases. 
Strict: The company produces results within the strict limits defined by the required 
standards leaving very few cases for deviation from them. 
Very strict: The company follows the law letter by letter in all cases making no 
exceptions in any project. All standards are met and the work produced is certified by 
the respective governmental organization. 
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Self-Assessment Tools Very few A few Average Enough More 
than 
enough 
Self-assessment tools: The methods and processes utilized to assess its own 
performance against benchmarked companies. 
Very few: The company's self assessment tools are limited to one or two mainly 
based on annual income and expenses. 
A few: The company's self assessment tools are limited on revenue and the annual 
report given by the board of directors or general manager. 
Average: The company's self assessment tools contain simple assessment reports 
made from internal personnel, mainly department managers trying to assess on very 
simple criteria such as overtime the quality of employees. 
Enough: The company has developed numerous forms covering each department 
which are then passed to the quality department where gaps and problems are 
identified and improved upon. 
More than enough: The company has developed methodologies measuring its 
department's performance and then combined to give the overall performance. 
Problems and gaps are identified no matter how important or insignificant they are 
and the managerial directive is continuous improvement of quality and services. 
Port Security Measures Very loose Loose Normal Strict Very 
strict 
Port security measures: The strategy and measures required to ensure adequate safety 
levels within a port environment. 
Very loose: Security measures are inadequate both for cargoes and for personnel. 
Loose: Security levels are operating to the absolute minimal. Typical checks only at 
main gate. 
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Normal: The port is surrounded by protective wall. Regular checks at the main gate, 
lighting installations at loading and unloading docks. 
Strict: The port is surrounded by a protective wall. Regular checks at the main gate, 
lighting installations at loading, unloading and stacking docks. Regular patrols from 
security officers. Close circuit television (CCTV) installed to monitor the movements 
within the port premises. 
Very strict: The port is monitored and checked 24 hours a day. Regular patrols at 
short periods of time in order to monitor movements from close range. CCTV is 
installed to cover all the ports areas and 24 hour security officers recording any 
unusual movements. 
Independent Not very often Often Regular 
Comparison Sources 
Independent comparison sources: The company assigns to 3'd parties to assess their 
performance either as a stand alone company or compared to other companies and 
produce a ranking report stating the strengths and weaknesses that need to be 
improved upon. 
Not very often: The company uses a 3'' party to asses its performance compared to 
other similar or leading companies once every 10 years. 
Often: The company uses a 3rd party to assess its performance compared to other 
similar or leading companies once every 3 years. 
Regular: The company uses a aid party to assess its performance compared to other 
similar or leading companies once every 1 year. 
In a similar sense and based on the description of the 3'a level criteria the 4th level 
criteria are described and assessed. 
Section C 
This section contains a brief description on the profile of each one of the four Greek 
safety oriented companies examined in the test case. It is due to reasons of anonymity 
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that the real names of the companies are not given, as the assessment data for those 
companies was kindly provided by Bureau Veritas, which maintains a very high lcvcl 
of self assessment and benchmark levels. 
Company 1: This company is in a transitional period. It has invested in the quality of 
its personnel in terms of past experience and academic qualifications, The last few 
years it has turned from a stable strategy tending to become reactive sometimes to a 
more pro-active strategic approach for a variety of cases. Due to the high level of 
qualifications of personnel and due to the restructuring of human resources company 
1 is at a constantly increasing path. Self assessment tools and benehmarking against 
companies like company 4, assisted company 1 in identifying gaps and problems and 
try to improve them. 
Company 2: This company uses the managerial directive of pro-activeness wherever 
possible. It has proper benchmarking tools and invests in the quality of employees 
specially when it comes to areas like innovation and strategy, It lacks a bit to the 
human resources organizations because even though it is a safety oriented company it 
pays more attention to the creation of software related software rather than the 
implementation of safety methodologies themselves. 
Company 3: This company does not quite meet the criteria required to lead the area of 
marine and port safety. It retains an average quality level of employees giving little 
attention to matters of innovation and identification of possible future scenarios for 
various cases. It tends to follow a reactive path when it comes to the company's 
strategy in assessing hazardous situations, something that questions the validity of the 
outcomes of the projects it undertakes. 
Company 4: This company utilizes the excellent internal organizational structure it 
has developed in terms of human resources. It maintains a very high level of quality 
of employees in terms of qualifications. It has very good self awareness compared to 
the other 3 companies and by keeping stability between reactive and pro-active 
approach invests in the identification of possible future scenarios based on the case 
examined. 
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Appendix V 
Publications being part of the work of this thesis 
The following publications have been created as part of this thesis: 
Maistralis E., Wang J., Bonsall S., "Safety issues and procedures concerning cargo 
handling of oil tankers", Journal of UK Safety and Reliability Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
2003,39-46 (ISSN: 0961-7353). 
Maistralis E., Wang J., "A subjective methodology for self assessment of 
organizations", Proceeding of the 5th IMA International Conference on Industrial 
Maintenance and Reliability (MIMAR, 2004), Salford, 5-7 April 2004. 
Wang J., Maistralis E., Sii H. S., Kim S. W., Wong C., Kwon Y. S., Jung G. M., 
"Some control engineering techniques and their application to risk modelling and 
decision making", Automation and Computer Science Conference in UK 2001 
(CACSCUK'2001), 22 September 2001, University of Nottingham, England 255-260 
(ISBN: 0 9533890 2 3). 
Wang J., Sii H. S., Yang J. B., Pillay A., Yu D., Liu J., Maistralis E, Saajedi A., "Usc 
of advanced in technology in marine risk assessment", Risk Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4, 
2004,1011-1033 (ISSN: 0272-4332). 
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